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Abstract 
The promotion of access to finance is considered as a top priority agenda in many 
countries. Finding the related and strong factors to enhance financial inclusion is 
therefore becoming crucial. Despite many studies on the factors associated with  
financial inclusion, the role of financial system has not been well explored. Leyshon 
& Thrift (1995) shed new lights on this issue by stating that ―Although the criteria for 
exclusion may vary over time, the financial system has an inherent tendency to 
discriminate against poor and disadvantaged groups‖. 
 
This thesis, therefore investigates the role of financial system and other determinants 
in shaping financial inclusion, based on institutional theory. The design of the study 
takes account two lacunae in our current understanding of this topic.  
 
Firstly, despite the fact that the financial inclusion literature is voluminous, it is 
perhaps surprising that relatively little research has been carried out on the effect of 
Islamic finance on financial inclusion, given its possible significant role as one of the 
contributing factors that creating and shaping financial inclusion. Empirically testing 
for the effect of Islamic financial sector (as proxied by Islamic banking presence) is 
challenging because the data on Islamic banking are imperfect since there is no single 
accepted definition of an Islamic bank nor is there a single and comprehensive 
database on it. To this juncture, our understanding in this field remains incomplete.   
 
Secondly, besides the role of financial system, empirical evidence on the other 
financial inclusion determinants is relatively lacking and far from conclusive. 
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Notably, a direct or indirect relationships and significance levels are commonly 
observed. Under the notion of institutional theory, the institutional settings are 
heterogeneous, and therefore affect the institutional differences and in turn increased 
structure of the financial inclusion level. 
 
In response to these two major issues, this study employs empirical research methods, 
namely cross-sectional pooled regression, panel data regression, and quantile 
regression to analyze a set of samples consisting of 80 countries, drawn from the 
Financial Access Survey (FAS, 2011) over the years 2007 through 2011. The 
financial inclusion levels are estimated using the cumulative index of financial 
inclusion (CIFI) which is constructed based on Sarma (2008, 2010) method while the 
Islamic banking presence variables (i.e., the number, size and profitability of Islamic 
banks) are used to proxy for the countries‘ type of financial system. 
 
Although not largely prevalent, using the Islamic banking presence as the proxy for 
Islamic financial sector has found some empirical support on its relationship with the 
incidence of financial inclusion. To a certain extent, this thesis presents fresh 
empirical evidence and renewed interpretation of the role of institutional settings in 
shaping financial inclusion. 
  
As far as the institutional theory is concerned, the use of quantile regression method 
in the present study represents a novel approach in further investigating the effects of 
the institutional settings on the levels of financial inclusion. The results reveal that the 
determinants of financial inclusion, particularly the institutional settings, are 
heterogeneous across the whole distribution of countries, consistent with the notion of 
vi 
 
heterogeneity as purported by Zucker (1987) and further extend the view that 
heterogeneity only evidenced within the organizational level. The findings 
demonstrate twofold; firstly, institutional settings are shaped and designed to be 
consistent with financial inclusion enhancement for both at lower and higher level of 
financial inclusion. Secondly, the quantile regression does not only further supports 
financial inclusion is institutionally-driven, but more importantly offers renewed 
insights on the heterogeneity aspect of the institutional theory.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
In 1980s, retail financial markets grown and more people have the ability to access to 
a broader range of financial products. In general, a considerable number of people 
have benefited from these developments especially those who enjoy stable income. 
On the other hand, there are minority of groups that lack even the most basic of 
financial products, for instance a current account or insurance. There is also rising 
concern that this group of people is the most underserved market in society and has 
limited participation in financial services which adding to the more general issue of 
social exclusion (Kempson & Whyley, 1999).  Since it is a problem of financial as 
well as social, financial exclusion has emerged as a major concern in both the US and 
the Europe (Zhijun, 2007). 
 
It is clear that financial inclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon. In order to get 
an idea of how bad financial exclusion (or how good financial inclusion) is in a 
particular country, measurement of financial inclusion is introduced in 2007 (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2007). The study measures banking sector 
outreach (i.e., demographic and geographic banking penetration as well as 
information on credit and deposit accounts) and investigates its determinants. Later in 
2008, Sarma (2008) formulates an index of financial inclusion to provide an aggregate 
picture of banking activities using outreach and usage dimensions, which followed by 
other the studies to include other dimensions such as ease and cost (Arora, 2010; 
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Gupte, Venkataramani, & Gupta, 2012). However, a single measurement of financial 
inclusion that can be applied across countries is simply does not exist. Besides limited 
data on the use of basic financial services by households and firms (Claessens, 2006), 
this constraint is also due to the continuous modifications that are being made to 
provide a more comprehensive measure of financial inclusion. Admittedly, the index 
of financial inclusion is important as a tool to investigate factors associated with 
financial inclusion. 
 
With regard to prior discussion and analysis concerning causes of financial exclusion, 
among others, Leyshon & Thrift (1995) note that ―although the criteria for exclusion 
may vary over time, the financial system has an inherent tendency to discriminate 
against poor and disadvantaged groups‖ (p.314). In the similar vein, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Beck, & Honohan (2008, p.2) mention that financial sector reforms that promote 
inclusive access to financial services is still at the core of the development agenda. 
Taking from the institutional perspective, it is very much true that the financial 
system, which is part of  the institutional settings, could influence financial inclusion. 
Institutional creation and diffusion happen, where top-down processes allow higher 
level structures to shape the structure and action of lower levels, while bottom-up 
processes shape, reproduce and change the context within, in which they operate 
(Scott, 2008, p. 190). In other words, an institution found at one level of analysis often 
affects behaviour on the level below (Bjorck, 2004), where macro structures in society 
are bridged by organizational fields to micro structures in organizations or even 
―down‖ to the individual actor level (Svejvig, 2009).  
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Given the unprecedented growth of Islamic banking and fnance sector since the last 
decade, it is much interesting to know how Islamic and conventional-based financial 
system interact with financial inclusion. To some extent, comparing between Islamic 
and conventional financial systems is not something new. There are voluminous of 
literature differentiating the two systems on different areas (e.g.,  Samad, 2004; Olson 
& Zoubi, 2008; Ariss, 2010; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). However, 
these studies are focusing more on the firm-level analysis, i.e., comparisons are made 
between particular Islamic and conventional financial institutions per se [e.g., banks 
(see for examples  Rashwan, 2012; Beck et al., 2013; Johnes, Izzeldin, & Pappas, 
2014), insurance providers (see for examples Mushtaq Hussain & Tisman Pasha, 
2011; Abdou, Ali, & Lister, 2014; Tahira & Arshad, 2014) and unit trusts (see for 
example Saad, Majid, Kassim, Hamid, & Yusof, 2010)]. Some studies even employed 
cross-country analysis (see for examples  Yudistira, 2004; Rashwan, 2012; Beck et 
al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014) but the basis of the comparison is similar, i.e., to explain 
on what aspects of the Islamic banks are different from  their counterparts.  
 
In analyzing the role of Islamic-based financial system on financial inclusion, it is 
essential to recap the functions of Islamic finance per se in inclusive financial system. 
As stated in many studies pertaining to the role of Islamic finance in promoting 
financial inclusion (e.g., Mirakhor & Iqbal, 2012; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu, 
2012: El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013; MIFC, 2015), Islamic finance could contribute to 
greater inclusion in two essential ways, namely promoting risk-sharing contracts that 
provide a viable alternative to conventional debt-based financing, and the other 
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through specific instruments of redistribution of the wealth (e.g., through zakat
1
, 
waqaf
2
, sadaqah
3
, etc) among the society. Among all the channels, Islamic banks are 
considered as the powerful tools to achieve maqasid al-shariah
4
 in which elements of 
emancipation and empowerment are embedded hence improving financial inclusion.  
 
The next milestone in the Islamic finance industry, particularly in Islamic banking 
operation, is therefore to expand its products and services within this ambit of 
maqasid al-shariah. However, to what extent financial inclusion has improved as a 
result of Islamic banking operation is an interesting empirical question.  
 
Using information from 209 banks in 62 countries, prior study on the determinants of 
financial inclusion by Beck et al., (2008)  shows that the effectiveness of creditor 
rights, contract enforcement mechanisms, and credit information systems are weakly 
correlated with barriers to bank access. On the other hand, they signify strong 
associations between barriers and measures of restrictions on bank activities and 
entry, bank disclosure practices and media freedom, as well as development of 
physical infrastructure. Specifically, barriers are higher in countries where there are 
                                              
1
 Zakat, or almsgiving, is one of the five pillars of Islam, along with prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and 
belief in Allah and His Messenger. The literal meaning of Zakat is ‗to cleanse‘ or ‗purification‘. In the 
Islamic faith, Zakat means purifying your wealth for the will of Allah SWT; to acknowledge that 
everything we own belongs to Allah SWT and to work towards the betterment of the Muslim Ummah. 
According to Islamic regulations, Zakat is 2.5% of one year‘s total cumulative wealth. This amount is 
then distributed to the poor. 
2
 Literally waqf means to stop, contain, or to preserve.  In shari‘ah, a Waqf is a voluntary, permanent, 
irrevocable dedication of a portion of ones wealth – in cash or kind- to Allah.  Once a waqf, it never 
gets gifted, inherited, or sold.  It belongs to Allah and the corpus of the waqf always remains 
intact.  The benefit of the waqf may be utilized for shari‘ah complient purpose. 
3
 In Islamic terminology, the word Sadaqah means to voluntarily give charity out of the goodness of 
one‘s heart. This is not an Islamic obligation, but rather a practice conducted to help those in need or 
the deprived. This act goes to show the strength of the believer‘s faith and increases it further.  
4
 Maqaṣid (singular: maqṣid) refers to the goals and purposes of the Shariah (i.e., the Islamic Law) 
either generally (i.e. al-maqaṣid al-ʿammah), or in reference to its particular themes and subjects (al-
maqaṣid al-khaṣṣah). Three other Arabic words that occur in the relevant literature of uṣul al-fiqh and 
convey similar meanings to maqaṣid are ḥikmah (wisdom), ʿillah (effective cause/ratio legis), and 
maṣlaḥah (interest, benefit) respectively. For details, refer Kamali (2011). Further discussion on 
maqasid al-shariah are given in section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and in section 9.3 in Chapter 9.   
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more stringent restrictions on bank activities and entry (i.e., based on bank regulatory 
on bank activities and entry), less disclosure and media freedom (i.e., less of 
transparency), and poorly developed physical infrastructure. However, the link is not 
much related to credit services. The study also reports that there is no consistent 
relationship between market structure (i.e., bank concentration, government-owned 
banks and foreign-owned banks) and credit barriers.  
 
As ―the great challenge before us is, to address the constraints that exclude people 
from full participation in the financial sector‖ (Annan, 2003)5 and ―the agenda on 
access to finance is still unfinished‖ (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2008), this research 
therefore, aims at exploring these issues in detail. 
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
Within the framework of institutional theory, this research is aimed to explore and 
analyse the role of financial system as an institutional setting on financial inclusion. In 
addition, it aims to further investigate the other factors especially the institutional 
settings in driving financial inclusion. As the aim suggests, the research will unveil 
the impact of Islamic-based financial system in particular, as well as the other 
pertinent factors on inclusive financial system. However, in investigating the 
influence of Islamic finance on financial access, it has to be understood that there are 
specific and unique channels  that Islam already outlined in taking care of its human 
well-being, i.e., through; firstly risk-sharing or asset-linked financing through banking 
and/or non-banking financial institutions and secondly wealth distribution (for 
example through zakat, waqaf and sadaqah). With the exponential growth of Islamic 
                                              
5Comments made on the ―International Year of Microfinance‖ on 29th December 2003. 
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banking in the past few years, this sector is expected and hoped to promote greater 
financial inclusion as compared to the other channels since Islamic banking is claimed 
as a powerful tool in realization of maqasid al-shariah. It is on this premise that the 
research will need to be assessed. 
 
In order to fulfil the identified aims, the following objectives are developed: 
1. Exploring the type of financial system which has positive association with 
financial inclusion.  
2. Further investigating the relationship of other determinants, especially the 
institutional settings and financial inclusion. 
 
In explaining the relationship between financial inclusion and financial system, the 
classification of financial system based on Islamic and conventional is far from 
conclusive. Apart from that, while the importance of broader access is becoming 
crucial in addressing financial inclusion, there is relatively lacking, inconclusive and 
mixed evidence on the determinants to financial inclusion. There are a few reasons 
that might explain the limitations.  Firstly, bearing in mind that the issue of financial 
inclusion is a complex issue in nature
6
, there could be just simply too many issues that 
need to be studied. This is commonly referred to as ‗an unfinished agenda‘ (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008).  Secondly, it could be due to limited data on access to 
financial services and therefore a proper investigation of this issue is far from possible 
(Claessens, 2006; Beck et al., 2008; Sarma & Pais, 2011).  
 
                                              
6
There are many angles in the discussion of financial inclusion such as types of financial services 
involved (World Bank, 1995), financial services providers who responsible to it, different factors from 
different dimensions associated to it (demand, supply and economic factors), different perspectives of 
the study (micro and macro) and so on so forth. 
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Therefore, the following pertinent questions are posed to achieve the overall aims and 
objectives: 
1. Does the Islamic financial sector (i.e., as proxied by the Islamic banking 
presence), has significant influence on financial inclusion?  
2. Are the empirical effects between Islamic financial sector and financial 
inclusion consistent with the theoretical presumption (i.e., Islamic banking is 
positively related with financial inclusion)? 
3. Do the financial inclusion determinants, especially the institutional settings 
that have been tested in prior studies remain significant in explaining factors 
associated with financial access?  
4. Are the financial inclusion determinants heterogeneous across the whole 
distribution of countries?  
1.3 Motivation and Rationale 
Financial exclusion is a complex problem and classic global phenomenon [see, for 
example, US- (Jacobson, 1995; Hogarth & O‘Donnell, 1999; Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & 
Moore, 2003). UK- (Budd & Campbell, 1998; Kempson et al., 2000; Hayton, 2001; 
Devlin, 2005). Scandinavia- (Hohnen, 2007). Canada- (J Buckland & Simpson, 2008). 
Australia- ( Chant Link and Associates, 2004; Howell & Wilson, 2005)]. It is very 
much synonym with the lack of access to formal finance. Over the years, a strand of 
institutional theory has been used to explain the situation  (e.g., North, 1990; Caskey, 
1997;  Barr & Sherraden, 2005). More specifically, Buckland (2012) suggests that 
financial exclusion is created and shaped by the  institutional processes and structures. 
However, Ostrom (2005) argues that understanding ‗institutions‘ is a serious 
endeavour given the dynamic and complexity of systems that embedded in an 
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institution.  Our understanding remains incomplete and usually not well specified in 
respect to what impede financial inclusion. Despite many studies on the factors 
associated with  financial exclusion,  the role of financial system has not been well 
explored. Leyshon & Thrift (1995) shed light on this issue by stating that ―Although 
the criteria for exclusion may vary over time, the financial system has an inherent 
tendency to discriminate against poor and disadvantaged groups‖ (p.314). Therefore, 
the present study revisits the institutional theory by investigating the role of financial 
system and other determinants of financial inclusion. 
 
The limited focus on the role of financial system in the financial inclusion literature 
may be partly explained by the diverse understanding and perception on the different 
approaches in classifying the type of financial system. For example, bank-based and 
market-based types of financial system are prominent in the economic development 
literature. Several studies, however, argue that classifying countries using bank-based 
or market-based is not a very fruitful way to distinguish financial systems (La Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Levine, 2002), not primarily important for policy-
making activities (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002) and, to a certain extent, is 
even out-dated (Veysov & Stolbov, 2012). Due to those critiques, La Porta, Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) classify a country‘s financial system based on legal origin 
(i.e.,  English, French, German and Scandinavian) since they argue that a country‘s 
legal system is a primary determinant of the effectiveness of its financial system. As 
far as the development and increase in the interest in Islamic finance are concerned, it 
is perhaps surprising that very little is known about the classification of financial 
system based on Islamic and conventional systems. 
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Understanding the determinants that promote financial inclusion is essential as stated 
by Annan (2003) ―the great challenge before us is, to address the constraints that 
exclude people from full participation in the financial sector‖. Given its important, it 
is perhaps not surprising that relatively many research has been carried out on this 
subject. Since the early 1990s, there are many studies on the factors associated with 
financial exclusion (see, for example, Kempson & Whyley, 1999; Collard, Kempson, 
& Whyley, 2001; Carbo, Gardener, & Molyneux, 2007). However, the discussions of 
the factors are rather normative than positive. Only since year 2007, empirical studies 
on the determinants of financial inclusion have been carried out (see, for example, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2007, 2008; Sarma & Pais, 2011; Ben 
Naceur, Barajas, & Massara, 2015) but such empirical studies are still lacking. 
Therefore, our understanding on the determinants of financial inclusion remains 
incomplete.  
 
The little empirical research on the determinants of financial inclusion may be 
partially explained by the issue of financial inclusion measurement. Empirically 
examining the determinants of financial inclusion is particularly challenging given 
uniform measure of financial inclusion across countries does not exist. Data constraint 
is the major problem in this issue (Claessens, 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Honohan, 2009). Building upon the work by Sarma (2008), other studies (e.g. Sarma, 
2010; Arora, 2010; Beck, Chakravarty & Pal, 2010; Prathap, 2011; Gupte, 
Venkataramani, & Gupta, 2012) developed the indices of financial inclusion. With 
these indices, significant progress has been made in understanding the determinants of 
financial inclusion (see, for example, Sarma & Pais, 2011and Prathap, 2011).  
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The heterogeneity aspect of the institutional theory has not been investigated by many 
researchers, particularly in respect to the determinants of financial inclusion. Drawing 
from earlier work on the institutional theory of organization by Tolbert (1985), who 
found that the features of organizations affect its maintenance and transmission, 
Zucker (1987) argues that institutional environment is heterogeneous, hence reflects 
the impact of institutional processes on the organization. She claims that homogeneity 
of environment decreases the structure of internal organization, which contradicts to 
the environment-as-institution approach. By putting forward this argument, Zucker 
(1987) also acknowledges studies that seem contradict to her claim (i.e., Tolbert, 
(1987) and Rowan, (1982)). With this regard, examination of heterogeneity in 
financial inclusion determinants is warranted.  
1.4 A Brief Research Methodology 
Empirical analysis is employed to explain the relationship between financial inclusion 
and both financial system as well as other factors. The analyses use pooled cross-
sectional, panel data and quantile regression methods. In the analyses, those 
determinants of financial inclusion are investigated assuming the institutional settings 
and other factors affect the level of financial inclusion. This enables the behaviour of 
the determinants to be clearly observed and provides evidence for comparison with 
earlier studies and subsequent analysis.  
1.5 Overview of the Research 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Subsequently, in Chapter 2, the thesis will 
elaborate more on financial inclusion/exclusion; its definitions, key aspects as well as 
the underlying theories. It also reviews literature on relationship between financial 
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inclusion and financial system within the institutional theory perspective. The chapter 
also explains the background of financial system by highlighting the Islamic financial 
system and the role of Islamic finance on financial inclusion. 
 
In Chapter 3, a detailed issue of financial inclusion measurement is discussed. 
Dimensions and indicators of financial inclusion as well as its computation are 
presented and discussed in greater detail. This chapter also highlights and discusses 
the determinants of financial inclusion. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe the research methods adopted in the present study. In 
particular, Chapter 4 describes the basic structure of the research design and the 
methodology used to conduct the study, including variable definitions and the data 
collection procedure. Chapters 5 and 6 are more specifically describing the 
construction of financial inclusion index and financial system classification 
procedures, respectively, without which this thesis could not be realised.  
 
In Chapter 5, computation of cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) is 
presented in detailed, including the methodology and variable definitions. The index 
is further strengthened by conducting index justification and validity. Results of CIFI 
is also presented and discussed using both descriptive and empirical approaches.  
 
In order to understand and to construct financial system variable, the classification of 
Islamic and conventional-based financial system is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The basis of the classification as well as the conceptual framework for Islamic-based 
financial system are outlined, followed by variable definition and data collection 
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procedure. This chapter also presents and discusses the results of Islamic banking 
presence indicators as suggested in the study.     
 
The results of the present study are presented in Chapters 7 and 8. The analysis is 
spread into two chapters given the nature of data analysis in the study. The former 
chapter reports the results of investigating the determinants of financial inclusion 
using cross-sectional and panel data regression while the results of examining the 
heterogeneity in the financial inclusion determinants are presented in the latter chapter 
using the quantile regression methods.  
 
More specifically, Chapter 7 presents the findings on financial inclusion determinants 
using descriptive statistics as well as univariate and multivariate analysis. The results 
of multivariate analysis are discussed in detail, both for the institutional settings 
variables (i.e., which include Islamic banking presence) as well as the other 
explanatory variables. Robustness checks and regression diagnostics are also 
conducted and presented in this chapter. Chapter 8 further presents and discusses the 
heterogeneity in the determinants of financial inclusion, also for both the institutional 
settings variables and the other explanatory variables. Likewise, robustness checks are 
also shown in this chapter.   
 
To end with, Chapter 9 provides an overall summary of the thesis, followed by the 
summary and conclusion on the research findings as well as implications of the study. 
The chapter also highlights the contribution to the knowledge and addresses 
limitations and delivers suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW I: FINANCIAL INCLUSION/EXCLUSION 
AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a thorough review of existing literature of financial 
inclusion/exclusion and financial system to provide the context for the present study. 
The next section presents a review of background of financial inclusion/exclusion. 
Using the framework of institutional theory, further discussion on financial inclusion 
and financial system is presented in section 2.3. Discussion on the background of 
Islamic and conventional types of financial system and the role of Islamic finance in 
financial inclusion are presented in section 2.4 and section 2.5, respectively. Finally, 
section 2.6 summarises the chapter. 
2.2 Background of Financial Inclusion/Exclusion 
In 1980s, retail financial markets grown and more people have the ability to access to 
a broader range of financial products. Kempson (1994) reports that less than half of 
households in UK had a current account in the mid-1970s. Similarly, about a quarter 
of households have access to credit facilities in the early 1970s – a figure that had 
increased to seven out of ten in the period of two decades (Berthoud  & Kempson, 
1992). Kempson & Whyley (1999) identify two key reasons that influenced these 
developments: deregulation of the financial services sector and developments in the 
application of information technology for risk assessment. 
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In general, a considerable number of people have benefited from these developments 
especially those who enjoy stable income. On the other hand, there are minority of 
groups that lack even the most basic of financial products, for instance a current 
account or insurance. There is also rising concern that this group of people is the most 
underserved market in society and has limited participation in financial services 
which adding to the more general issue of social exclusion (Kempson & Whyley, 
1999).  Since it is a problem of financial as well as social, financial exclusion has 
emerged as a major concern in both the US and the Europe (Zhijun, 2007). 
 
The World Bank has differentiated between those who are financially served, 
formally included and financially excluded as shown in the following Figure 2.1 
(World Bank, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.1 The access strand: financial access in the institutional dimension 
from formal to informal provider 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2005, p. 4) 
 
The ‘formally served’ is those who have access to financial services from a bank 
and/or other formal providers (i,e., all other legal entities licensed to provide financial 
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services). The ‗financially served’ includes those who formally served as well as 
people who use informal providers (i.e., other organized providers of financial 
services that are not registered as financial intermediaries and not subject to any 
oversight). In contrast, the term ‗financially excluded‘ is used to illustrate individuals 
who have no access at all (World Bank, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, in their review of the issue, Leyshon & Thrift (1993) identify that the 
term financial exclusion was first used in 1993 by geographers who were concerned 
about limited physical access to banking services as a result of bank branch closures. 
During 1990s there was also a growing body of research relating to difficulties faced 
by some sections of societies in gaining access to conventional financial system.  
 
It is worth noting that, the debate on financial exclusion has shifted from the 
geographical access aspect to include factors contributing to the problem (Hogarth & 
O‘Donnell, 1999; Kempson, 2000). In addition, the European Commission has 
outlined the types of exclusion based on the financial services that are considered 
important and should be accessed by all in a society. These include banking, saving, 
credit and insurance exclusion (European Commission, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, with approximately 2.5 billion people still excluded from financial 
services [Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2009], this field of research 
has attracted many researchers around the world (see, for example, US- (Jacobson, 
1995; Caskey, 1997; Hogarth & O‘Donnell, 1999; Lee, 2002; Aizcorbe, Kennickell, 
& Moore, 2003). UK- (Budd & Campbell, 1998; Whyley, McCormick, & Kempson, 
1998; Kempson & Whyley, 1998; Rowlingson, Whyley, & Warren, 1999; Kempson 
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et al., 2000; Hayton, 2001; Devlin, 2005). Scandinavia- (Hohnen, 2007). Canada- (J 
Buckland & Simpson, 2008). Australia- ( Chant Link and Associates, 2004; Howell & 
Wilson, 2005). Despite that, Carbo, Gardener, & Molyneux (2007) conclude that 
many areas of financial exclusion in the developed world have similarities to those in 
the developing world. The discussions on financial exclusion are now shifting to 
promote financial inclusion (see for example Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez 
Peria, 2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2007; Sarma & Pais, 2011). 
 
With regard to prior discussion and analysis concerning causes of financial exclusion, 
among others, Leyshon & Thrift (1995) note that ―although the criteria for exclusion 
may vary over time, the financial system has an inherent tendency to discriminate 
against poor and disadvantaged groups‖ (p.314). In the similar vein, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Beck, & Honohan (2008, p.2) mention that financial sector reforms that promote 
inclusive access to financial services are still at the core of the development agenda. 
This could give an indication of the role of financial system in driving financial 
inclusion. However, little effort has been made to explore the outcome.  
2.2.1 The context of definition 
Many attempts have been made by previous studies to define both, financial exclusion 
as well as financial inclusion. As the phrase of ‗financial exclusion‘ is quoted earlier 
as compared to ‗financial inclusion‘, the definitions of the two phrases are presented 
in this study. 
 
Providing a precise definition of financial exclusion is somewhat problematic (Devlin, 
2005). The first definition of financial exclusion was given by Leyshon & Thrift 
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(1995). They referred financial exclusion as ―those processes that serve to prevent 
certain social groups and individuals from gaining access to the financial system‖ 
(1995, p. 314). The authors explain this by the fact that some financial institutions are 
reluctant to move into certain geographical areas where groups of people with limited 
incomes and certain disadvantaged social groups live. Hence, it is primarily problems 
of physical (i.e., geographical access), which are discussed.  The same problem of 
physical access also shared by Panigyrakis, Theodoridis, & Veloutsou (2002, p.55) 
when they study financial exclusion in isolated Greek Islands and they termed 
financial exclusion as ‗‗inability of some financial services segments to access 
financial services in an appropriate form.‘‘   
 
In addition, Kempson & Whyley (1999) highlight that there are other causes 
exacerbate financial exclusion rather than merely physical access, namely access 
exclusion, condition exclusion, price exclusion, marketing exclusion and self-
exclusion. These new factors are supported and further elaborated by Devlin (2005). 
Hence six factors of access limitations are added to the geographical exclusion put 
forward by Leyshon & Thrift (1995). The six factors are explained as follows:  
i. Access exclusion: a restriction of access to financial services, which might be 
rooted by unfavourable risk assessments.  
ii. Condition exclusion: some individuals cannot benefit from financial services 
due to conditions attached to the offered product/services.  
iii. Price exclusion: the current price offered by the financial provider is not 
affordable for certain individuals.  
iv. Marketing exclusion: people who are excluded from the financial provider‘s 
target market and sales.  
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v. Self-exclusion: people may hesitate applying for a financial product because 
they believe they would be refused.  
vi. Resource exclusion: people may not have the discretionary income to save for 
the future. 
 
By putting the five causes of access difficulties, Kempson and Whyley (1999) broadly 
define financial exclusion as simply as ―constrained access to the mainstream 
financial services‖. As for Devlin (2005), by adding another cause of access 
difficulties (i.e., resource exclusion), he postulates financial exclusion as ―it is all 
about those with few or no financial services holding‖. 
 
Jointly, these different aspects of financial exclusion represent a complex set of 
constraints to accessing and using mainstream financial services for many people with 
limited incomes (Kempson, Whyley, Caskey, & Collard, 2000b). This implies that, 
studying financial exclusion should take into account both of difficulties; access and 
use of financial services. In addition, a recent report on financial exclusion in 
Australia by Chant Link and Associates (2004) defined financial exclusion as ―the 
lack of access by certain consumers to appropriate low cost, fair and safe financial 
products and services from mainstream providers‖ (p. 61). 
 
Taking into consideration all the attributes of financial exclusion, the European 
Commission came out with more comprehensive definition of financial exclusion as 
follows: 
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 ―A process whereby people encounter difficulties accessing and/or using financial 
services and products in the mainstream market that are appropriate to their needs 
and enable them to lead a normal social life in the society in which they belong‖ 
(European Commission, 2008, p.9). 
 
The European Commission (2008) further stated that the constraints in accessing 
and/or using financial services are caused by:  
i. the features of the products/services offered and the how they are put up for 
sale (supply side), and 
ii. the situation and the financial capacity of the customer (demand side). 
 
Alternatively, there have been financial inclusion definitions mentioned in the 
literature, for instance ―access to financial services‖, ―responsible and sustainable 
provision of financial services‖, ―affordable delivery to disadvantaged and low-
income segments of society‖ and ―broad range of services of high quality, with 
attention to consumer protection‖. Sarma (2008) defines financial inclusion as ―a 
process that ensures the ease of access, availability and usage of the formal financial 
system for all members of an economy‖. This definition highlights several dimensions 
of financial inclusion, namely accessibility, availability and usage of the financial 
system. In the latest study, Ben Naceur, Barajas, & Massara (2015) describe financial 
inclusion as ―the share of the population who use financial services‖, which according 
to them, this definition allows for measurement on a comparable basis across 
countries.  
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2.2.2 Key aspects in financial inclusion 
For further understanding on this complex issue, several institutions [e.g., the World 
Bank, Financial Services Authority (FSA) and European Commission] and 
researchers (e.g., Kempson & Whyley, 1999; Rowlingson, Whyley, & Warren, 1999; 
Chant Link and Associates, 2004) have provided some key aspects which need to be 
highlighted in studying this issue. These include: 
i. Which financial services and institutions are involved?, 
ii. Is there any difference between access to financial services and use of them?, 
iii. Are there levels of financial exclusion and, if so, how to express these?, and 
iv. What is the unit of analysis: the individual, the family, the household, the 
financial institution and financial system 
v. Which channel is better in tackling financial exclusion? 
 
The following sub sections discuss the aspects in details. 
 
2.2.2.1  Types of financial services  
Previous studies on financial inclusion are more concentrating on savings and credits 
(see, for example Strahan, 1999; Beck & Torre, 2007; Qian & Strahan, 2007; 
Honohan & King, 2009; Ghosh, 2012). Only a few discuss on the other financial 
services namely banking transactions and insurance (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-kunt, & 
Martinez Peria, 2006; Prathap, 2011). In considering which financial services 
considered essential, the World Bank (2005) has outlined four main types of services 
that individuals in society should have access, namely, banking transactions, savings, 
credit, as well as insurance. These four key areas are confirmed and further explained 
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by the work carried out by FSA (2000) and European Commission (2008). Each of 
the exclusion are now listed and briefed as follows: 
 
i. Banking exclusion; transactions 
There is a considerable number of literature on the issue of access to banking from 
different perspectives including individuals, households, communities and financial 
service providers (see, for example Pollard, 1996; Kempson & Whyley, 1999; 
Wallace & Quilgars, 2005). 
 
In the UK, is is found that the top priority products for the financially excluded is an 
account to receive income and make payments, i.e., current account (Kempson and 
Whyley, 1999). For example, at the individual level, a survey by UK‗s Family 
Resource Survey (FRS) reveals that 23% of individuals are lacking of a current 
account. This somewhat consistent with surveys by Association for Payment Clearing 
Services (APACS) and ONS Omnibus which found that about 15% of individuals is 
without a current account (Kempson & Whyley, 1998; Office of Fair Trading, 1999).  
 
In categorising the degree of ‗financially included‘, Kempson, Atkinson, & Pilley 
(2004),  Corr ( 2006) and Anderloni & Carluccio (2007) have considered three 
degrees of inclusion, namely, ‗unbanked‘, ‗marginally‘ banked and ‗fully banked‘. 
‗Unbanked‘ are generally people with no bank at all. ‗Marginally‘ banked are people 
with a deposit account that has no electronic payment facilities and no payment card 
or cheque book. It can also be people who do have these facilities but make little or no 
use of them. In contrast, ‗fully banked‘ are people that have access to a wide range of 
transaction banking services that are appropriate to their needs and socio-economic 
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status. In addition, the term ―unbanked‖ is not widely used outside the US and UK. 
―Vulnerable‖ consumers have been a term used in Australia (Chant Link and 
Associates, 2004).  
 
ii. Savings exclusion 
In general, many people perceived that savings are essential in providing security (i.e., 
physical and psychological), acting as a safety net in the face of unanticipated events 
as well as providing cushion for one‘s budget during financial constraint. However, 
several studies suggest that relatively one third of people are without any formal 
savings. For example, in UK, a Gallup poll commissioned by Yorkshire Bank found 
that 32% of people had no savings at all (FSA, 2000). Based on statistics from the 
1995/6 Family Resources Survey (FRS), Rowlingson et al. (1999) estimate about 37% 
of individuals has no savings.  
 
In its report on saving exclusion, the European Commission (2008) argues that people 
might have lack of saving due to some reasons. This includes lack of money to save 
(i.e., low income, low pension), lack of habit to save money in bank as well as 
unwilling to deal with banks because of negative past experience. 
 
iii. Credit exclusion 
According to Kempson and Whyley (1999), credit is not usually recognised to be the 
main issue in the financial exclusion debates since borrowing is often viewed as 
something that exacerbates the problems faced by low-income households. Such view 
is perhaps well-supported since research has found that financially excluded 
households do not, in particular, prioritise credit as a financial product that they would 
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like to have an access. However, to a certain extent, the need for credit is unavoidable 
especially in a situation where essential household items need to be purchased 
(Kempson and Whyley, 1999). In the similar vein, the European Commission (2000) 
also argued that problems of access or use of credit are more difficult to define and 
contain, because of their multidimensional aspects (i.e., various products, various 
providers, various laws, various demands and various methodologies).  
 
In contrast, this issue received the most mentions and was often assigned as the most 
importance of all financial exclusion issues in Australia (Chant Link and Associates, 
2004). The discussion surrounding appropriate credit centred on three issues: major 
credit card exclusion, inappropriate access to or abuse of credit cards, and exclusion 
from personal loans. 
 
iv. Insurance exclusion 
Insurance exclusion was seen as a widespread and serious problem for those who 
could not afford it due to their income, health status, location or other reasons 
(Kempson et al., 2000; Chant Link and Associates, 2004; Carbo, Gardener, & 
Molyneux, 2007). 
 
However, studies that are related to people without any kind of insurance are 
relatively very much lacking (Kempson and Whyley, 1999; European Commission, 
2008). Based on prior studies in the UK, the numbers of households without particular 
types of insurance are relatively higher. Kempson et al., (2000) indicate that 26% of 
them did not have home contents insurance, 87% did not have mortgage payment 
protection insurance (MPPI), 91% had not taken out medical insurance, and 93% did 
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not have personal accident insurance. While in the case of Australia, home and 
contents insurance and motor vehicle third party property insurance are less accessed. 
For instance, there were 17% of people who owned their own homes, lacking building 
insurance, and 17% lacked contents insurance, suggesting a large group of consumers 
who potentially needed insurance, and who lacked any cover (Chant Link and 
Associates, 2004).  
 
2.2.2.2  Access and/or use 
The shift in policy focus to extend access to finance (World Bank, 2007) implies the 
need for empirical measurement of access and use of financial services. This signifies 
the important of access and use dimensions in measuring financial inclusion. Besides 
access and use dimensions, Arora (2010) suggests the other two basic dimensions 
namely, cost and ease dimension. However, most of the prior studies on measurement 
of financial inclusion are only using use and access dimension (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2007; Honohan, 2008; Sarma, 2008, 2012) except for Arora 
(2010) and Gupte, Venkataramani, & Gupta (2012). This would suggest that 
measurement of financial inclusion is not well developed. This primary issue is 
discussed further in detail in section 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2.3  Levels of financial inclusion 
Basically, the discussion on the level of financial inclusion is varies and inconclusive. 
As mentioned earlier, the World Bank (2005) distinguishes between those who are 
‗formally served‘ that is those who have access to financial services from a bank and / 
or other formal providers and those who are ‗financially served‘ who also include 
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people who use informal providers. Conversely, the term ‗financially excluded‘ is 
only used to describe those who have no access at all (World Bank, 2005). In the 
similar vein, Chant Link and Associates (2004) categorized it as ‗included‘, ‗limited 
access‘ and ‗core exclusion‘. On the other hand, referring to specific financial 
services, European Commission (2008) categorised the levels based on certain 
degrees as following:  
 
i. bank transactions account category: 
- ‗unbanked‘ who are generally people with no bank at all, 
- ‗marginally‘ banked who are people with a deposit account that has no 
electronic payment facilities and no payment card or cheque book. It can also 
be people who do have these facilities but make little or no use of them, and 
- ‗fully banked‘ are people that have access to a wide range of transaction 
banking services that are appropriate to their needs and socio-economic 
status. 
 
ii. credit category: 
− credit excluded, 
− inappropriately served by alternative lenders, 
− inappropriately served by mainstream lenders, 
− appropriately served by alternative lenders, and 
− appropriately served by mainstream lenders. 
 
However, it can be argue that such levels of financial inclusion is rather normative 
than positive because the levels are used to describe an appropriate level of financial 
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inclusion in general. Therefore, a few attempts have been made to compute financial 
inclusion index. Based on the index computation, the level of financial inclusion is 
classified as high, medium and low financial inclusion (Sarma, 2008; Prathap, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the indexes are still far from inconclusiveness. In this regard, it can be 
suggested that the measurement of financial exclusion are not very well supported. 
Detail discussion on this issue is presented in section 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2.4  Unit/Level of analysis: individual, family, household, institutions 
and   financial system 
In general, data for financial exclusion analysis is gathered through various 
categories. Despite some debates and limitations of the individual, family and 
household data (Kempson & Whyley, 1999; Anderloni & Carluccio, 2007), most of 
the country-specific surveys are using those data in analysing and reporting the issue 
(e.g., Kempson et al., 2000;Howell & Wilson, 2005; Devlin, 2005; Johnson & Nino-
Zarazua, 2011).  With regard to the analysis of supply side, data on financial 
institutions are employed in examining the factors associated with financial exclusion 
(e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2008; European Commission, 2008; 
Sarma & Pais, 2011).  
 
On top of that, Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) is considered as the first attempt in 
examining financial exclusion using financial system data, namely bank-based and 
market-based as factor contributing to financial exclusion. However, the study finds 
no significant different result between the two systems. This might due to the 
argument that classifying countries as bank-based or market is not a very fruitful way 
to distinguish financial systems (Levine, 2002)  since it is not primarily important for 
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policy (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002) and even out-dated (Veysov & 
Stolbov, 2012). This would suggest that there is other classification of financial 
system that could explain and address the issue of financial inclusion. In addition, 
data availability is the main problem which has been addressed in many studies in 
examining financial inclusion in macro-level (e.g., Beck et al., 2006; Sarma, 2008; 
Arora, 2010).   
 
2.2.2.5  Distribution channel in promoting financial inclusion: banking 
and non-banking institutions 
With regard to the channel in tackling financial exclusion, previous studies do not 
make clear answers whether banking or non-banking institutions serve better result. 
On the one hand, some researchers opine that banking institutions provide better 
environment in promoting financial inclusion (e.g., Feldstein, 1991; Beck & Levine, 
2002; Mehrotra, Puhazhendhi, Nair, & Sahoo, 2009). On the other hand, supporters of 
non-banking institutions favour this channel based on the impact showed by these 
institution particularly through microfinance (e.g., Park & Ren, 2001; Morris & 
Barnes, 2005; Siebel, 2005; Al-Mamun, Abdul Wahab, & Malarvizhi, 2010; Mokhtar, 
2011; Saad, 2012). 
 
2.2.3 Underlying theories of financial inclusion/exclusion 
Financial inclusion is a complex problem and is constructed by several factors that 
range from psychological, sociocultural, geographical, economic to political issues. 
Variety of theories and methods are employed to describe and analyse this subject 
matter. Specifically, neoclassical economic theory, institutional theory and political 
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economy theory are among the theoretical perspectives that have been used to 
examine the complex financial exclusion phenomenon.  
 
Buckland (2012) highlights the key theories that have been used to analyze financial 
exclusion. The theories can be determined by identifying the key assumptions that 
they make by placing them within two broad categories, namely economic (i.e., 
neoclassical economic theory and new-keynesian theory) and interdisciplinary 
theories (i.e., behavioural economics, institutional theories, political-economy 
theories, poverty and community-based analyses, geographic spatial analyses, and 
household economy). The two key assumptions are pertaining to human rationality 
and the role of institutions. Buckland (2012) mapped those theories onto ‗rationalist-
institutional‘ space as depicted in Figure 2.2.  
 
Beginning with the north-west quadrant, we observe theories that assume that humans 
are rational and at the same time, institutions (i.e., whether they are rules, norms, 
clasess, genders or nations) play an essential role in explaining financial exclusion. 
Demand-and-supply theory, new institutional economics and political economy are 
included in this corner. Moving clockwise to the north-east, new-Keynesian 
economics can be seen where the human rationality assumption hold, however more 
concerned is also put in institutions. Further clockwise, there are theories that hold 
onto human rationality and assume that social reality is best acknowledged as a series 
of frictionless markets. In this category, neoclassical economics school fits well. 
Moving further clockwise, we find space for bounded rationality, starting from 
behavioural economics, which due to dropping the assumption of individual 
rationality, opens up the economy to sizeable social friction. Lastly, moving to the last  
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Figure 2.2 Financial exclusion/inclusion theories mapped onto rationality-
institutions space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adopted from Buckland (2012), page 63 
 
corner is the institutional theory of savings which characterized by bounded 
rationality and a role for institutions (Buckland, 2012). 
 
The aforementioned theories can be grouped into two broad categories, namely 
economic and interdisciplinary theories. Those theories are briefly discussed in the 
following sub-sections.  
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2.2.3.1  Economic Theories 
Under economic theories, financial exclusion can be examined using both the 
neoclassical economic theory and new-Keynesian theory. The former theory 
concentrates on economic agents and places the state in secondary role. The primary 
economic agents are firms and consumers whose behaviour are assumed to be 
rationally self-interested, well-informed and competitive. With these assumptions, it 
concludes that financial exclusion is the result of consumer choice and/or mistaken 
government policy. As far as consumer choice is concerned, it is possible when they 
opt to use informal financial services instead of mainstream markets due to economic 
costs which lead to access limitations. It is also possible that government policy for 
example a usury ceiling creates distortions in credit markets that further lead to 
exclusion of disfavoured segment.  
 
New-Keynesian analysis emphasizes on the market distortions embedded in the 
microeconomy, for instance information asymmetries. In relation to financial 
exclusion, it relates to the notion of credit constraints. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) provide 
a compelling explanation on this issue by shedding lights on the effect of imperfect 
information about borrowers on credit exclusion, whereby creditors tend to depress 
interest rates and restrict credit in order to avoid risky borrowers. This alarming 
problem further reinforces income and asset inequality i.e., ‗credit markets are no 
longer unified (if they ever were), but instead are fragmented and diverse; and 
financial exclusion grows as do the wealth/income and security/insecurity divides‘ 
(Dymski, 2005, page 454).   
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2.2.3.2  Interdisciplinary Theories 
Bearing in mind that financial exclusion is interdisciplinary in nature, there are a 
number of approaches can be applied to understand this topic of interest. An 
interdisciplinary theory is one that is learned by insights from more than one 
discipline which include institutional theory, political economy and poverty-and-
community analyses (Buckland. 2012). Each of these theories has been influenced by 
more than one discipline, consisting of economics, sociology, psychology as well as 
geography. 
 
Under behavioural economics, the questions on the consumer side (i.e., behaviour of 
low-income people) of financial exclusion can be unfolded by relaxing the 
assumption about human rationality and using experimental methods. However, its 
scope is not as broad as that of some other indisciplinary approaches such as 
institutional analyses (Scott, 2008; Buckland, 2012) as it does not take into account 
the institutional barriers of financial exclusion. 
 
Institutional analysis offers important insights about financial exclusion. It refers to 
analyses that seek to comprehend the broad context and the main institutions involved 
in the issue being studied. For example, under new institutional economics, it 
highlights the role of history as well as institutions in effective markets, governments, 
communities and societies in understanding financial exclusion (Buckland, 2012). 
 
Political-economy theories are also useful theories for understanding financial 
exclusion. These theories refers to the examination of the social world, cognizant of 
social, state and political structures (Buckland, 2012). This political-economy 
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framework to financial exclusion is important in apprehending the role of bank 
bifurcation and financialization in segmentizing the most marginal customers in the 
least advantage services (i.e., with high and complicated fees) (Aitken, 2006; 
Buckland, 2012).  
 
Other interdisciplinary theories are poverty and community-based analyses, 
geographic spatial analyses and household economy. Community-based analyses 
highlight the realities and experiences of the financially excluded by understanding 
the structures that reinforce inequality and poverty. Results show that low-income 
consumers usually behave in highly rational ways according to the relative costs and 
benefits of the variety types of financial services (Buckland & Martin, 2005). In 
relationship of geographical spatial analyses to financial exclusion, the studies seek to 
investigate if mainstream banks are under-located and fringe banks over-located in 
low-income neighbourhood (Buckland, 2012). With respect to household economy, it 
allows unpacking of the household especially on its decision making, resource 
allocation and gender relations. Several studies have provided support for the gender 
impact on credit inclusion (Hashemi, Schuler, & Riley, 1996; Kabeer, 2001)           
 
Specifically, within the framework of institutional theory, most of the previous studies 
use economic approach in explaining financial inclusion (e.g., Caskey, 1997; North, 
1990; Barr & Sherraden, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). However, Buckland (2012) argues that 
while the economic approach allows for high-level quantitative analysis, it is more 
abstract and lack of breadth that interdisciplinary theories can provide. With this 
regards, he uses institutional approach in analysing financial exclusion. However, it is 
worth noting that his research is somewhat broad in nature, which merely discussing 
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who are affected by financial exclusion (i.e., institutions and the lower income 
groups). Generally, his study analyses the individual and firm level, leaving ample 
space to examine this issue in macro level (i.e., financial system). Therefore, it can be 
suggested that there are a few areas within the framework of institutional theory that 
have not been analysed in examining financial inclusion.  
2.3 Financial Inclusion and Financial System: An Institutional Theory 
Perspective 
This study is particularly grounded on institutional theory. This theory rejects an 
analysis of financial exclusion which is based solely on consumer choice (i.e., 
associated with neo-classical approach), and yet serves a better picture of the 
structures and processes that are rooted in organizations, markets as well as policies 
(Buckland, 2012). Using this approach, a more complete understanding of financial 
inclusion can be gained through the role of institutional settings.  
 
Principally, institutional theory attempts to describe the deeper and more resilient 
aspects of how institutions are created, maintained, changed and dissolved (Scott, 
2004). In the context of the present study, it deals with the persistent influence of 
financial system on institutions. This includes the factors by which structures (e.g. 
rules, routines and norms) guide social behaviour that shaped financial inclusion. It is 
worth noted that the study of financial inclusion based on institutional theory involves 
general theory spanning economics, political science and sociology (Scott 2001) 
rather than a theory which specific to finance particularly. Therefore, within the 
framework of institutional theory, this present study would argue that financial system 
is one of the factor associated with financial inclusion. Specifically, a particular 
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financial system, which influenced by the institutional pillars (i.e., 
regulatory/coercive, normative and mimetic factors) as well as economic factor, has 
an essential role in shaping financial inclusion.  
 
Principally, within some elements of institutional theory, financial inclusion can be 
described and discussed in certain areas. The following subsections discuss these 
areas in detail. 
2.3.1  Financial system as a factor associated with financial inclusion 
Principally, institutional creation and diffusion happen, where top-down processes 
allow higher level structures to shape the structure and action of lower levels, while 
bottom-up processes shape, reproduce and change the context within, in which they 
operate (Scott, 2008, p. 190).   In other words, an institution found at one level of 
analysis often affects behaviour on the level below (Bjorck, 2004), where macro 
structures in society are bridged by organizational fields to micro structures in 
organizations or even ―down‖ to the individual actor level (Svejvig, 2009). In this 
regard, it can be suggested that financial system (i.e., the higher level structures), 
plays an important role in shaping the institutions (i.e., the lower levels) towards 
financial inclusion. Scott (2008) also mentions that it is beneficial to look at multiple 
levels in a given study in order to enrich the understanding in institutional analysis, 
and this is exactly one of the powerful features of institutional theory i.e., its ability to 
operate at varying levels ranging from society, organizational field, organization to 
individual actor level (Scott 2008: 85-90). Table 2.1 describes the levels in 
institutional analysis with specific examples pertaining to this present study. 
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Table 2.1 Levels in institutional analysis 
 
Level Characteristics Example 
World system Involve societal level at international level Comparison of studies in 
different countries. 
   
Societal A population of organizations (e.g., exchange 
partners, competitors, funding sources and regulators) 
operating in the same domain as indicated by 
similarity of their services or products. 
United Kingdom 
   
Organizational 
field 
Bounded by the presence of shared cultural-cognitive 
or normative frameworks or a common regulatory 
system so as to ―constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life‖. 
Financial system 
   
Organizational 
population 
A collection or aggregate of organizations that are 
―alike in some respect‖; in particular, they are ―classes 
of organizations that are relatively homogeneous in 
terms of environmental vulnerability‖. 
Banking and non-banking 
sector 
   
Organization Specific organization within the organizational 
population. 
Specific banking and 
non-banking institution  
   
Organizational 
subsystem 
Specific unit/department within the organization. Management or Finance 
department  
   
Individual Individual or group of individual who affected the 
organization 
Poor/Low income group 
 
Source: Adapted and added from Scott (2001, p. 81-82) 
 
Scott (2001) further mentions that level of organizational field (i.e., in this study is the 
financial system) is possibly the least recognizable although this level is the most 
significant in institutional theory. This is where Buckland‘s (2012) study is lacking of. 
In this regard, it can be suggested that financial system is associated with the financial 
inclusion. 
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2.3.2 Institutional and competitive pressures  
Using the concept of isomorphism
7, the theory suggests that ‗institutional pillars‘ (i.e., 
a regulatory/coercive pressure, normative influence and mimetic factors) and 
economic factor as well as competition, influence the top-bottom level of decisions. 
This would suggest that, within the framework of institutional theory, financial 
inclusion is the result of the configuration of institutional and competitive pressures 
within a financial system. These factors are discussed in turn. 
 
A regulatory or coercive pressure is based on political and legislative inﬂuences. In 
other words, the regulatory factors are affected by politics and legislations (Scott, 
2001). In this regard, it can be suggested that institutions actions and decisions are 
highly governed by the regulations adopted by the financial system.  
 
A normative influence is motivated by norms that are prevalent and observed in the 
domain to which the institutions belong. Institutions are made up of many elements 
with processes through which structures are maintained and modiﬁed towards 
consistencies within or across organizations over time (Scott, 2001). The consistency 
often means upholding norms. Institution often take actions, not because of economic 
considerations, but because they are expected to follow the financial system norms. 
For example, interest is prohibited in Islamic financial system due to its norms and 
worldview. 
 
                                              
7Isomorphism means ―a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions‖ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 149) or 
simply expressed as structural similarity.  
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A mimetic factor refers to copying other systems' practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2001). It works when uncertainty is prevalent, at which point 
organizations are likely to model themselves on other organizations or refer to 
culturally presumed meanings and ideologies (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009).  
 
While the lines of demarcation of these categories are not without controversy, these 
three basic categories in institutional theory are widely accepted (Bruton, Fried, & 
Manigart, 2005). Table 2.2 summarized the basic explanation of the three factors. 
 
Table 2.2 Three pillars of institutions 
 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Mechanisms/Factors Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for granted, shared 
understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive scheme 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification, accreditation Common beliefs, shared 
logics of action 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported, 
conceptually correct 
Source: Adopted from Scott, (2001, p. 52) 
 
In addition, Scott (2001) also argues that isomorphism is an important consequence of 
both the three institutional pressures (i.e., coercive, normative and regulative) and 
competitive. Competitive pressures might assume a financial system emphasizes 
market competition where organizations compete for resources and customers, which 
in turn, product and services are expected to be produced in an effective and efficient 
way (Scott & Meyer, 1991).  
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Competitive and institutional pressures ―live side by side‖ and dichotomous 
explanations must be avoided (Svejvig, 2009).  Therefore, on top of those three 
categories, Hussain and Gunasekaran (2002) propose economic factor as another 
important category that further support the institutional analysis. This argument is 
based on two basic ideas of institutional isomorphism in institutional theory (Hussain 
and Gunasekaran, 2002, p. 519): 
i. Environments are collectives and interconnected; and 
ii. Organizations must be responsive to external demand and expectations in order 
to survive.  
2.3.2 Financial exclusion evidence 
Given the importance of understanding financial exclusion, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that many of potential factors have been identified in the literature. It is worth noting 
that, in 2008, European Commission has developed a new schema in explaining the 
issue financial exclusion that combines ideas from each of the existing reports and 
surveys. This schema is based on fourteen countries which comprises of Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, 
Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. This study is used in the present study 
to analyze financial exclusion based on the institutional theory. Table 2.3 in the next 
page describes the analysis of financial exclusion based on institutional theory. 
 
The evidence supports Scott‘s (2001) argument that level of organizational field is 
possibly the least recognizable although this level is the most significant to 
institutional theory.  
39 
 
Table 2.3 Factors Associated with financial exclusion in European Commission (2008) and modified for the present study 
Assessment Level of analysis involved
1
 The possible relationship 
Type of service 
affected 
Economic factors 
Demographic changes: 
technological gap 
Societal; Organizational  
population 
The ageing population has difficulty in staying up-to-date with all the new ways of 
dealing with money 
Banking; credit 
Labour market changes Societal; organizational  
population 
Leading to a greater ‗flexibility‘ and growing job insecurity (i.e., some countries are 
accompanied by high levels of youth unemployment which contribute to less stable 
incomes) 
Banking; credit 
Income inequalities Societal; organizational  
population 
Bring difficulties of access to financial services Banking; credit 
Liberalization of markets: less 
attention to marginal market 
segments 
Societal; organizational  
population 
Increased competition may result in less attention to marginal market segments Banking 
Liberalization of markets: 
disappearance institutions 
targeted to low income 
Societal; organizational  
population 
Increased competition may result in levelling the regulation of different 
banking/financial institutions generally resulted in the disappearance of types of 
financial institutions which traditionally served people on low incomes 
Banking 
Coercive factors 
Fiscal policy Societal; organizational  
population 
Duties and taxes on banking services may represent a heavy burden for people on 
low incomes people, reducing the convenience of using the services 
Banking 
Money laundering rules/Identity 
checks 
Societal; organizational  
population 
Preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering and financing of 
terrorism brings a greater bureaucracy to financial transactions 
Banking 
Demographic changes: over 
indebted 
Societal; organizational 
population; individual  
Risk of over-indebtedness is higher and may lead to exclusion Banking; credit 
Social assistance Societal; organizational  
population 
Paying social assistance in cash can deter people from opening a bank account Banking  
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Assessment Level of analysis involved The possible relationship 
Type of service 
affected 
Risk assessment Societal; organizational 
population; organization 
Generally the risk assessment procedures are becoming more and more tight and 
thus create financial exclusion 
Banking; credit 
Normative factors    
Demographic changes: young Societal;  organizational 
population 
Whereas younger people tend to use credit more often, in some countries they stay 
longer with their families and therefore find it less useful to open a bank account 
Banking; credit 
Religion Societal;  organizational 
population; organization 
Religion can act as a barrier to use – especially in Muslim populations Banking; credit; 
savings 
Marketing Societal;  organizational 
population; organization 
The methods used can be unclear and lead potential clients to abandon the request or 
to mistrust financial institutions and look for other alternatives 
Banking; credit; 
savings 
Geographical access Societal; organizational 
population 
Location of financial services providers are too far away from potential clients Banking; savings 
Product design (terms and 
conditions) 
Societal; organizational 
population; organization 
The terms and conditions are not clear and target public is not defined Banking; credit 
Service delivery (e.g. internet) Societal; organizational 
population; organization 
The financial service is delivered by inadequate means for the target public, e.g. 
Internet for older people 
Banking; credit; 
savings 
Complexity of choice Societal; organizational 
population 
It can be an education issue, too many products proposed, target public has trouble 
to choose 
Savings 
Price Societal; organizational 
population 
The price offered by financial services providers are high and cannot afford by 
certain group of people 
Banking; credit 
Mimetic factors 
Type of product Societal; organizational 
population  
The appropriate financial service is non-existent on the market Banking; credit; 
savings 
Demographic changes: 
migrants/minorities 
Organizational population; 
individual 
There can be cultural or languages barriers to using and / or accessing financial 
services 
Banking; credit 
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Source: Adopted and added from European Commission (2008).
 
1 
 The levels referred to; World system level (i.e., research comprises of 14 countries), societal level (i.e., individual countries involved in the research), organizational 
population level (i.e, banking institutions, credit institutions and savings institutions), organization level (i.e, particular banking, credit and savings institution involved in the 
previous studies), and individual level (i.e, an individual customer or a potential customer) . 
 
 
Assessment Level of analysis involved The possible relationship 
Type of service 
affected 
Concern about costs Organizational population; 
individual 
Potential clients fear costs might be too high or lack information Banking; credit 
Belief that not for poor/low self 
esteem 
Organizational population; 
individual 
Customer perceived that the services are not offered to them. Banking; credit; 
savings 
Fear of loss of financial control Organizational population; 
individual 
Bank account feels intangible compared to cash, also some means are seen as 
―unsure‖ i.e. Internet hacking 
Banking; credit 
 
Mistrust of providers Organizational population; 
individual 
Fear of bankruptcy or lack of confidence with financial institutions Banking; credit; 
savings 
Preference for alternative 
providers and cultural factors 
Organizational population; 
individual 
Customers prefer to use other alternatives to access for the financial services. Banking; credit; 
savings 
Opposition to use Organizational population; 
individual 
Customers themselves are reluctant to use the services. Credit  
Bad past experience Organizational population; 
individual 
One refusal of a financial service in the past of a potential client is enough to 
become a barrier to any new trial 
Banking; credit 
Fear of seizures Organizational population; 
individual 
Some people might be afraid that creditors will seize their minimal guaranteed 
income 
Banking; credit; 
savings 
Cash is common Organizational population; 
individual 
It is not a stigma not to use sophisticated payments Banking 
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2.4 Background of Financial System 
2.4.1  Overview of financial system 
The idea of classifying financial system is not something new. Generally, 
conventional wisdom holds that there are basically two types of financial systems, 
namely bank-based and market-based. Bank-based and market-based financial 
systems is concerning about financial structure in development economics which 
focus on the relation between a country‘s financial system (i.e., bank-based or market-
based) and its economic development (see for example, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 2002; Levine, 2002; Beck & Levine, 2002). Principally, this 
classification is based on financial market structure (Veysov & Stolbov, 2012). Some 
research, however, argues that classifying countries using bank-based or market-based 
is not a very fruitful way to distinguish financial systems (La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1998; Levine, 2002) since it is not primarily important for policy-making 
activities (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002) and, to a certain extent, is even out-
dated (Veysov & Stolbov, 2012). With regard to financial inclusion in particular, 
Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) argue that rather than solely focusing on the banking 
sector, financial policy should also enhance other areas including developing 
appropriate macro-prudential safeguards and promoting capital market development. 
This would suggest that the concepts of bank-based and market-based are not very 
well accepted as the primary type of financial system. 
 
Responding to the debate on bank-based and market-based financial system, La Porta 
et al. (1998) adds the law and finance perspective in classifying the system. Based on 
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legal origin, they argue that a country‘s legal system is a primary determinant of the 
effectiveness of its financial system. As mentioned by La Porta et. al (2000, p.19)―… 
bank-versus market-centeredness is not an especially useful way to distinguish 
financial systems‖. Therefore, these authors stress the role of the legal system in 
creating a growth-promoting financial sector. From this perspective, a well-
functioning legal system facilitates the operation of both markets and intermediaries. 
By this, La Porta et. al (2000) clearly argue that laws and enforcement mechanisms 
are a more useful way to distinguish financial systems rather than focusing on 
whether countries are bank-based or market-based. With regard to financial inclusion, 
Qian & Strahan (2007) and Ge et al. (2012) confirm that legal differences shape the 
ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. Nevertheless, this present study 
is not mainly focus on the legal aspect in classifying the financial systems. 
 
Due to the development and increased interest in Islamic finance, the present study 
focuses on the financial system based on Islamic and conventional. Despite 
voluminous studies on the comparison between the two, none of them are found to 
specifically examine the relationship between these types of financial system with 
financial inclusion. The idea of comparison between Islamic and conventional 
financial system is not something new. Even, there are voluminous of literature 
differentiating the two systems on different areas (e.g.,  Samad, 2004; Olson & Zoubi, 
2008; Ariss, 2010; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013) However, it is worth 
noted that all the studies are more focused on the firm-level analysis, i.e., comparisons 
are made between particular Islamic and conventional financial institutions per se 
(e.g., banks, insurance providers, unit trusts). Although some of the studies are cross-
country analysis, the basis is the same, i.e.,  to explain on what aspects of the Islamic 
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banks are different from its counterpart. Except for Ben Naceur et al., (2015), this 
would suggest that there is no attempt has been made so far in analyzing financial 
inclusion based on Islamic-based and conventional types of financial system. 
 
In differentiating between conventional and Islamic financial systems, revisiting the 
meaning and scope of financial system is equally important. A financial system 
comprises of markets and institutions which are actively involved in the channelling 
of investable funds from the surplus-income units to deficit-income units. The main 
players in a financial system consist of four different types of economic agents: 
individuals, households, corporations (firms/institutions) and governments, who 
represent either surplus fund units (SFUs) or deficit fund units (DFUs). Hence, the 
principal objective of a financial system is to mobilise large amounts of relatively 
smaller savings and to pool them together as a channel for productive investments in 
the economy. This is accomplished either directly through financial markets (i.e., 
stock exchanges, over-the counter trading, etc.) or indirectly via financial 
intermediaries (i.e., bank and non-bank institutions) (International Shari‘ah Research 
Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), 2016). 
 
As far as the Islamic financial system is concerned, Shariah becomes the most 
important parameter in mobilising funds from SFUs, and subsequently, channelling 
those funds to DFUs. Essentially, this means that the behaviour and the operation of 
markets and financial institutions operating under the Islamic financial system will 
have to comply with the rules and principles of Shariah. Typically, the Islamic 
financial institutions can be in the forms of Islamic banks (commercial and investment 
banks), takaful companies (insurance with Islamic alternative), mutual funds and 
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other Islamic institutions that facilitate the operation between the SFUs and DFUs 
(International Shari‘ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), 2016). On this 
note, it is reasonable to assume that a particular country is adopting an Islamic 
financial system if the country has both the markets and the institutions in which 
funds are mobilized within the parameters of Shariah.      
 
Except for Iran, it is worth noting that countries adopting the so-called Islamic 
financial system per se are not yet present. However, there are several  countries that 
already have the Islamic finance sector within their financial system; commonly in the 
form of Islamic banking. Based on the OIC member countries, Yakcop (2003) 
classifies OIC countries into four categories based on their approach in the 
implementation of Islamic banking. Table 2.4 summarises the classifications.  
 
Table 2.4 Classification of countries based on Islamic banking implementation 
 
Category Example of country 
Only Islamic banking system 
 
Iran, Pakistan, Sudan 
Dual system (Islamic banking system operating 
parallel with the conventional system) 
 
Malaysia 
"Conventional plus" system (the system is basically 
a conventional system with a few Islamic banking 
institutions operating on the fringe of the banking 
system). 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Egypt, Guinea and Indonesia 
Only conventional system 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Cameroon, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon and 
Gambia. 
    Source: Adopted from Yakcop (2003) 
 2.4.2 Islamic and conventional financial systems: a comparison 
With increased understanding on the importance of a just financial system to human 
welfare, some issues are worth discussing. These include the conceptual, ideological 
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and functional differences between the prevailing interest-based conventional 
financial system and equity-based Islamic financial system (Loqman, 1991). To 
document full understanding on this matter, an overview of the Islamic financial 
system is presented below, followed by a comparative assessment between the two 
types of financial system. 
2.4.2.1  Overview of Islamic financial system 
The term ―Islamic financial system‖ is relatively new, appearing only in the mid-
1980s. In fact, all the earlier references to commercial or mercantile activities in 
compliance to Islamic principles were made under the umbrella of either ―interest 
free‖ or ―Islamic banking‖. However, describing the Islamic financial system simply 
as ―interest-free‖ does not provide a true picture of the system as a whole. 
Undoubtedly, prohibiting the receipt and payment of interest is the nucleus of the 
system, but it is supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine advocating risk 
sharing, individuals‘ rights and duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts. 
Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking but also covers capital 
formation, capital markets, and all types of financial intermediation (Iqbal, 1997). In 
addition, Islamic financial system is also prohibits doubtful transactions, stocks of 
companies dealing in unlawful activities and unethical or immoral transactions such 
as market manipulations, insider trading and short-selling (Loqman, 1991). 
 
The objectives of the Islamic financial system are based on Shariah
8
 (Chapra, 1992; 
Iqbal, 1997; Loqman, 1991; Mills & Presley, 1999; Zaher & Kabir Hasan, 2001; 
Siddiqi, 2006), which is to be treated as an important driver to transfer funds from the 
                                              
8
 Shariah literally means ―the way‖ and is the Arabic term for Islamic Law as a way of life.  
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surplus to the deficit units. This is done to ensure equitable allocation of capital to 
sectors which would yield the best returns to the owners of capital, thereby 
contributing towards the overall growth and expansion of an economy. 
 
Another important objective of the Islamic financial system is to ensure that the 
surplus fund is worthwhile investment in accordance with the owners‘ preference in 
terms of the extent of risk involvement, rate of return, as well as the period of 
investment. In addition, the Islamic financial system also plays significant role in 
assisting the fund owners to find sufficient opportunities to invest in the short term. 
Since it is contrary to the Shariah principles to hoard wealth, it is therefore necessary 
for the wealth owners to invest their funds in either short-term or long-term projects 
(Chapra, 1992; Loqman, 1991). 
 
Practically, the Islamic financial system is commonly viewed by the Muslims as an 
alternative to the existing interest-based financial system whereas for the non-
Muslims, they observed it as a healthy development that adds a variety version of 
financial system that would offer another source of competitiveness (Khan, 1992).  
2.4.2.2  Differences between Islamic and conventional financial systems 
The difference between Islamic and conventional finance can be viewed in two 
respects, namely based on ontology and operation. It is worth noted that the key 
difference between the two is the ontological difference. Islamic finance‘s advocates 
agree that the differences between the two systems emerge from the philosophical and 
ethical viewpoints. The philosophical foundation of an Islamic financial system 
(henceforth IFS) goes beyond the interaction of factors of production and economic 
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behaviour. While the conventional financial system (henceforth CFS) focuses 
primarily on the economic and financial aspects of transactions, the Islamic system 
places equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social, and religious dimensions, to 
enhance equality and fairness for the good of society as a whole. The system can be 
fully appreciated only in the context of Islamic teachings on the work ethic, wealth 
distribution, social and economic justice and the role of the state (Loqman, 1991; 
Iqbal, 1997). 
 
Loqman (1991) also added that the CFS recognises individual as the exclusive owner 
of his property with absolute rights to wealth. This principle contradicts the IFS. As 
mentioned earlier, the IFS is a product of Islamic principles and philosophy and is 
based on Sharia functions. With that note, IFS recognises man as the vicegerent of 
God on earth. For instance, Hassan (2007) argues that any wealth earned by a man is 
seen to be merely entrusted upon him, and therefore does not have absolute ownership 
of the wealth. As such, in IFS, freedom of enterprise as well as financial decisions 
made either by individuals or corporations should be on the basis of guidelines given 
by Islam. These do not prohibit profit making activities, as long as the interest of the 
society and the nation as a whole are protected and preserved (i.e., the profitable 
undertaking is permissible under Shariah). 
 
The CFS is based purely on riba (interest), in which this is strictly prohibited in Islam 
(Chapra, 1992; Chong & Liu, 2009; Siddiqi, 2006). Moreover, IFS is purely based on 
reward/loss/compensation and charity instead of riba. It is increasingly argued that the 
riba-based financial system has resulted in concentration of income and economic 
power in few hands, while the financial system based on profit and loss sharing 
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principle has resulted in more equitable distribution of economic opportunities and 
productive social charge in the long- run (Chapra, 1992; Iqbal, 1997). It is also worth 
noting that economists such as Fisher (1945), Simons (1948) and Friedman, (1969) 
have all pointed out to this instability feature of the current interest-based financial 
system. Moreover, Islamic finance prohibit in any activities which involves gharar 
(uncertainty) matters and maysir (gambling).  
 
With regard to financing, there are also differences between the CFS and the IFS. 
There are two types of financing which are necessary in both financial systems. In the 
CFS, equity financing takes place through the issuance of shares on which dividends 
are earned, while debt financing takes place by way of loans and borrowings on which 
interests are given or taken. The IFS on the other hand has its own unique norms and 
regulations with regards to both equity and debt financing. 
 
Operational wise, in equity financing, the IFS is based on profit and loss sharing 
contracts (henceforth PLS). Two important contracts in this category are used; 
mudarabah (profit sharing) and musharakah (joint venture). Under the PLS paradigm, 
the assets and liabilities of Islamic banks for example, are integrated in the sense that 
borrowers share profits and losses with the banks, which in turn share profits and 
losses with the depositors. Advocates of Islamic banking, hence, argue that Islamic 
banks are theoretically better positioned than conventional banks to absorb external 
shocks because the banks‘ financing losses are partially absorbed by the depositors 
(Iqbal, 1997). In the similar vein, Chapra (1992) and Mills & Presley (1999) agree 
that the risk-sharing feature of the PLS concept allows Islamic banks to lend on a 
longer term basis to projects with higher risk-return profiles and consequently 
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promoting better economic growth. In addition, Hassan (2007) argues that Islamic 
banks are somewhat reasonably efficient in managing risk where risk identification as 
well as risk assessment and analysis are the most influencing variables in the risk 
management practices. Ali Al-Jarhi (2004) and Iqbal (2001) also indicate that some 
studies comparing profit sharing with interest-based systems have shown that the 
former has yielded superior results compared to the latter. 
 
In the case of debt financing, Islam permits the contract of exchange which involves 
deferred payments and there are three important contracts in this category. Firstly, bai 
muajjal (sale on deferred payment), under which an entrepreneur of a project can buy 
the required goods and pay in instalments later on. Secondly, ijarah (leasing) under 
which the entrepreneur can lease the goods required for his project. Thirdly, 
murabahah or sale with price mark-up is commonly used in trade financing wherein 
the entrepreneur can purchase raw materials but settle the payments in cash at a later 
date. All these three types of contract provide profit margin to the financier through 
the cost plus pricing of sale and rental on leasing as agreed upon (Chapra, 1992; Iqbal, 
1997; Cebeci, 2012). In sum, Table 2.5 summarizes the differences between CFS and 
IFS. 
 
Table 2.5 Differences between conventional financial system and Islamic 
financial system 
 
Type of difference Conventional financial system 
(CFS) 
Islamic financial system (IFS) 
Ontology 
Worldview 
The individual as the exclusive 
owner of his property with 
absolute rights to wealth. 
Man as the vicegerent of God on earth. Any 
wealth earned by a man is seen to be merely 
entrusted upon him. He holds the wealth as 
a trust from God, and does not have 
absolute ownership of the wealth. 
Philosophy Economic and financial aspects of 
transactions are emphasized. 
Beside economic and financial aspects of 
transactions, ethical, moral, social, and 
religious dimensions for human welfare are 
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Type of difference Conventional financial system 
(CFS) 
Islamic financial system (IFS) 
equally emphasized. 
Operation 
Basic principles 
Based purely on riba (interest) 
and involves (gharar) uncertainty 
matters and maysir (gambling). 
Based on reward, loss, compensation and 
charity. Prohibit (gharar) uncertainty 
matters and maysir (gambling). 
Business 
Operations  
 
 Equity financing 
Issuance of shares on which 
dividends are earned. 
 
 Equity financing 
Based on profit and loss sharing contracts -
mudarabah (profit sharing) musharakah 
(joint venture). 
 Debt financing 
Based on loans and borrowings on 
which interests are given or taken. 
 Debt financing 
Permits the contract of exchange which 
involves deferred payments through 
contracts of bai muajjal (sale on deferred 
payment), ijarah (leasing) and murabaha 
(sale with price mark-up). 
 
Empirically speaking, the evidence so far is mixed. For instance, the efficiency of 
Islamic banks is found to be quite similar to their conventional counterparts (e.g., 
Abdul-Majid, Mohammed Nor, & Said, 2005; Mokhtar, Abdullah, & Al-Habshi, 
2006). Some studies do favour Islamic banks in terms of their business orientation and 
efficiency (see, for example (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013; Beck et al., 2013) 
but some do not share the same thought (see, for example Alshammari, 2003;Al-
Jarrah & Molyneux, 2005; Hasan & Dridi, 2011; Rashwan, 2012).  Perhaps, these 
could be better explained by the fact that Islamic banks are relatively inferior than 
their conventional counterparts in many aspects such as quantity, size, profitability 
and economies of scale (Wilson, 2004; Al-Maraj, 2009; Ahmed, 2013; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). In other words, the major constraints of 
diseconomies of scale can be traced to the fact that the Islamic market is remains 
comparatively smaller and ghettoised (Wilson, 2004; Yudistira, 2004; Al-Maraj, 
2009). 
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2.5 The Role of Islamic Finance towards Financial Inclusion 
As discussed earlier, theoretically, the Islamic financial system plays an important 
role in promoting welfare in the society through its prohibition of riba (interest), 
speculation and gambling (Chapra, 1992). It places equal emphasis on the ethical, 
moral, social, and religious dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the good 
of society as a whole. With the application of the work ethic, wealth distribution, 
social and economic justice and the role of the state, Islamic financial system 
considers to be more welfare-based financial system as compared to its counterpart. In 
this regard, it can be suggested that an Islamic-based financial system is theoretically 
better in promoting financial inclusion. 
 
As stated in many studies pertaining to the role of Islamic finance in promoting 
financial inclusion (e.g., Mirakhor & Iqbal, 2012; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu, 
2012: El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013; MIFC, 2015), Islamic finance could contribute to 
greater inclusion in two essential ways, namely promoting risk-sharing contracts that 
provide a viable alternative to conventional debt-based financing, and the other 
through specific instruments of redistribution of the wealth (e.g., through zakat
,
, 
waqaf, sadaqah, etc) among the society. This is shown in Figure 2.3.  
 
As non-banking financial institutions, the redistribution instruments complement the 
risk-sharing instruments to target the poor segment of the society so as to provide a 
holistic approach towards financial inclusion through reduction in poverty and 
building a healthy economy. For example, it is estimated that 20 out of 39 OIC 
countries have a large enough zakat collection to improve poverty for those living  
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Figure 2.3 Financial inclusion through Islamic finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with income below USD1.25 per day. By estimating the share of zakat to GDP vis-à-
vis the resources needed to support poverty reduction, half of the sample countries 
were reported to have enough zakat funds to cover for the resource shortfall 
(Mohieldin et al., 2012). 
 
Except for Ben Naceur et al. (2015)
9
, it is worth noted that although the discussion on 
the role of Islamic finance in financial inclusion is largely mentioned in the previous 
studies, those discussions are rather normative than  positive. These studies are very 
much lacking in terms of empirical evidence to support their arguments. In this 
regard, it could be suggested that the evidence on how Islamic finance, especially the 
banking institution, deals with the financial inclusion remains unclear. 
2.6 Chapter Summary     
This chapter has presented a comprehensive literature review of financial 
inclusion/exclusion studies, including discussion of the type of financial systems. It 
                                              
9
 Using the number and assets size of Islamic banks, the study finds tentative and relatively weak link 
between financial inclusion and Islamic banking. 
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can be observed that the empirical research on financial inclusion is somewhat limited 
and far from complete. Nevertheless, the richness of the financial inclusion literature 
highlights the importance of the issue and further research in the area is clearly 
warranted.  
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Chapter 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW II: MEASUREMENT AND DETERMINANTS 
OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the survey of financial inclusion literature on measurement issue 
as well as factors associated with financial inclusion. Section 3.2 presents the 
discussions on the measurement of financial inclusion. Section 3.3 extends the 
discussion on the determinants of financial inclusion. Section 3.4 summarises the 
chapter. 
3.2 Measurement of Financial Inclusion 
3.2.1 Current Measurement of Financial Inclusion 
3.2.1.1  Overview 
While numerous amounts of data are available on many aspects of the financial 
sector, systematic indicators in measuring financial inclusion are far from complete. 
Most of the evidence concerning the causal links between financial development, 
growth, and poverty comes from aggregate data using, for example, financial depth 
measures (size of finance) rather than outreach or access measures (number of 
participants) (e.g., Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
2002; Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2007). 
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Moreover, despite a large developing literature on financial access, a single 
measurement of financial inclusion that can be applied across countries is simply does 
not exist. Besides limited data on the use of basic financial services by households 
and firms (Claessens, 2006), this constraint is also due to the continuous 
modifications that are being made to provide a more comprehensive measure of 
financial inclusion. This would suggests that the dimensions and indicators of 
financial inclusion that could explain and track the incidence of financial inclusion 
over the time are still far from conclusive.  
 
The current finance literature on identifying barriers to financial inclusion is mainly 
focusing on the credit and saving services provided by the banking sectors. This has 
resulted in several papers discussing on the measurement of financial inclusion using 
banking indicators (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2007; Honohan, 
2008; Sarma, 2008; Arora, 2010; Chakravarty & Pal, 2010; Gupte, Venkataramani, & 
Gupta, 2012). Some of the authors also attempt to derive an index for the level of 
financial inclusion by identifying valuable dimensions of financial access. However, it 
can be argued that such of the early research in the financial inclusion measurement is 
very limited to savings and credits data, while ignoring other essential financial 
services namely banking transactions and insurance. Moreover, empirical studies that 
use index of financial inclusion as the dependent variable are very much lacking.  
 
The discussions on the measurement of financial inclusion entail two major aspects, 
namely (i) the dimensions and indicators, and (ii) the computation of the index. These 
main two aspects are discussed separately in the following sub-sections. 
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3.2.1.2  Dimensions and indicators of financial inclusion 
While still far from conclusive, a limited number of studies suggests that the 
measurement of financial inclusion needs to take into account as many dimensions as 
possible to represent the financial inclusion. Apart from that, by including the four 
essential financial services as outlined by the World Bank (i.e., banking transaction, 
credit, saving and insurance), the comprehensiveness of the index could be improved.     
 
Regarded as the first attempt in measuring financial sector outreach, Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Martinez Peria (2007) measure banking sector outreach and investigate its 
determinants. They report data on the following eight indicators of financial inclusion 
corresponding to the year 2003-2004: 
1.  Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000 sqkm. 
2.  Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 100,000 
people 
3.  Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1,000 sqkm 
4.  Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people 
5.  Credit accounts per capita: number of loans per 1,000 people 
6.  Credit-income ratio: average size of loans to GDP per capita 
7.  Deposit accounts per capita: number of deposits per 1,000 people 
8.  Deposit-income ratio: average size of deposits to GDP per capita 
 
Indicators (1) through (4) measure the outreach dimension of the financial sector in 
terms of access to banks‘ physical outlets, while indicators (5) through (8) measure 
the usage dimension i.e., use of banking services (Beck et al. 2007). Regressing the 
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share of households with deposit accounts obtained from household surveys on their 
aggregate indicators of deposit accounts and branch penetration, Beck et al. (2007) 
show that the predicted share of households with deposit accounts resulting from this 
regression provides a reasonably accurate estimate of the actual share of households 
with deposit accounts obtained from household surveys. Following Beck et al. (2007), 
other studies have used the same dimensions and indicators to examine other factors 
that influence banking outreach (Ghosh, 2012) and barriers to banking outreach 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2008). 
 
Honohan (2008) constructs estimates of the fraction of the households who have 
access to formal financial intermediaries and thereafter compared these estimates to 
poverty and inequality using the Gini coefficient
10
. To calculate the estimates, 
Honohan (2008) uses the ratio of microfinance accounts and bank accounts to the 
total population, household survey-based access and the average deposit size and the 
GDP per capita for more than 160 countries. Looking at how the access indicators 
varies across regions of the developing world, Latin America and the Caribbean have 
the highest mean and median percentages, but the variation within each region quite 
reasonable. The lowest mean and median are for Africa and for the developing 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
 
                                              
10
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion developed by 
the Italian statistician, Corrado Gini and published in his 1912 paper "Variability and Mutability" 
(Italian: Variabilità e mutabilità) (Gini, 1912).The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a 
distribution, a value of 0 expressing total equality and a value of 1 maximal inequality. It has found 
application in the study of inequalities in disciplines as diverse as economics, health 
science, ecology, chemistry and engineering. It is commonly used as a measure of inequality 
of income or wealth (Gini, 1997). 
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Sarma, (2008) in her concept note of ‗Index of Financial Inclusion‘ considers three 
dimensions to measure the extent of inclusion namely: 
i. Depth (penetration) of financial access (e.g., measured as the number of bank 
accounts per 1000 population); 
ii. Availability of financial services (e.g., measured as the number of bank 
branches and number of ATMs per 1000 population), and 
iii. Usage of financial services (e.g., measured as the number of loans per 1,000 
people). 
 
Using one variable for each dimension, Sarma (2008) adopts the concept used in the 
calculation the human development index (HDI)
11
. In her study of index of financial 
inclusion (IFI), equal weights have been appointed in each of the dimensions. 
Depending on the value of IFI, countries are categorized as high financial inclusion 
(an index of above 0.6), medium financial inclusion (an index of 0.4 to 0.6) and low 
financial inclusion (an index of less than 0.4). Finally, she ranks both the 45 countries 
(for which data on all three dimensions was available to her) and 100 countries (for 
which data on only two dimensions are available) in order of the IFI to indicate their 
relative position among other countries. Based on the distance from the ideal concept, 
Sarma (2008) makes improvement of the index by assigning weightage for each 
dimension (Sarma, 2010; Sarma & Pais, 2011), and later in 2012, further 
improvement is made by incorporating the distance from both the ideal and worst 
points
12
. 
                                              
11
A tool developed by the United Nations to measure and rank countries' levels of social and economic 
development based on four criteria: Life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years 
of schooling and gross national income per capita. The HDI makes it possible to track changes in 
development levels over time and to compare development levels in different countries. For more 
details, see Technical Note in UNDP‘s Human Development Reports at vwww.undp.org 
12
  For detail, see Refer Sarma (2012). 
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Following Sarma (2008), several researchers compute the financial inclusion index 
for specific states in India (e.g., Kumar & Mishra, 2009; Kumar, 2011). Mehrotra, et 
al (2009) also construct an index for financial inclusion using the same kind of 
aggregate indicators such as number of rural offices, number of rural deposit 
accounts, volume of rural deposit and credit from banking data for sixteen major 
states of India. In addition, Sarma & Pais (2011) examine the relationship between 
financial inclusion index and development as well as its relationship with factors 
associated with financial inclusion (i.e., socioeconomic factors, characteristics of 
banks and physical infrastructure). Using a different approach, Dacanay, Nito, & 
Buensuceso (2011) employ Sarma‘s index to show the link between microfinance and 
financial inclusion in Philippine.   
 
Adopting the axiomatic
13
 measurement approach for the measurement of financial 
inclusion, index measurement by Chakravarty & Pal (2010) improves upon the IFI 
proposed by Sarma (2008). The objective is to use the axiomatic structure (i.e., 
boundedness, global monotonicity, global homogeneity, global lower difference in 
gain at higher levels of attainment difference and symmetry) for more efficient 
utilization of available data on banking services. The index can be used to monitor 
progress in performance of financial inclusion and can make recommendations on 
what more is required to be done for better performance. This demonstrates an 
important policy application of the index. Using indicators from both Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) and Sarma (2008), Chakravarty & Pal‘s 
index can be utilized to determine the percentage contributions by the various factors.  
 
                                              
13
The axiomatic approach entails formal definitions of important postulates of an index (that is, the 
axioms) and then identifies the index using the postulates. 
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In addition, Arora (2010) computes the index of financial inclusion using the same 
reasoning as Sarma (2008) for two major groups of countries (i.e., advanced 
economies and developing and emerging economies). Compared to Sarma (2008), 
Arora includes more variables in the outreach dimension. She employs not only the 
demographic penetration but also geographic penetration. She also adds the 
dimensions of ease and cost of transactions, which are not included in the previous 
studies. 
 
A very recent study by Gupte et al. (2012) adopt all the four dimensions (i.e., 
outreach, usage, east and cost) and indicators used by Sarma (2008) and Arora (2010) 
for the computation of financial inclusion index.  
 
In the area of microfinance, Mersland & Øystein Strøm (2009) come out with 
microfinance outreach measurement using two indicators, namely average loan and 
number of credit clients. Apart from performance, they use outreach dimension to 
examine the relationship between the two dimensions and corporate governance in 
microfinance institutions. 
 
Concentrating only on the usage dimension, Prathap (2011) takes into account all the 
four financial services which consider essential by the World Bank (World Bank, 
1995) from various service providers. Using household data (i.e., the usage of banking 
transaction, savings, credit and insurance) from a particular state in India, Prathap 
(2011) attempts to compute and measure financial inclusion within the state. Table 3.1 
summarizes the dimensions and indicators considered by the previous studies. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of studies associated with dimensions and indicators for the measurement of financial inclusion/exclusion 
 
Authors Financial 
services 
Dimension 
Outreach 
Usage Ease Cost 
Penetration Availability 
Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & 
Martinez Peria 
(2007) 
Banking 
 
 Demographic branch 
penetration (number of 
bank branches per 
100,000 people) 
 
 Demographic ATM 
penetration (number of 
bank ATMs per 100,000 
people) 
 Geographic penetration 
(number of bank 
branches per 1,000  
sq.km) 
 
  Geographic penetration 
(number of bank ATMs 
per 1,000 sq.km) 
 Credit indicators: 
i. Credit accounts per 
capita : number of loans 
per 1,000 people 
ii. Credit-income ratio: 
average size of loans to 
GDP per capita 
 
 Deposit indicators: 
i. Deposit accounts per 
capita: number of 
deposits per 1,000 
people 
ii. Deposit-income ratio: 
average size of deposits 
to GDP per capita 
Not considered Not considered 
Honohan (2008) Banking and 
Microfinance 
 Demographic bank 
penetration (number of 
bank accounts per 100 
adults) 
 
 Demographic MFIs and 
alternative 
intermediaries 
penetration (number of 
accounts at MFIs and 
alternative 
intermediaries per 100 
adults) 
Not considered  Average bank deposit 
size  
Not considered Not considered 
Sarma ( 2008) Credit; savings  Demographic bank 
penetration (number of 
bank account per 1000 
adults) 
 Demographic branch 
availability (number of 
bank branches per 
    100,000 adults) 
 Credit indicators: 
i. Domestic credit (as % 
of GDP)  
 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
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  Outreach 
Usage Ease Cost 
Penetration Availability 
     Deposit indicators: 
ii. Domestic deposit (as % 
of GDP) 
  
Mersland & 
Øystein Strøm 
(2009) 
Credit  Average loan 
 Number of credit 
clients  
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
Chakravarty & 
Pal (2010) 
Credit; savings Use dimensions and indicators stated in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria 
(2007) and Sarma ( 2008) 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
Arora (2010) Credit; savings  Demographic branch 
penetration (number of 
bank branches per 
100,000 people) 
 Demographic ATM 
penetration (number of 
bank ATMs per 100,000 
people) 
 Geographic penetration 
(number of bank 
branches per 1,000  
sq.km). 
 Geographic penetration 
(number of bank ATMs 
per 1,000 sq.km) 
Not considered  Locations to open 
deposit account 
 Minimum amount to 
open checking account 
 Minimum amount to 
open savings account 
 Minimum amount to be 
maintained in checking 
account 
 Minimum amount to be 
maintained in savings 
account 
 Number of documents 
to open checking 
account 
 Number of documents 
to open savings 
account 
 Locations to submit 
loan applications 
 Minimum amount of 
consumer loan 
 Minimum amount of 
mortgage loan 
 Days to process 
consumer loan 
application 
 Fees consumer loan (% 
of minimum loan 
amount) 
 Fees mortgage loan (% 
of minimum loan 
amount) 
 Annual fees checking 
account 
 Annual fees savings 
account 
 Cost of transfer funds 
internationally (% of 
$250) 
Amount of fees for 
using ATM cards (% of 
$100) 
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14
 Self- help groups (SHGs), is one of policy under the Reserve Bank of India to provide channels of lending.  
15
  Microfinance provider (MFP) includes all agencies that provide finance (credit/grants) to the SHGs as part of their financial assistance to poor.  
Authors Financial 
services 
Dimension 
Outreach 
Usage Ease Cost 
Penetration Availability 
      Days to process 
mortgage loan 
application 
 
Gupte, 
Venkataramani, 
& Gupta (2012) 
Credit; savings 
Integrate all four dimensions initiated by Sarma (2008) and Arora (2010) to compute Financial Inclusion Index for India  
Prathap (2011) Banking 
transactions, 
savings, credit 
and insurance 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
 Banking transaction:  
usage of Cheque/DD,  
social security pension 
payments through 
banks/cooperatives,  
usage of ATM 
 Savings:  Savings 
account with institutional 
sources (commercial 
bank, cooperative bank 
or post office or SHG14 
bank linkage),  Fixed 
Deposit or Recurring 
Deposit account with 
institutional agencies,  
Informal savings in an 
SHG 
 Formal credit:  From 
institutional sources or 
through SHG 
bank/MFP15 linkage 
during 2007, 2008 and 
2009 
 Insurance:  Any 
source/type of insurance 
 
Not considered 
 
Not considered 
 
 
65 
 
3.2.1.3 Computation of financial inclusion index: comparison of past 
attempts 
From Table 3.1 overleaf, we could observe that only after year 2007, some 
researchers attempt to come out with the access indicators in measuring financial 
inclusion. Based on their studies, different methods are employed to calculate the 
index of financial inclusion. It has been observed that the computation of the index is 
strongly motivated by the data availability, which seems to be the biggest constraint. 
Since data on deposit and credit in the banking sector can be accessed for a large 
number of countries, this banking data is mostly used in the computation of the index 
as compared to other services such as insurance, microfinance and cooperatives.   
 
Sarma (2008) is considered as the first who come out with financial inclusion index 
for cross-country analysis. In calculating the index, she applies the similar approach 
that used by United Nations Development Programme (hereafter referred as UNDP) 
for computation of some well-known development indexes such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), the Human Poverty Index (HPI), and the Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI)
16
. The Index of Financial Inclusion (IFI) by Sarma is 
computed by first calculating a dimension index for each dimension of financial 
inclusion. The dimension index for the i
th
 dimension, di, is computed by the following 
formula: 
 
                                                          
     
     
                                                       (3.1) 
 
where 
                                              
16
 For more details, see Technical Note in UNDP‘s Human Development Reports at vwww.undp.org 
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Ai = Actual value of dimension i, 
mi = minimum value of dimension i, and 
Mi = maximum value of dimension i 
 
Eq (3.1) ensures that            where the higher the values of Di, the higher the 
country‘s achievement in dimension i.  With regard to the dimension, Sarma (2008) 
states that the dimensions included are determined by the availablity of consistent data 
sets. Thus, using data pertaining to 2004, her study focuses on one variable for the 
three dimensions, namely penetration, availability and usage.  The IFI for the country 
i is measured by the normalized inverse Euclidean distance of the point (pi, ai, ui) 
from the ideal point (1,1,1). After givingequal weights to the dimensions, the index of 
financial inclusion (IFI) is computed as follows: 
 
                                          √
                         
 
                                    (3.2) 
 
where: 
pi= dimension indices for penetration, 
ai=dimension indices for availability, and 
ui =dimension indices for usage. 
 
The IFI thus incorporates information on these dimensions in one single number lying 
between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes complete financial exclusion and 1 indicates the 
complete financial inclusion in an economy. In addition, depending on the value of 
IFI, countries are categorized into three categories, namely:  
i.  0.5 < IFI ≤ 1    :high financial inclusion  
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ii. 0.3 ≤ IFI <0.5  :medium financial inclusion  
iii.  0 ≤ IFI <0.3    :low financial inclusion 
 
Later, Sarma (2010) improves the IFI by adding weightage to the Eq (3.1) to capture 
the relative importance of the dimension i in quantifying the inclusiveness of a 
financial system: 
                                                   
                                                           =     
     
     
                                                  (3.3) 
   
 
where: 
   = Weight attached to the dimension i, 0 < wi <  1   
Ai = Actual value of dimension i, 
mi = minimum value of dimension i, 
Mi= maximum value of dimension i. 
 
By taking into consideration some aspects of data availability, Sarma (2010) gives 
weightage for each dimension, i.e., 1 for penetration and 0.5 for availability and 
usage. Thus, algebraically: 
                                         √
                             
   
                                 (3.4) 
   
Taking into consideration both supply and demand side of financial inclusion, Kumar 
& Mishra (2009) compute the Financial Inclusion Index (FII) for banking outreach 
and households in India. They compute FII for banking outreach using distance-from-
average method, where FII lies between zero (no inclusion) and unity (full inclusion). 
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First, for each of the six indicators, the actual value is divided by the overall average 
of that indicator, as following: 
                                                          
    
 
    
                                                              (3.5) 
 
where: 
    
   = value of indicator q for the state s at time t, 
    
  =  mean value of indicator q for the state s at time t, and 
q=  1, 2, … , 6 
 
Subsequently, the average of all the indicators gives the proposed supply side 
composite index as below: 
                                                       
(∑    )
 
                                                         (3.6) 
         
Similarly, the demand side composite indices using household data for the formal and 
informal sector are computed as follows: 
                                                     
  
(∑    
 )
 
                                                        (3.7) 
 
where: 
    
   the value of indicator q for the state s at time t, and 
q=  the Formal saving, Formal credit and Formal insurance. 
 
                                                    
  
(∑    
 )
 
                                                         (3.8) 
 
where: 
    
   the value of indicator q for the state s at time t, and 
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q=  the Informal saving and Informal credit. 
 
Separate composite Financial Inclusion Indices (FIIs) using both the data sets are then 
calculated for the year 2002-2003. 
 
Arora (2010) argues that the financial inclusion index should covers as many 
indicators as possible for each dimension in order to present a more accurate and 
comprehensive picture of access to finance. Therefore, in contrast to a single indicator 
in each dimension adopted by Sarma (2008), she adds the dimensions of ease of 
transactions (i.e., 12 indicators) and cost (i.e., 6 indicators) on top of the outreach 
dimension (i.e., 2 variables). However, she does not include the usage dimension that 
is one of the critical dimensions in financial inclusion (Kempson, Atkinson, & Pilley, 
2004). The Financial Access Index (FAI) is computed for data pertaining to 2007 as 
follows: 
 
Each dimension DiI is defined as,      
                                                     (
               
 
)                                        (3.9) 
 
and computation of di is the same as Eq (3.1). 
 
Assigning weights of 2 to outreach and 1 to each, ease and cost of transactions, 
Arora‘s Financial Access Index (FAI) is derived as follows: 
 
                                                                                          (3.10) 
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Intuitively, the Eq (3.10) implies that the FAI is directly (inversely) related to 
outreach (east and cost). The FAI is then converted into a normalized index by setting 
the country with the highest FAI equal to 1 and all other nations are relatively ranked. 
 
In the most recent study, Gupte, Venkataramani, & Gupta (2012) computes the 
Financial Inclusion Index (FII) for India as a geometric mean using the four critical 
dimensions – outreach (penetration and accessibility), usage, ease of transactions and 
cost of transactions, following the methodology used by UNDP in computing the HDI 
in 2010
17
. Using the same argument by Arora (2010)
18
, they manage to fill the gap 
from Sarma‘s and Arora‘s approaches by taking into account all the dimensions in 
their computation of FII. The computation of variables for each dimension is the same 
as Sarma (2008) and Arora (2010). Therefore each Dimension (Dj) is a simple 
average of all the di 
 
                                                       
∑   
 
                                                            (3.11) 
and,   
                                       
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
    
 
                                         (3.12) 
  
where: 
D1 = the outreach dimension (Σd1i / n)                          (3.13) 
D2 = the usage dimension (Σd2i / n)                                        (3.14) 
D3A= the ease of transaction dimension  (Σd3ai / n)                                             (3.15) 
                                              
17
 The methodology adopted by UNDP to calculate HDI prior to 2010 had attracted a lot of criticism 
and the technical note on HDI 2010 clarifies that the introduction of the geometric mean in this 
computation embodies imperfect substitutability across all the dimensions. It thus addresses one of the 
most serious criticisms of the linear aggregation formula, which allowed for perfect substitution across 
dimensions (UNDP, 2010). 
18
 Any attempt to measure financial inclusion will have to take into consideration as many dimensions 
as possible that impact the inclusion factor (Arora, 2010). 
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D3B= the ease of transaction dimension (   
∑      
 
                                          (3.16) 
D4 = the cost of transactions dimension (   
∑      
 
                                          (3.17) 
 
Unlike other studies, Prathap (2011) manages to fill the gap on the key limitation of 
previous studies in terms of types of financial services covered in the computation of 
his Financial Inclusion Index (FI Index). His computation takes into consideration all 
the four main types of services that individuals in society should have access, namely 
banking transaction, saving, credit and insurance, using only usage dimension. This is 
consistent with Kempson, Atkinson, & Pilley (2004) who emphasized on the usage 
dimension. Similar to Sarma (2008) and Gupte, Venkataramani, & Gupta (2012), 
Prathap (2012) also adopts the same method employed by UNDP (i.e., using a single 
composite rather than complementary composite) in calculating the index. The FI 
Index is calculated by aggregating responses in each variable. Using principal 
component analysis (PCA), the computation of the index is based on weighted 
average index numbers. The appropriate weights are assigned by using judgement 
method
19
. The value assigned to each variable are either 1 or 0 which denotes 
respondent having association with the source of finance and respondent having no 
association with the specified source of finance, respectively. With total weightage of 
100, the computation of the index is as follows: 
 
     ∑       ∑                                                                      (3.18) 
 
where: 
                                              
19
 The weightage is evaluated by a panel of 30 experts from banking sectors, academicians and 
researchers. 
 
 
72 
 
(a) through (c) = banking transaction indicator,  
(d) through (f)   = formal credit indicator,  
(g) through (i)   = banking savings indicator, and  
(j) = insurance indicator.  
 
The FI Index varies between ‗0 and 100‘. Value ‗100‘ signifies full inclusion while 
value ‗1‘ implies complete exclusion. Besides that, depending on the value of the 
index, level of inclusion can be identified as follows: 
i.  1-29                  : low financial inclusion  
ii. 30-60    : medium financial inclusion  
iii.  61 and above   : low financial inclusion 
 
Table 3.2 overleaf summarizes the index and computation considered by prior studies. 
3.2.2 Review of Current Measurement of Financial Inclusion  
Since the existing paradigm is based on neo-liberalism, one can argue that financial 
inclusion is very much explained through acces to banking, i.e., bank accounts, loans, 
etc. (i.e., all the measures are product of neo-classical and neo-liberal political 
economics). One of the reasons might lies on their basis that the banking sector has 
taken a lead role in promoting financial inclusion through the efficacy of financial 
system (Sarma & Pais, 2011).  
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Table 3.2 Summary of studies associated with computation of financial inclusion index 
 
Author Name of Index Formula 
Sarma (2008) Index of Financial Inclusion (IFI)       √
      
         
         
 
 
 
Sarma (2010) Index of Financial Inclusion (IFI)       √
      
           
           
 
   
 
Kumar & Mishra (2009) 
Financial Inclusion Index (FII) for Banking      
(∑   )
 
 
Financial Inclusion Index (FII) for Formal 
Sector     
  
(∑     
 )
 
 
Financial Inclusion Index (FII) for Informal 
Sector     
  
(∑     
 )
 
 
Arora ( 2010) Financial Access Index (FAI)                                  
Gupte, Venkataramani, & 
Gupta (2012) 
Financial Inclusion Index (FII)        
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
    
 
    
Prathap (2011) Financial Inclusion Index (FI Index) 
∑  
   
  ∑                              
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However, looking from another perspective, financial inclusion is also worth to be 
observed under the purview of developmentalism (see for example, Schwittay 
(2014) and Kalpana, 2015)) and should therefore relate to emancipation and 
empowerment. It should be noted that, in the case of loans, the current debate on 
financial inclusion relates to ‗indebting‘ people rather than empowering (see for 
example Lazzarato, (2012)). This empowerment aspect is much related to the 
human development itself. On this matter, Sarma & Pais (2011) attempts to 
compare their financial inclusion index in relation to the Human Development 
Index (HDI)
20
.  They concluded that countries having high level of human 
development are also the countries with a relatively high level of financial 
inclusion. Nevertheless, the HDI simplifies and partially captures some aspects of 
human development. It does not reflect on the aspect of empowerment indicator 
(UNDP, 2017). 
 
In the context of Islamic political economy, the empowerment paradigm is 
captured through maqasid al-shariah. It  is regarded as the core of human life, 
without which the human‘s life will be uncertain and aimless. With its 
observance, human life will be directed objectively (Mohammad & Shahwan, 
                                              
20
 The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate 
criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of 
human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of 
living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The 
health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by 
mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for 
children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national 
income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of 
income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated 
into a composite index using geometric mean. For details, refer http://hdr.undp.org/. 
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2013). With regards to socio-economic in Islamic perspective, maqasid al-shariah 
stands as its pillar and base while its development and issues are the manifestation 
of the pillar. Hence, Islam has taken into account the importance of ―purpose‖ or 
in Arabic ―maqsud‖ and in plural sense ―maqaasid‖, to guide human life.  
 
By referring to the Quran
21
 and the Sunnah
22
 as well as definitions and 
explanation from a number of scholars, Chapra (2007) concludes that all the 
raison d'être of the Shariah which, as recognized by almost all the jurists, is to 
serve the interests of all human beings and to save them from harm. These two 
essential aspects (i.e, to serve the interests of all human beings and to save them 
from harm) are the key elements for empowerment. With regards to financial 
inclusion, there are many areas of empowerment that can be considered as well as 
measured under the framework of maqasid al-shariah. For example, Imam Abu 
Hamid al-Ghazali, an eminent scholar, classified the maqasid into five major 
categories by stating that, ―the very objective of the Shariah is to promote the 
well-being of the people, which lies in safeguarding their faith (din), their self 
(nafs), their intellect (‗aql), their posterity (nasl), and their wealth (mal). 
Whatever ensures the safeguard of these five, serves public interest and is 
desirable, and whatever hurts them, is against public interest and its removal is 
desirable.‖(Chapra, 2000).   
 
                                              
21
 The Arabic speech of Allah that was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad both in word and in 
meaning. It is collected between the two covers of the mushaaf (i.e., Quran), was narrated in 
mutawaatir (chains), and is a challenge to humankind. 
22
 In brief, it is the tradition portion of Muslim law, based on words and acts of Prophet 
Muhammad and preserved in the traditional literature. 
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With respect to the study on maqasid al-shariah in socio-economic in general, 
Chapra (2007) and Mohammad & Shahwan (2013) have made a great 
contribution in shedding the light of connecting these two essential scopes, i.e., 
maqasid al-shariah and socio-economic. Based on the theory of five maqasid that 
has been mentioned earlier (i.e., primary maqasid), Chapra (2007) came out with 
the corollaries maqasid for each of the primary maqasid, respectively. Figure 3.1 
shows the relationship between the five maqasid, human development and well-
being, while Figures 3.2 to 3.6 present the corollaries for each of the five primary 
maqasid, namely the human self (nafs), faith (din), intellect (‘aql), posterity (nasl) 
and wealth (mal).  
 
Figure 3.1  Realizing human development and well-being through maqasid 
al-shariah 
 
 
       Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 9). 
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Figure 3.2  The corollaries of human self (nafs) maqasid 
 
                       Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 11). 
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Figure 3.3  The corollaries of faith (din) maqasid 
 
                          Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 32). 
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Figure 3.4 The corollaries of intellectual (aql) maqasid 
 
 Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 40). 
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Figure 3.5  The corollaries of posterity (nasl) maqasid 
 
                   Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 45). 
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Figure 3.6   The corollaries of wealth (mal) maqasid 
 
                   Source: Adopted from Chapra (2007, p. 49). 
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Mohammad & Shahwan (2013) analyse critically the 
conceptual association between the framework of maqasid al-
shariah that rooted from both al-Ghazali and al-Zaharah
23
 as 
well as the objectives of Islamic economics and Islamic 
banking and finance. Adopting content analysis and inductive 
method, they originated alternative version of the maqasid al-
shariah framework as well as the objectives of Islamic 
banking and finance and Islamic economics. This is shown in 
Figure 3.7 overleaf. L1, L2, L3 and L4 represent the following 
title respectively: the two main types of objective; 
philosophical-based and operational-based objectives, 
objective of Islamic economics, VMO (i.e., vision, mission, 
objective) of Islamic Bank and the maqasid framework. 
 
It is worth noting that there are increased interests in 
deliberating the realization of maqasid al-shariah in different 
areas that range from Islamic banking and Islamic economics 
(see, for example, al-Mubarak & Osmani, 2010; Eddy Yusof,   
                                              
23
 For further details, refer Abu Zaharah (1997) and its brief explanation in 
Mohammad & Shahwan (2013). 
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Figure 3.7 The conceptual association between maqasid al-shariah framework and the objectives of Islamic banks and Islamic economics 
 
 
  Source: Adopted from Mohammad & Shahwan (2013, p. 80). 
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Kashoogie, & Kamal, 2010; Mohammad & Shahwan, 2013; Rosly, 2010), democracy 
and development (see, for example, Çizakça, 2007), capital market (see, for example, 
Dusuki, 2009, 2010) to social aspect (see, for example, (Laluddin et al., 2012). Some 
of these studies also highlight the important of risk-sharing element towards 
realization of maqasid al-shariah, or in other words, to promote Islamic finance 
development through empowerment.    
 
However, these studies are rather normative than positive and have not specifically 
discussed the subject of maqasid al-shariah in relation to financial inclusion. Not to 
mention, the use of this maqasidic approach in measuring financial inclusion by 
incorporating the empowerment aspect is very limited. Therefore, our understanding 
of the comprehensive measurement of financial inclusion remains incomplete.  
3.3 Factors Associated with Financial Inclusion 
3.3.1 Overview 
While the importance of broader access is becoming crucial in addressing financial 
inclusion, there is relatively lacking, inconclusive and mixed evidence on the 
determinants to financial inclusion. There are a few reasons that might explain the 
limitations.  Firstly, bearing in mind that the issue of financial inclusion is a complex 
issue in nature
24
, there could be just simply too many issues that need to be studied. 
This is commonly referred to as ‗an unfinished agenda‘ (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2008).  Secondly, it could be due to limited data on access to financial services and 
                                              
24
There are many angles in the discussion of financial inclusion such as types of financial services 
involved (World Bank, 1995), financial services providers who responsible to it, different factors from 
different dimensions associated to it (demand, supply and economic factors), different perspectives of 
the study (micro and macro) and so on so forth. 
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therefore a proper investigation of this issue is far from possible (Claessens, 2006; 
Beck et al., 2008; Sarma & Pais, 2011). 
 
Although the issue of financial inclusion has been discussed since early 1990s, the 
discussions on its factors have been commonly normative rather than positive. 
Possibly, prior studies are mainly interested in explaining and describing the factors 
associated with financial exclusion (e.g., Elaine Kempson & Whyley, 1999; Collard, 
Kempson, & Whyley, 2001; Carbo, Gardener, & Molyneux, 2007) rather than 
providing empirical evidence on what determines the financial inclusion. Such 
empirical evidence is important to identify the constraints that would contribute to 
policy-making activities in tackling financial exclusion (Beck et al., 2009). In the 
same spirit, it was once noted that ―the great challenge before us is, to address the 
constraints that exclude people from full participation in the financial sector‖ (Annan, 
2003).  
 
The determinants of financial inclusion are now reviewed as following. 
3.3.2 Determinants of financial inclusion 
Literature on barriers to financial inclusion suggests that some areas of constraints do 
exist within the institutional settings. The determinants are now reviewed as follows.  
 
Using the determinants of the depth of the financial sector, Beck et al. (2007) explore 
the factors associated with financial outreach which affect the access to credit. 
Despite having significant link with the overall level of economic development, the 
findings also reveal that both outreach and depth indicators are positively associated 
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with the quality of the institutional environment, the degree of credit information 
sharing, the level of initial endowments, and the development of the physical 
infrastructure. The importance of physical infrastructure in promoting financial access 
are also supported by other studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2008; Sarma & Pais, 2011). 
Apart from that, outreach and depth indicators are negatively correlated with the cost 
of enforcing contracts and the degree of government ownership of banks. However, 
only financial sector depth is positively associated with the level of creditor rights 
protection. Finally, historical variables such as legal origin and religion have less 
consistent impact on financial outreach relative to depth. In particular, economies 
based on a French legal origin seem to have lower levels of depth, but not consistently 
lower levels of outreach. Similarly, while predominantly Protestant societies appear to 
have deeper financial sectors than Catholic societies, the same cannot be said 
consistently about banking sector outreach. 
 
Qian & Strahan (2007) argue that legal and institutional differences shape the 
ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. Using demand-side factors (i.e., 
firms characteristics), credit risk factors (i.e., loan characteristics), as well as country 
level factors (i.e., creditors rights, legal formalism, information sharing, legal origin), 
they show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated 
ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of 
creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and 
tangibility of assets. Apart from that, foreign banks appear more sensitive to the legal 
and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic 
banks as creditor protection falls. The results support the reason underlying the law 
and finance literature, pioneered by La Porta, et al (1997, 1998), that some 
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environments are more conducive to operate financial contracts than others, and that 
better contracting leads to better outcomes
25
. Sharing the similar result, Ge et al. 
(2012) also find that the favourable effect of firm-level governance on some loan 
contracting terms is stronger in countries with strong legal institutions than in 
countries with weak legal institutions. 
 
Using information from 209 banks in 62 countries, Beck et al., (2008) show that the 
effectiveness of creditor rights, contract enforcement mechanisms, and credit 
information systems, are weakly correlated with barriers. On the other hand, they 
signify strong associations between barriers and measures of restrictions on bank 
activities and entry, bank disclosure practices and media freedom, as well as 
development of physical infrastructure. Specifically, barriers are higher in countries 
where there are more stringent restrictions on bank activities and entry (i.e., based on 
bank regulatory on bank activities and entry), less disclosure and media freedom (i.e., 
less of transparency), and poorly developed physical infrastructure. However, the link 
is not much related to credit services. Apart from that, the study report no consistent 
relationship between market structure (bank concentration, government-owned banks 
and foreign-owned banks) and credit barriers. 
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2009) argue that usury ceilings or 
interest rate cap may inhibit the expansion of credit and increase actual costs paid by 
consumers although it designed to protect consumers. Beside disclosure requirement, 
interest rate ceilings or usury rates are the oldest form of consumer protection. 
Introduced in Babylon in 1750 B.C.E., the interet rate are still used in many 
                                              
25
 In this study, the result suggests that stronger investor protection and more efficient institutions are 
correlated with better access to credit. 
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countries. Throughout history, however, enforcement has proven problematic, with 
actual interest rates consistently exceeding the ceilings, sometimes by many 
multiples. In the Financial Access Survey, 39 countries have usury limits, while the 
other 97 countries do not. According to CGAP (2009), there is no clear pattern across 
regions and income groups in regulating interest rates and the overall interest rate in 
countries with usury ceilings does not differ systematically from that in countries 
without usury ceilings. Although interest is been considered as crucial aspect in credit 
barrier, evidence on its relationship is still lacking with exception of Sarma & Pais 
(2011)
26
.  
 
With respect to the health of banking system, Sarma & Pais (2011) use the non-
performing asset (NPA) and capital asset ratio (CAR) to examine its barrier to 
financial inclusion. The result shows that the level of NPA of the banking system in 
an economy is found to be significantly and negatively associated with financial 
inclusion. They argue that high NPA of a banking system is that NPAs are a result of 
providing credit to the low income groups (who are more likely to default). If lending 
to the poor and consequent default on their part was in fact the cause for NPA, then 
higher levels of NPAs should be associated with higher levels of financial inclusion. 
Since the results show the opposite, it signifies higher level of NPA to be associated 
with lower level of financial inclusion. Thus, they suggest that efforts to include more 
people into the financial system are not the significant cause for the NPA. In another 
proxy for the health of the banking system, the capital asset ratio (CAR) is found to 
have a negative coefficient that is significant at 0.05 level. Hence, the study shed 
lights that highly capitalised banking systems seem to be less inclusive. It implies that 
                                              
26
 The study found that the interest rate does not show any significant relationship with financial 
inclusion. 
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banking systems having high CAR tend to be more cautious in lending, thus 
negatively affecting financial inclusion. 
 
Other than that, Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) suggest that adequate civil rights as 
well as support to entrepreneurship would help dealing with financial exclusion. This 
is based on the results of the study that show that there are significant relationship 
between the determinants of financial inclusion and the determinants of access to 
entrepreneurship (i.e., civil liberties rating, legal rights index and paid-in minimal 
capital requirement). In addition, Honohan (2008) in his study found that there is a 
robust and highly significant coefficient on the mobile phone variables which reliably 
associated with financial inclusion. 
 
Looking at how the access indicators varies across regions of the developing world, 
Honohan (2008) find that some regions have some influence on access to finance. 
This study support the view of institutional approach in economic geography which 
tries to answer the question, ‖to what extent and in what ways are the processes of 
geographically uneven capitalist economic development shaped and mediated by the 
institutional structures?‖ (Martin, 2005, 79).  In this regard, region could be a 
plausible factor in shaping financial inclusion. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided further related survey of the literature related to financial 
inclusion. Principally, it can be argued that there is no systematic and standard 
measurement on financial inclusion. Moreover, the chapter discusses the financial 
inclusion determinants arising from both institutional settings and others. While other 
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determinants are found to be typically associated with financial inclusion, factors like 
interest rate, legal origin and geographical region, to a certain extent, show little 
evidence.  
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Chapter 4  
RESEARCH METHOD I: RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the basic research design and methodology used 
to conduct the present study. It begins by summarizing the key research focus. Next, 
section 4.3 discusses the models and techniques of empirical research method 
employed to analyze the data followed by section 4.4 to describe the variables 
definitions. The data collections is discussed in section 4.5. The final section 
concludes this chapter. 
4.2 Research Focus 
The focus of the research is to examine the role of financial system in shaping 
financial inclusion, as well as recognising other determinants of financial inclusion. In 
explaining the relationship between financial inclusion and financial system, the 
classification of financial system based on Islamic and conventional is developed 
since there is no such categorization is made before. Given there is still no systematic 
and standard measurement on financial inclusion available, the financial inclusion 
index is constructed in the present study. The index is later used to investigate factors 
contributing to financial inclusion. Those factors are selected based on a number of 
prior financial inclusion studies.  
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Against the backdrop ―the agenda on access to finance is still unfinished‖ (Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008), the present study specifically seeks to answer the following 
main questions: 
1. Does the Islamic financial sector (i.e., as proxied by the Islamic banking 
presence), has significant influence on financial inclusion?  
2. Are the empirical effects between Islamic financial sector and financial 
inclusion consistent with the theoretical presumption (i.e., Islamic banking is 
positively related with financial inclusion)? 
3. Do the financial inclusion determinants, especially the institutional settings 
that have been tested in prior studies remain significant in explaining factors 
associated with financial access?  
4. Are the financial inclusion determinants heterogeneous across the whole 
distribution of countries?  
 
In answering the above research questions, two parts of analyses are identified. The 
first part examines the relationship between the incidence of financial inclusion and 
the financial system. The second part deals with the other factors associated with 
financial inclusion. 
4.3 Research Method 
4.3.1 Financial inclusion determinants 
To answer the first three research questions, individual country‘s composite index of 
financial inclusion (henceforth CIFI) is modelled as a function of several financial 
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inclusion determinants including the types of financial system. Specifically, the 
following linear model is estimated on CIFI measures: 
 
                                                                                                            (4.1) 
where: 
     =    the logit function of country‘s CIFI, 
     =  vector of all explanatory variables affecting financial inclusion,  
      =   constant term, 
      =   disturbance term, 
       =   individual countries,  
       =   time period of variables‘ measurements, and 
k      =   quantity of explanatory variables. 
4.3.2 Testing procedures 
Principally, the testing procedures are divided into two parts. The objective of the first 
part is to answer the first three research questions, while the second part provides 
answer to the fourth research question. Univariate and multivariate statistical analyses 
are used to analyze the data. Detail discussions on the analyses are presented in the 
subsequent sub-sections. 
4.3.2.1  Pooled cross-sectional regressions 
Initially, the first and the second parts of the analysis are estimated using the pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method which yields the best linear unbiased estimated 
(BLUE). The OLS estimation is common in financial inclusion literature. With regard 
to the results of OLS, it has been identified that heteroskedasticity has some 
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potentially serious implications for inferences. This problem can be solved using the 
White's (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity procedure when the  
heteroskedasticity problem is reported (i.e., when the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level). In this regard, the robust t-statistic is 
reported using the OLS regressions with robust option. 
4.3.2.2  Analysis of panel data method 
Since there are some arguments that OLS results may be biased due to the failure to 
control  for country-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity [see, for example, Bevan & 
Danbolt (2004)], the panel data analysis is also conducted in the present study. In this 
regard, Eq. (4.1) is re-estimated using the analysis of panel data method. The method 
employs a one-way error component model for the disturbance,     , with 
 
                                                                                                                     (4.2) 
where: 
      =   countries fixed effects, and 
      =   remainder disturbance. 
 
Intuitively, Eq. (4.2) expands the disturbance term in Eq. (4.1) into two components 
and the countries‘ fixed effects become one of the parameter to be estimated. For the 
purpose of estimating the panel equation, the assumption of the    can be in two 
forms, namely fixed effects and random effects. Nonetheless, it ―is not as easy as a 
choice as it might seem‖ (Baltagi, 2005, p.19) to select between the fixed effects and 
the random effects. Hence, a formal Hausman specification test for fixed versus 
random effects panel estimation is performed to identify the suitable estimation 
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results with regard to the underlying assumption of    . The test‘s null hypothesis is 
that the difference in coefficient is not systematic (or random). 
 
A number of separate regressions are estimated as additional checks for robustness of 
the main results.  
4.3.2.3  Quantile regression 
Apart from the pooled OLS, quantile regression is used to examine the last research 
question (i.e., are the financial inclusion determinants heterogeneous across the whole 
distribution of countries?). Introduced by Koenker & Bassett (1978) and Koenker & 
Hallock (2001), the conditional quantile regression estimator can be employed to 
examine the entire distribution of a response variable, conditional on a set of 
covariates (i.e., explanatory variables). Particularly, this regression method estimates 
the coefficients of the inclusion barriers depending on the location (i.e.,  th quantile) 
of the conditional distribution of CIFI.  
 
Instead of running separate regressions, the quantile regression approach is used to 
segment the dependent variables into different subsets according to its conditional 
distribution. With regard to running separate regressions, Heckman (1979) argues that 
they have the tendency to produce inconsistent and biased estimates because of the 
sample selection bias. Furthermore, Gallant & Fuller (1973) and Ramsay (1988) also 
point out that running separate regressions are least-squares based and can be 
sensitive to the Gaussian assumption or to the presence of outliers. Montenegro 
(2001) also added that the quantile regression method could deal with the following 
issues:  
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i. frequently the error terms are not necessarily constant across a distribution 
thereby violating the axiom of homoscedasticity, 
ii. by focusing on the mean as a measure of location, information about the tails of 
a distribution are lost, 
iii. OLS is sensitive to extreme outliers that can distort the results significantly.  
 
These are all the advantages that make the quantile regression approach robust 
especially to departures from normality and skewed tails (Mata & Machado, 1996). 
In accordance with Eq. (4.1), the regression specification of the  th conditional 
quantile can be presented as follows: 
  
                                                (4.3) 
                       |          {         |   }                           (4.4) 
 
where:  
           |     =   th conditional quantile of     on the regressor variable    , 
    =  unknown parameters to be estimated for different values of   in (0,1), 
      |   = conditional distribution function of  , and 
    = disturbance term where it requires that             |     = 0. 
 
From the regression, the entire distribution of  , condition on  , can be traced by 
placing the value of   from 0 to 1. Regression for dependent variable is run 
simultaneously using the seven setting quantiles being examined in this study, namely 
5
th
, 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
 and 95
th
, which largely considers the whole distribution 
of the sample. As suggested by Efron (1980) and Buchinsky (1995, 1998), bootstrap 
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method is used to estimate the coefficients of the parameters. Particularly, 1,000 
bootstrap replications
27
 are employed and it is argued that the bootstrap estimate is 
evidence to be fairly robust (Buchinsky, 1995). 
 
The robustness of the quantiles regression results is examined by conducting inter-
quantile regression, where the disparity of the estimated coefficient between different 
quantiles is examined. The disparity is checked between the two extreme tails (95
th
 
and 5
th
), the right tail and the median (95
th
 and 50
th
), the median and the left tail (50
th
 
and 5
th
) and the two quartiles (75
th
 and 25
th
) respectively. The inter-quantile 
regression is modelled as higher quantile minus lower quantile, and the positive sign 
represents an ascending pattern of coefficients between the two quantiles while a 
negative sign indicates a descending pattern (Dzolkarnaini, 2009). 
4.4 Variables Definitions 
In general, the selection of variables is primarily based on the theoretical propositions 
of institutional theory as well as findings of prior empirical studies. Specifically, this 
study focuses on the determinants of the financial inclusion within the established 
institutional settings. Thus, the selected explanatory variables are those that seem 
plausible on a priori grounds and could explain the factors that affect financial 
inclusion.   
                                              
27
 1,000 bootstrap replications were applied in this study following Fattouh, Scaramozzino, & Harris 
(2005) and Chen, Kuan, & Lin (2007). 
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4.4.1 Dependent variable 
4.4.1.1  Cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) 
Following Sarma & Pais (2011), index of financial inclusion is employed as the 
primary financial inclusion measure in all analyses. As argued by Sarma (2008, 
2010), using indicators of financial access individually, provide only partial 
information on the inclusiveness of the financial system of an economy, which can 
lead to misleading understanding of the extent of financial inclusion in an economy. 
Therefore, a single measurement (i.e., in this case, index), is more appropriate in 
representing the inclusiveness of the financial system by taking into considerations 
some important aspects.  
 
The use of inclusion index is not relatively straightforward (i.e., since there are 
several formula as well as modifications made in computing the index). In response to 
this, CIFI in computed in this study. Detail discussion on the construction of the 
composite index is presented in Chapter 5. 
4.4.2 Explanatory variables 
As far as institutional theory is concerned, institutional setting variables are primarily 
observed along with the other variables associated with financial inclusion. Table 4.1 
overleaf provides a summary of description, definition and source of each other 
variable. The following variables are included by virtue of their potential to have 
indicatory power in explaining the factors associated with financial inclusion. The 
following sub sections further discuss the variables.  
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Table 4.1 Description of variables for investigating financial inclusion determinants 
 
Variable Definition Sources Date 
Islamic banking variable     
IB quantity  Total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in 
the banking system. 
Based on author‘s calculation using data from 
Bankscope, Islamic Banking Database created by 
the World Bank as well as various Islamic banks 
and central banks of the corresponding countries. 
  
IB size The average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks   
IB profitability The average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets 
of the Islamic bank 
  
Macroeconomics variable    
GDP per capita GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates/Total population World Development Indicators, World Bank  2007-2011 
Overall institutional environment   
Governance index Average score on six governance indicators (voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption). Higher score 
correspond to better governance. 
Authors‘ calculations based on Aggregate 
Governance Indicators, World Bank  
2007-2011 
 
Contractual and Informational Framework 
Credit information index Scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of 
credit information. 
World Bank Doing Business Indicators 2007-2011 
Legal rights index Scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Index 
measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate 
lending. 
Costs of enforcing contracts Total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court 
fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
Index of banking restrictions 
Index captures government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in 
financial sector. Higher values indicate more banking restrictions. 
Index of  Economic Freedom. The Heritage 
Foundation/The Wall Street Journal 
2007-2011 
 
Physical Infrastructure    
Paved road 
Paved roads (in km) per square km of land area (Sarma & Pais (2011) 
have repeated the same regression with paved roads 
per 1000 population and have obtained similar results) World Development Indicators, World Bank 2007-2011 
Phone Logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) 
Internet Number of internet users per 1000 subscription per 1000 population 
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Variable Definition Sources Date 
Interest Rates    
Deposit interest rate 
The rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or 
savings deposits. 
World Development Indicators, World Bank 2007-2011 
Lending interest rate 
The bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing 
needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated 
according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of 
financing. 
 
 
Legal Origin    
French legal origin 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of French Civil Law 
origin. 
La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) 
 
British legal origin 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of British Common 
Law origin. 
 
German legal origin 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of German Civil Law 
origin. 
 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil 
Law origin. 
 
Socialist legal origin Dummy equal to 1 if a country legal system is of Socialist Law origin. Siems (2006)  
Region    
Africa Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to Africa region 
World Bank 
 
East Asia & Pacific Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to  East Asia & Pacific region  
Europe & Central Asia 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to  Europe & Central Asia  
region 
 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to  Latin America & Caribbean  
region 
 
Middle East & North Africa 
Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to  Middle East & North Africa  
region 
 
South Asia Dummy equal to 1 if a country belong to  South Asia region  
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4.4.2.1  Institutional setting variables 
In this study, several institutional setting variables are included, namely financial 
system (i.e., proxied by the Islamic banking presence), overall institutional 
environment, contractual and informational framework, regulatory restrictions, legal 
origin as well as region. The variables are discussed as following: 
 
i. Financial system 
In terms of financial system, the impact of Islamic financial sector is not well 
explored. Following Ben Naceur et al., (2015), Islamic banking presence, is employed 
as the primary proxy for type of financial system in all analyses.  On top of the 
number and size of assets in Islamic banking
28
 that has been suggested by Ben Naceur 
et al., (2015), this present study adds another indicator to gauge the Islamic banking 
presence, namely profitability of Islamic banking. Detail discussion on the 
classification of financial system (i.e., proxied by the Islamic banking presence) is 
presented in Chapter 6. Using the two indicators of Islamic banking, Ben Naceur et 
al.,  (2015) find that the empirical link between financial inclusion and Islamic 
banking is mixed, i.e., Islamic banking in OIC countries is associated with greater use 
of bank credit by households and by firms, primarily for investment purposes, but find 
no significant association with ownership of accounts by households. 
 
ii. Overall institutional environment  
                                              
28
 In Ben Naceur et al., (2015) study, both indicators are scaled by the adult population. Similar results 
were obtained when scaling by total population or as a share of total number of banks or total assets of 
the banking system. 
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Overall institutional environment variable is gauge using the governance index. This 
index consists of score on six governance indicators (voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption). Higher score correspond to better governance. Considering the prediction 
of institutional theory, it is expected that countries with high level of governance 
index will have greater financial inclusion. The findings of Beck, et al., (2007) reveal 
that both outreach and depth indicators are positively associated with the quality of 
the institutional environment.  
 
iii. Contractual and informational framework 
Combining both studies by Beck, et al., (2007) and Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012), 
three variables are employed to examine the impact of contractual and informational 
framework on financially excluded. The informational environment is captured 
through a credit information index from the World Bank Doing Business Database, 
which measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit 
information available through either public or private bureaus. Higher values of the 
index (ranging from one to six) represent a better informational environment. The cost 
of contract enforcement (also from the Doing Business Database) measures the 
official cost of going through court procedures, including court costs and attorney fees 
where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, or the costs of an administrative 
debt recovery procedure, expressed as a percentage of the debt value. Beck, et al., 
(2007) find that outreach indicators are correlated with the credit information 
environment and with the cost of contract enforcement, while Beck et al., (2008) 
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uncover a weak association between these two variable and the barrier indicators
29
. 
With regards legal rights in getting credit (i.e., scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores 
increasing with legal rights, legal right index measures the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending),  Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) finds a 
positive and significant impact of this variable on those financially included. 
 
iv. Regulatory restrictions 
To capture regulatory restriction, index of banking restrictions is applied. This index 
captures government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector. 
Higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Beck et al., (2008) argue that bank 
regulations might have both a direct and indirect effect on financial inclusion. Their 
finding reveals that banks in economies with more restrictions on banking activities 
are found to discriminate those who are financially excluded in accessing deposit and 
lending services.  
 
v. Interest rate 
Both deposit and lending rates which are gathered from the World Development 
Indicators database, are used in this study. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) (2009) argue that usury ceilings or interest rate cap may inhibit the 
expansion of credit and increase actual costs paid by consumers although it designed 
to protect consumers. However, the evidence is remains lack and inconclusive. Sarma 
& Pais (2011) find negative sign for interest rate but found no significant association, 
                                              
29
 The barrier indicators, among others are minimum balance to open checking account (percent of 
GDP per capita), annual checking account fees (percent of GDP per capita), minimum amount 
consumer loan (percent of GDP per capita) and fee for using ATM card (percent of $100).  
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whereas Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) report negative relationship between the 
interest spread and credit.  
 
vi. Legal origin 
Following Beck, et al., (2007), this study further investigates the link between legal 
origin and financial access since the literature finds that economies with legal 
institutions based on the French Civil Code tend to be less financially developed than 
those that originated from the British Common Law. Following Siems (2006), 
socialist origin is added on top of the four legal origin classified by La Porta, et al. 
(1997). Beck, et al., (2007) find that legal origin and religion have a less consistent 
impact on financial outreach. 
 
vii. Region 
Except for Honohan (2008), as far as financial inclusion literature is concern, there is 
no attempt has been made before to explore the affect of region on financial inclusion 
in particular. Following the note from Martin (2000), this study introduces region 
variable to further examine the impact of this institutional setting on financial access. 
Six geographic regions based on World Bank database are observed, namely Africa, 
East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East 
& North Africa and South Asia. 
4.4.2.2  Other variables 
i. Macroeconomics variable 
Established in most of the financial development literature, GDP per capita variable is 
used to represent the macroeconomics aspect in examining the impact of this variable 
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on financial inclusion. On the one hand, Beck, et al., (2007) and Sarma & Pais (2011) 
find that access to finance is positively related to the GDP. On the other hand, Dabla-
norris, Ji, Townsend & Unsal (2015) find that GDP is more responsive to a decrease 
in credit participation costs, demonstrating that limited credit availability or lower 
financial access is attributed by GDP in different dimension.  
 
ii. Physical infrastructure 
Following Beck, et al., (2007), Beck et al., (2008) and Honohan (2008), physical 
infrastructure is further examined in the present study to uncover the great impact of 
this variable in driving financial inclusion. Using the World Development Indicators 
database, paved road, phone and internet are employed to capture the development of 
country‘s physical infrastructure. The above studies concluded that countries with 
physical infrastructure development impose higher access to finance. 
 
iii. Years of observation (2007 to 2011) 
The period of study (i.e., 2007 to 2011) is chosen to take into consideration the 
financial crisis impact on the Islamic finance industry in general and Islamic banking 
in particular, by which could affect the level of financial inclusion. With regards to 
efficiency and profitability of Islamic banking, with a few exceptions, existing studies 
that predate the crisis indicate that there are no significant differences between Islamic 
and conventional banks as far as their business orientation and efficiency is concerned 
(both Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Merrouche (2013) and Abedifar, Molyneux & Tarazi 
(2012) are comprehensive studies that also contain excellent literature reviews). 
Whereas, most recent studies comprising data for the crisis period indicate that, 
during the financial crisis, Islamic banks had more difficulties as compared to 
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conventional banks in maintaining their efficiency and profitability (Hasan & Dridi, 
2011; Rashwan, 2012).  
 
With regard to the stability and resilience of Islamic banks during this crisis period, 
Hasan and Dridi (2011) find that Islamic banks‘ financing and asset growth performed 
better than that of conventional banks did in 2008 to 2009. In a country-specific study, 
using data from 2002-2010 in Pakistan, Zaheer & Farooq (2011) find that Islamic 
banks are more stable than conventional banks but that Islamic banking branches are 
not. Conversely, a within-bank comparison shows that the Islamic banking branches 
of conventional banks are more stable than their conventional branches, though this 
difference decreases with as conventional banks become larger. Having the changes 
of Islamic finance landscape within the study period, it is possible to know how this 
relate to financial inclusion debates. 
4.5 Data Collections 
Principally, three parts of data collections are involved. The first and the primary part 
encompasses data collections for the financial inclusion index computation, which is 
discussed further in detail in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is designed to capture the second 
part of data collection, i.e., the financial system variable, which is proxied by Islamic 
banking presence. As for the third part of data collection, it involves data for the rest 
of the explanatory variables as summarized in Table 4.1 above. All these three parts 
are synchronised in the final stage of data collections. In the final stage, a balanced 
panel of 400 country-year obervations is used as the final sample in the present study, 
i.e., comprising of 80 countries, from year 2007 to 2011.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the fundamental research design of the present study. In 
particular, it has outlined the models and the empirical research techniques used in the 
analysis. The variables used are broadly defined while the data collections procedure 
is identified.  With this research framework at hand, the next two chapters are 
specifically devoted to discuss the two major data construction, namely the financial 
inclusion index and the financial system classification, proxied by Islamic banking 
presence.  
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Chapter 5  
RESEARCH METHOD II: FINANCIAL INCLUSION INDEX 
CONSTRUCTION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the construction of financial inclusion index. The chapter starts 
by discussing the background and the model of index computation. Section 5.3 and 
5.4 proceed by describing the variables used in the computation of the index as well 
as data and index justification, respectively. Results of the financial inclusion index 
are presented in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Cumulative Index of Financial Inclusion (CIFI) 
Sarma (2008, 2010) argues that any one single indicator is fails to adequately capture 
the extent of financial inclusion by giving statistical evidence. For instance, the 
number of bank accounts per 1000 adults is highest in Russia, followed by Thailand, 
Malaysia and Colombia. However, if we look at the number of bank branches per 
100,000 adult people, Russia ranks the lowest. Looking at another dimension of an 
inclusive banking system, that is, usage of the banking system in terms of the volume 
of credit and deposit, Argentina seems to be having very low credit to GDP ratio in 
spite of moderate density of bank accounts and bank branches. In India, in spite of 
low density of bank branches, the usage of the banking system in terms of volume of 
credit and deposit seems to be moderately high. 
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Therefore, a comprehensive measure, such the index computes in this present study, is 
required. As suggested by Sarma, the index should be able to incorporate information 
on several aspects (dimensions) of financial inclusion preferably in one single 
number. The single index which measures the level of financial inclusion could 
contributes to the literature in three aspects (Sarma, 2008 and 2010), namely: 
 Such a measure can be used to compare the levels of financial inclusion across 
economies and across states/provinces within countries at a particular time 
point. It also can be employed to monitor the progress of policy initiatives for 
financial inclusion in a country over a period of time.  
 Such a measure would be of academic interest to address issues put forward in 
the growing literature on financial inclusion. For example, scholars have 
attempted to investigate the barriers to financial inclusion. In order to examine 
such questions empirically, a robust and comprehensive measure of financial 
inclusion is required.  
 A good measure of financial inclusion should be constructed based on the 
following criteria: it should incorporate information on as many aspects 
(dimensions) of financial inclusion as possible; it should be easy and simple to 
compute and it should be comparable across countries. 
 
Hence, this section outlines the development of financial inclusion index with 
reference to studies done by Sarma (2008), Sarma (2010) and Sarma & Pais (2011). 
As highlighted by those studies, the index computed in the present study, i.e., 
cumulative index of financial inclusion (henceforth CIFI), has merit in the following 
aspects: 
i. Dimension indexes are combined to compute the final index.  
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ii. The index is based on a measure of the distance from the ideal
30
.  
iii. The min and max values for any dimension of the index may change for 
different points of time and if the number of countries in the set of 
countries change. By computing inclusion index in this manner, we are 
incorporating certain element of relativity in the inclusion index, i.e., it 
measures the extent of financial inclusion in an economy relative to the 
prevailing situation in all economies. Applying this, the index is a dynamic 
one. 
 
The CIFI takes values between 0 and 1, where zero indicating lowest financial 
inclusion (complete financial exclusion) and 1 indicating complete financial inclusion. 
5.2.1  Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, basically, this study follows the similar methodology and 
reasoning (i.e., dynamic concept) as employed by Sarma (2008), Sarma, (2010) and 
Sarma & Pais (2011). Hence, for each dimension (i.e., outreach, usage), n numbers of 
variables are included: 
 
                                                    =                                                  (5.1) 
 
where: 
D = inclusion dimension, 
x = variable, and 
i  = individual countries. 
 
                                              
30
 Distance-based approach satisfies several interesting and intuitive properties of a development index, 
viz. normalization, symmetry (or anonymity), monotonicity, proximity, uniformity and signalling 
(collectively termed NAMPUS). 
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For each variable, di is computed using the Linear Scaling Technique (LST) as shown 
in Eq. (5.2). A weight wi such that 0 < wi <  1  is attached to the dimension i, 
indicating the relative importance of the dimension i in quantifying the inclusiveness 
of a financial system: 
 
      =     
     
     
                                                          (5.2) 
     
 
where: 
   = Weight attached to the dimension i, 0 < wi <  1   
Ai = Actual value of dimension i, 
mi = minimum value of dimension i, 
Mi= maximum value of dimension i. 
 
Eq. (5.2) ensures that 0 ≤ di ≤ wi. Higher the value of di indicates higher achievement 
in dimension i of the country. If n dimensions of financial inclusion are considered, 
then, a country will be represented by a point D = (d1 , d2 , d3 , ….dn ) on the n-
dimensional Cartesian space. 
 
In the n-dimensional space, the point 0 = (0, 0, 0,…0) signifies the point indicating 
the worst situation while the point W = (w1, w2 ,…..wn ) denotes the highest 
achievement in all dimensions. The cumulative index of financial inclusion, CIFI, for 
a country, is then measured by the normalized inverse Euclidean distance of the point 
D from the ideal point I = (w1, w2 ,…..wn ). Thus, the formula is: 
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                          CIFI=    
√                              
√   
         
 
 
                             (5.3) 
 
where: 
d=  inclusion dimension, and 
n =  number of variable. 
 
In Eq. (5.3), the numerator of the second component is the Euclidean distance of D 
from the ideal point W, normalizing it by the denominator and subtracting by 1 gives 
the inverse normalized distance. The normalization is done in order to make the value 
lie between 0 and 1 and the inverse distance is considered so that higher value of the 
CIFI corresponds to higher financial inclusion. 
 
As an illustration, if we consider all dimensions to be equally important in measuring 
the inclusiveness of a financial system, then wi = 1 for all i. In this case, the ideal 
situation will be represented by the point I = (1,1,1,…,1) in the n-dimensional space 
and the formula for CIFI will be: 
 
                                CIFI=    
√                           
√ 
                (5.4) 
 
Depending on the value of CIFI, countries can be classified into three levels of 
financial inclusion, namely:  
i.  0.5 < CIFI ≤ 1  : high  
ii. 0.30 ≤ CIFI < 0.49  : medium  
iii.  0 ≤ CIFI < 0.29 : low  
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The CIFI thus, can be employed to measure financial inclusion at different point of 
time and at different levels of economic aggregation (country, state, province, etc). 
5.2.2  The present index 
It is worth noting that an inclusive financial system should tackle all the basic 
financial services (i.e., savings, credit, insurance and banking transactions) in all 
dimensions (i.e., outreach, usage, ease and cost).  However, due to data limitation, this 
present study covers only savings and credit in two dimensions, namely outreach and 
usage.    
 
As far as assigning appropriate weights is concern, as highlighted in Sarma (2008 and 
2010), the lack of sufficient data on important indicators that completely characterize 
the outreach and usage dimensions renders us to give less weight to these dimensions 
in the present index. With regards to outreach of banking services, many countries 
have moved towards internet banking, thus reducing the importance of physical bank 
outlets (i.e. bank branches and ATMs). Some countries also offer banking services 
through telephones as well as internet. Thus, using data only on bank branches and 
ATMs can give an incomplete picture of the outreach of banking services. Likewise, 
data on credit and deposit can only partly represent the usage of the financial system 
as other services of the banking system, such as payments, transfers and remittances 
are not taken into account. In the absence of such data, a complete characterization of 
these dimensions is not possible. 
 
Unlike Sarma (2008 and 2010), the present index calculate the usage dimension index 
for both credit and deposit. Thus, for CIFI, the following weights are assigned, (i) 0.5 
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for the index of outreach, and (ii) 0.5 for the index of usage, both for credit and 
deposit. This allows for specific index for each financial service tracking purposes, if 
possible.  Given these weights, the present index can represent a country k by a point 
(ok , uCreditk, uDepositk ) in the two dimensional Cartesian space, such that 0 ≤ ak 
≤0.5, 0 ≤ uCreditk ≤0.5, 0 ≤ uDepositk ≤0.5where ak, uCreditk and uDepositk  are the 
dimension indexes for country k computed using Eq. (5.2). In the three dimensional 
Cartesian space, the point (0,0,0) will indicate the worst situation (complete financial 
exclusion) and the point (0.5,0.5,0.5) will indicate the best or ideal situation (complete 
financial inclusion) in the present context. 
 
The CIFI for the country k is measured by the normalized inverse Euclidean distance 
of the point (ok , uCreditk, uDepositk) from the ideal point (0.5, 0.5, 0.5). 
Algebraically,  
 
                     CIFI=    √
                                            
    
            (5.5) 
 
 
Following Sarma & Pais (2011), in the regression equations, the dependent variable is 
a logit transformation of the cumulative index of financial inclusion described earlier. 
Unlike the CIFI which lies between 0 and 1, the transformed variable lies between -∞ 
and ∞. Applying this, classical OLS regression as well as panel data regression can be 
carried out.  The transformed variable is a monotonically increasing function of CIFI, 
and thus it preserves the same ordering as CIFI. The transformed variable is a logit 
function of the original variable CIFI, as defined below: 
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                                                       (
    
      
)                                                     (5.6) 
 
 
The general form of the regression equation is as following: 
 
                                                                                         (5.7) 
 
where   ,   , and so on are regressor variables,   ,    and so on are the parameters to 
be estimated from the data and   is the error term following classical OLS 
assumptions. The rate of change of   with respect to a unit change in the variable    
will be given by the derivative of y with respect to   , which is 
 
                                              
  
   
  
            
             
                                                    (5.8) 
 
Therefore, the direction of change in   corresponding to a unit change in    is 
determined by the sign of    while the magnitude of the change depends on the value 
of    as well as   . 
5.3 Variables Definitions 
This section describes the variables for each financial inclusion indicators (i.e., 
dimensions). Table 5.1 provides a summary of description, indicators and definition 
of each variable. Based on the basic dimensions, the following variables are included 
by virtue of their potential to have indicatory power in examining financial inclusion. 
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Table 5.1 Description of variables for inclusion index computation 
 
Description Dimension/Indicator Variable 
Cumulative 
Index of 
Financial 
Inclusion 
(CIFI) 
Outreach (o) 
 Number of bank branches per 1,000 km2 
 Number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km2 
Usage (uCredit)  Outstanding loans (% of GDP) 
Usage (uDeposit)  Outstanding savings (% of GDP) 
5.4 Data and Index Justification  
5.4.1 Data collections 
Ideally, one should take into consideration all the dimensions in all the financial 
services to capture the inclusiveness of financial system across countries. However, 
availability of data is always the challenge, as mentioned by prior research. Currently, 
a single database on all the four types of financial inclusion with all four dimensions 
is absent.  
 
Due to data constraint and complexity of inclusion measurement, only data from the 
banking institution are taken. For the index computation, a few databases are referred 
to represent the two dimensions.  Basically, data on usage and outreach dimensions 
for savings and deposit are gained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
through Financial Access Survey (FAS) database
31
. Although data on usage for 
banking transaction is available from the World Bank through Global Financial 
                                              
31
 The FAS is the sole source of global supply-side data on financial inclusion, encompassing 
internationally comparable basic indicators of financial access and usage. In addition to providing 
policy makers and researchers with annual geographic and demographic data on access to basic 
consumer financial services worldwide, the FAS is the data source for the G-20 Basic Set of Financial 
Inclusion Indicators endorsed by the G-20 Leaders at the Los Cabos Summit in June 2012.  The FAS 
database currently contains annual data for 187 jurisdictions, including all G20 economies, covering an 
eight-year period (2004-2011), totaling more than 40,000 time series. For more detail, 
referhttp://fas.imf.org/. 
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Inclusion (Global Findex) database
32
, only data in year 2011 is available. 
Additionally, only the World Bank (2007)
33
 database provides ease and cost 
dimensions. The data, however, only covers year of 2007.  
 
Initial sample was 213 countries (or 1,065 country-year observations). Countries with 
index variable not available were removed from the initial sample.  A total of 132 
countries (or 660 country-year observations) were removed due to the data 
availability constraint. The final sample contains a balanced panel of 80 countries or 
400 country-year observations. 
5.4.2 Index justification 
Irrespective of which dimensions and formula employed in constructing the index, it 
has to ensure the validity and reliability of the index. Both issues have been 
considered in the present study in constructing CIFI. The following sub sections 
discuss these elements in detail. 
5.4.2.1  Index validity 
In brief, validity refers to ‗a test of how well an instrument measures whatever 
concept it is measuring‘ (Sekaran, 2003). Specifically, two types of validity aspects 
are considered in the index construction, namely content and construct validity.  
                                              
32
 Authored by Demirguc-kunt and Klapper (2012), the Global Findex indicators are drawn from 
survey data collected by Gallup, Inc. over the 2011 calendar year, covering more than 150,000 
individuals in 148 economies and representing more than 97 percent of the world's adult population. 
The questionnaire was translated into 142 languages, and interviews were conducted face-to-face or via 
telephone. The complete set of Global Findex indicators will be collected again in 2014 and 2017. For 
more detail, refer http://microdata.worldbank.org and Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper (2012). 
33
 The database is based on survey conducted by Demirguc-Kunt, Thorsten Beck and Patric Honohan 
under World Bank. They introduced east and cost barrier (i.e., dimension) for composite measure of 
access to financial services. 
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Content validity specifies whether the instrument ‗adequately measures the concept of 
interest‘ (Sekaran, 2003), i.e., in this case, the formula and indicators used in the CIFI 
computation. As far as index formula is concern, for the purpose of the present study, 
the index is constructed using formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). Apart from 
what has been stated earlier, this formula has some other advantage over the other 
formula used in the previous studies in a few aspects as highlighted by Sarma (2008, 
2010) as following: 
 The formula follows a multidimensional approach of index construction 
similar to the UNDP approach for computation of some well-known 
development indexes such as the HDI, the HPI, the GDI and so on
34
. 
 Instead of using average calculation approach (i.e., as used in the UNDP‘s 
indexes computation), this formula is based on a measure of the distance from 
the ideal approach which satisfies several interesting and intuitive properties 
of a development index, i.e., normalization, symmetry (or anonymity), 
monotonicity, proximity, uniformity and signalling (collectively termed 
NAMPUS). 
 This measure can be used to compare the levels of financial inclusion across 
economies and across states/provinces within countries at a particular time 
point. It also can be employed to monitor the progress of policy initiatives for 
financial inclusion in a country over a period of time.  
 Using the formula, information on many aspects (dimensions) of financial 
inclusion could be incorporated; thus CIFI is easy and simple to compute and 
it could be comparable across countries. 
 
                                              
34
 Refer <www.undp.org> for more details. 
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In terms of indicators, CIFI is computed using the indicators constructed by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, et al. (2007) as listed in section 5.3 above. The validity of the 
indicators has been verified by some robustness tests. The indicators even have been 
used in Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) study to examine the barriers to financial 
inclusion. 
 
The CIFI computation is further verified using the construct validity. Construct 
validity examined ‗how well the results obtained from the use of the measure fit the 
theories around which the test is designed‘ (Sekaran, 2003). In this case, following the 
approach done by Sarma & Pais (2011), CIFI is compared with human development 
index (HDI). Table 5.2 presents the CIFI mean value for 80 countries and 
corresponding HDI
35
 mean value along with their rank.  
 
Table 5.2 Cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) and human 
development index (HDI), mean value 
 
No. Country Cumulative index of  
financial inclusion (CIFI) 
Human development 
index (HDI) 
Mean Country rank Mean Country rank 
1 Albania 0.271 28 0.715 48 
2 Algeria 0.171 50 0.714 49 
3 Angola 0.152 55 0.493 72 
4 Argentina 0.045 75 0.801 30 
5 Armenia 0.091 66 0.713 50 
6 Australia 0.313 20 0.923 2 
7 Austria 0.166 52 0.871 17 
8 Azerbaijan 0.054 72 0.724 47 
9 Bangladesh 0.271 29 0.537 66 
10 Belarus 0.170 51 0.767 33 
11 Belgium 0.377 13 0.878 14 
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.253 36 0.710 51 
13 Botswana 0.123 61 0.660 58 
14 Bulgaria 0.343 17 0.766 34 
15 Burundi 0.033 79 0.370 80 
16 Cambodia 0.122 62 0.523 68 
17 Canada 0.365 14 0.901 8 
18 Chile 0.255 35 0.808 28 
19 Costa Rica 0.229 41 0.743 38 
20 Croatia 0.338 18 0.801 31 
                                              
35
 Before 2010, HDI data is reported once in five years‘ time. Therefore, the mean value for HDI is 
calculated by the author using data in year 2005 (i.e., to represent data in 2007 to 2009), 2010 and 
2011. 
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No. Country Cumulative index of  
financial inclusion (CIFI) 
Human development 
index (HDI) 
Mean Country rank Mean Country rank 
21 Czech Republic 0.405 10 0.859 22 
22 Dominican Republic 0.078 68 0.694 55 
23 Egypt 0.300 23 0.670 56 
24 France 0.191 48 0.877 16 
25 Georgia 0.117 63 0.729 41 
26 Germany 0.129 59 0.901 7 
27 Greece 0.402 11 0.861 20 
28 Honduras 0.237 38 0.602 63 
29 Hungary 0.245 37 0.815 25 
30 India 0.276 27 0.574 65 
31 Indonesia 0.154 54 0.657 59 
32 Iran 0.206 45 0.728 42 
33 Ireland 0.205 46 0.904 5 
34 Israel 0.463 3 0.880 12 
35 Italy 0.424 5 0.866 19 
36 Jamaica 0.134 57 0.728 43 
37 Japan 0.508 2 0.881 11 
38 Jordan 0.424 6 0.740 39 
39 Kenya 0.200 47 0.515 69 
40 Korea 0.463 4 0.878 15 
41 Kuwait 0.288 24 0.805 29 
42 Kyrgyz Republic 0.038 76 0.629 61 
43 Latvia 0.266 30 0.810 27 
44 Lebanon 0.222 44 0.749 36 
45 Lesotho 0.078 69 0.463 75 
46 Macedonia 0.237 39 0.496 71 
47 Madagascar 0.021 80 0.401 78 
48 Malawi 0.072 70 0.758 35 
49 Malaysia 0.408 8 0.739 40 
50 Mexico 0.064 71 0.667 57 
51 Moldova 0.190 49 0.602 64 
52 Morocco 0.388 12 0.388 79 
53 Mozambique 0.124 60 0.906 4 
54 Netherlands 0.405 9 0.902 6 
55 New Zealand 0.266 31 0.612 62 
56 Nicaragua 0.145 56 0.937 1 
57 Norway 0.349 16 0.515 70 
58 Pakistan 0.132 58 0.710 52 
59 Peru 0.107 64 0.822 23 
60 Poland 0.223 43 0.812 26 
61 Portugal 0.309 21 0.774 32 
62 Russian Federation 0.162 53 0.436 77 
63 Rwanda 0.034 77 0.880 13 
64 Singapore 0.851 1 0.817 24 
65 Slovak Republic 0.226 42 0.870 18 
66 Slovenia 0.334 19 0.636 60 
67 South Africa 0.288 25 0.861 21 
68 Spain 0.262 32 0.899 10 
69 Sweden 0.282 26 0.918 3 
70 Switzerland 0.258 33 0.485 74 
71 Tanzania 0.082 67 0.707 53 
72 Thailand 0.349 15 0.706 54 
73 Tunisia 0.300 22 0.725 46 
74 Turkey 0.230 40 0.459 76 
75 Uganda 0.047 74 0.728 44 
76 Ukraine 0.256 34 0.899 9 
77 United Kingdom 0.412 7 0.745 37 
78 Venezuela 0.100 65 0.489 73 
79 Yemen 0.034 78 0.537 67 
80 Zambia 0.054 73 0.726 45 
Note: The HDI mean value is calculated based on data in year 2005, 2010 and 2011. The HDI ranks are re-ranks 
based on the HDI mean value for the set of 80 countries.  
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A comparison of CIFI with HDI shows that most of the countries with high and 
medium CIFI values belong to the group that is categorized by the UNDP as countries 
with high human development (i.e., HDI > 0.7). Germany, a high HDI country is 
reported to have a low CIFI value. Other countries having a high or medium HDI 
value but a low CIFI are Lebanon, Argentina and Mexico, the same as reported in 
Sarma & Pais (2011). Apart of these exceptions, CIFI and HDI seem to move in the 
same direction. As seen in Table 5.2, the CIFI and HDI for the set of 80 countries 
move closely with each other. This is again, consistent with Sarma & Pais (2011) 
findings.  
 
Additionally, the correlation coefficient between CIFI and HDI mean values is found 
to be about 0.30 and is statistically significant
36
. Hence, this can be generally 
concluded that countries belong to high level of human development are also 
countries that relatively have medium to high level of financial inclusion, which in 
this case, the CIFI is consistent with the index of financial inclusion (IFI) constructed 
by Sarma (2008, 2010).   
5.4.2.2  Reliability of the index 
Very briefly, the reliability of a measure indicates ‗the extent to which it is without 
bias and thus warrants consistent measurement which indicate the stability and 
consistency of the measurement‘ (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
To ensure the reliability of the index, firstly, we compare the outcome of index 
constructed in the present study with other studies. The detail of the comparison is 
                                              
36
 The calculated value is significant at 1% level of significance.  
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made in section 5.5.1 below under the general description of CIFI results. In sum, if 
compared the composite index with previous studies, the results are tend to show the 
consistency. Secondly, we also consider the findings of most of financial inclusion 
studies especially Beck, et al., (2007) and Sarma & Pais (2011) regarding its 
relationship with one of the main determinants of financial inclusion, i.e., the GDP 
per capita. It is establishes that this variable, which represent the income levels, is one 
of the important factor in explaining financial inclusion (Sarma & Pais, 2011).  
 
Therefore, the CIFI variable (i.e. the transformed CIFI
37
) is regressed over GDP per 
capita. As observed in Table 5.3 overleaf, the result of regression shows that the 
coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and highly significant with financial 
inclusion. Thus, this can be generally concluded that CIFI computed in the present 
study could be used as measurement for level of financial inclusion in a particular 
country.  
 
Table 5.3 Realibility test for CIFI 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t p > | | 
ln(GDP) 0.17*** 0.01 12.53 0.00 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The 
dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by 
Sarma (2008, 2010). GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market 
exchange rates divided by total population). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
(2-tail test). 
 
5.5 Results of Financial Inclusion Index Computation 
This section presents the outcome of the index computation. General descriptive 
statistics of the index are presented, followed by the empirical distribution of the 
                                              
37
 Fore detail, refer section 4.3.1 in Chapter 4.  
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index (i.e., based on level of inclusion and marginal changes) in order to gain a better 
understanding on the index.  
5.5.1 General descriptive statistics of financial inclusion index 
Table 5.2 presents the countries‘ CIFI values for various countries for the years 2007 
– 2011. The numbers of countries for the index computation are the same for different 
years since balanced panel data is used based on the availability of data on the 
component of dimensions and type of financial services that are considered in 
computing the index. As evident from Table 5.4 and as expected, different countries 
around the world are relatively at different levels of financial inclusion. With regard 
to CIFI, among 80 countries in the year of 2007 to 2011, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, 
Czech and Greece are those among the highest ranked countries, whereas 
Madagascar, Kyrgyz Republic, Uganda, Georgia and Armenia are among the 
countries that fall under the countries ranked at the bottom of the list.  
 
If compared the composite index with previous studies, the results are tend to show 
the consistency. With two sets of composite indexes computation [i.e., using data on 
two (100 countries) and three dimensions (55 countries) of financial inclusion, 
respectively) in year 2004, results of study by Sarma (2008) show that Malaysia, 
Greece and Czech are also among the highest ranked countries. Similarly, 
Madagascar, Uganda and Georgia appear under the countries ranked at the lower of 
the list. Moreover, results in study by Arora (2010) also show the same tendency. 
Using data in year 2007 [i.e., with inclusion of three dimensions (i.e., outreach, ease 
and cost)], the results show that Korea, Italy and Greece are among those countries 
 124 
 
within the high ranked index, while Madagascar and Uganda are among the low 
ranked index.  
 
Table 5.4 CIFI values for various countries, 2007-2011 
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Overall 
Mean 
Country 
rank 
Singapore 0.979 0.894 0.858 0.848 0.674 0.851 1 
Japan 0.513 0.515 0.510 0.505 0.498 0.508 2 
Israel 0.464 0.468 0.465 0.457 0.464 0.463 3 
Korea 0.442 0.465 0.466 0.465 0.478 0.463 4 
Italy 0.418 0.438 0.440 0.414 0.413 0.424 5 
Jordan 0.423 0.426 0.421 0.425 0.426 0.424 6 
United Kingdom 0.411 0.440 0.431 0.396 0.379 0.412 7 
Malaysia 0.426 0.431 0.404 0.394 0.385 0.408 8 
Netherlands 0.409 0.435 0.416 0.382 0.385 0.405 9 
Czech Republic 0.388 0.403 0.406 0.408 0.418 0.405 10 
Greece 0.414 0.433 0.428 0.379 0.359 0.402 11 
Morocco 0.381 0.390 0.390 0.389 0.393 0.388 12 
Belgium 0.267 0.328 0.389 0.431 0.467 0.377 13 
Canada 0.348 0.352 0.363 0.369 0.394 0.365 14 
Thailand 0.350 0.358 0.346 0.337 0.354 0.349 15 
Norway 0.343 0.361 0.356 0.337 0.346 0.349 16 
Bulgaria 0.332 0.341 0.342 0.348 0.349 0.343 17 
Croatia 0.326 0.328 0.331 0.350 0.356 0.338 18 
Slovenia 0.326 0.331 0.339 0.335 0.339 0.334 19 
Australia 0.310 0.328 0.329 0.288 0.312 0.313 20 
Portugal 0.324 0.336 0.314 0.277 0.295 0.309 21 
Tunisia 0.279 0.286 0.290 0.313 0.332 0.300 22 
Egypt 0.336 0.319 0.290 0.282 0.274 0.300 23 
Kuwait 0.279 0.257 0.339 0.310 0.254 0.288 24 
South Africa 0.297 0.306 0.288 0.273 0.275 0.288 25 
Sweden 0.309 0.270 0.281 0.265 0.286 0.282 26 
India 0.250 0.275 0.278 0.281 0.298 0.276 27 
Albania 0.245 0.256 0.260 0.285 0.311 0.271 28 
Bangladesh 0.238 0.247 0.272 0.286 0.310 0.271 29 
Latvia 0.270 0.255 0.264 0.273 0.269 0.266 30 
New Zealand 0.276 0.275 0.266 0.240 0.271 0.266 31 
Spain 0.250 0.285 0.279 0.224 0.272 0.262 32 
Switzerland 0.256 0.315 0.275 0.223 0.220 0.258 33 
Ukraine 0.249 0.271 0.257 0.254 0.248 0.256 34 
Chile 0.244 0.268 0.255 0.247 0.260 0.255 35 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.249 0.248 0.246 0.258 0.266 0.253 36 
Hungary 0.228 0.247 0.248 0.248 0.251 0.245 37 
Honduras 0.251 0.242 0.232 0.231 0.230 0.237 38 
Macedonia 0.207 0.228 0.229 0.254 0.267 0.237 39 
Turkey 0.185 0.214 0.225 0.258 0.269 0.230 40 
Costa Rica 0.211 0.240 0.236 0.225 0.234 0.229 41 
Slovak Republic 0.201 0.223 0.226 0.236 0.245 0.226 42 
Poland 0.182 0.221 0.221 0.236 0.254 0.223 43 
Lebanon 0.221 0.216 0.215 0.229 0.230 0.222 44 
Iran 0.183 0.210 0.225 0.203 0.211 0.206 45 
Ireland 0.147 0.157 0.164 0.249 0.307 0.205 46 
Kenya 0.169 0.188 0.181 0.219 0.242 0.200 47 
France 0.170 0.178 0.183 0.206 0.218 0.191 48 
Moldova 0.196 0.190 0.183 0.178 0.204 0.190 49 
Algeria 0.164 0.161 0.185 0.173 0.171 0.171 50 
Belarus 0.121 0.130 0.166 0.197 0.234 0.170 51 
Austria 0.169 0.165 0.167 0.165 0.166 0.166 52 
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Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Overall 
Mean 
Country 
rank 
Russian Federation 0.143 0.147 0.166 0.168 0.187 0.162 53 
Indonesia 0.154 0.149 0.138 0.155 0.174 0.154 54 
Angola 0.082 0.109 0.205 0.174 0.190 0.152 55 
Nicaragua 0.146 0.140 0.134 0.148 0.159 0.145 56 
Jamaica 0.140 0.141 0.130 0.126 0.131 0.134 57 
Pakistan 0.169 0.156 0.118 0.113 0.103 0.132 58 
Germany 0.124 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.135 0.129 59 
Mozambique 0.077 0.097 0.137 0.157 0.149 0.124 60 
Botswana 0.125 0.117 0.137 0.117 0.119 0.123 61 
Cambodia 0.089 0.095 0.113 0.139 0.173 0.122 62 
Georgia 0.099 0.113 0.104 0.127 0.141 0.117 63 
Peru 0.084 0.112 0.101 0.114 0.123 0.107 64 
Venezuela 0.108 0.092 0.102 0.085 0.112 0.100 65 
Armenia 0.039 0.054 0.088 0.114 0.159 0.091 66 
Tanzania 0.063 0.079 0.074 0.089 0.104 0.082 67 
Dominican Republic 0.078 0.069 0.070 0.081 0.091 0.078 68 
Lesotho 0.075 0.069 0.069 0.078 0.097 0.078 69 
Malawi 0.029 0.060 0.064 0.073 0.134 0.072 70 
Mexico 0.054 0.060 0.060 0.067 0.077 0.064 71 
Azerbaijan 0.041 0.044 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.054 72 
Zambia 0.052 0.062 0.042 0.049 0.063 0.054 73 
Uganda 0.025 0.047 0.036 0.057 0.072 0.047 74 
Argentina 0.050 0.036 0.032 0.045 0.061 0.045 75 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.047 0.038 0.040 0.031 0.033 0.038 76 
Rwanda 0.026 0.043 0.024 0.030 0.047 0.034 77 
Yemen 0.043 0.037 0.041 0.027 0.021 0.034 78 
Burundi 0.028 0.021 0.025 0.041 0.052 0.033 79 
Madagascar 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.022 0.028 0.021 80 
The CIFI values in this table are based on author‘s calculation using formula initiated by Sarma (2008 and 2010).  
Source of data: Financial Access Survey (FAS) database of IMF.  
5.5.2 Empirical distribution of the inclusion index 
This section endeavours the understanding of the inclusion index through the 
empirical distribution based on two aspects, namely level of inclusion index and 
marginal differences (i.e., percentage of changes in the inclusion index values 
between years). 
5.5.2.1  Distribution based on level of inclusion index 
In this brief discussion of the computed CIFI results, countries are categorized into 
three levels of financial inclusion depending on their index values, namely (i) index 
values between 0.49 and 1 are categorized as high CIFI countries, (ii) 0.39 and 0.5 as 
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medium CIFI countries and (iii) CIFI values less than 0.29 are classified as low CIFI 
countries.  
 
The empirical distribution of CIFI based on level of inclusion is depicted in Figure 
5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Empirical distribution of CIFI 
 
 
This shows that the distribution is highly left-skewed (i.e., the mass of the distribution 
is concentrated on the low level of CIFI) but substantial (little) variation in the CIFI 
across countries (through time) is noticeable. A cross-sectional comparison shows 
that, only around 3% of the countries belong to high level of CIFI, about 65%-75% 
have low level of CIFI and about 25%-30% are in medium level of CIFI. Over the 
periods, there is a gradual decrease in the percentage of countries with low level of 
CIFI which symmetrically resulted in a gradual increase of countries with medium 
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studies, the results are consistent in some aspects of study. Result in a recent study by 
Sarma (2012) shows that the proportion of low index of financial inclusion (IFI) is 
decreasing from year 2004 to 2010. Likewise, the proportion of low CIFI in this study 
demonstrates the same result where the percentages are declining from year 2007 
through 2011 but report gradual increase within the years. 
 
The cross-sectional small variation in the countries‘ CIFI, to a certain extent, can be 
explained by the fact that the issue of financial inclusion is still unresolved and 
unfinished agenda as mentioned by Beck & Demirguc-Kunt (2008). Possible 
explanations for this could be, the various factors contributing to financial inclusion 
are far from conclusive to be translated into possible policies in order increase and 
promote financial inclusion. 
 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 overleaf further illustrate the CIFI distribution according to 
countries‘ income level (i.e., based on GNP per capita38) and types of financial system 
(Islamic and pure conventional system
39
). 
                                              
38
 As of 1 July 2012, the World Bank income classifications by GNI per capita are: Low income: 
$1,025 or less; Lower middle income: $1,026 to $4,035; Upper middle income: $4,036 to $12,475; 
High income: $12,476 or more. 
39
 Islamic banking presence is used as the main proxy to distinguish the two types of financial system. 
For more details, refer Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.2 Empirical distribution of CIFI based on GNP per capita 
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Figure 5.3   Empirical distribution of CIFI based on classification of financial 
system 
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With respect to CIFI, as compared with the study by Sarma (2012), the results are as 
expected, i.e., as the level of countries‘ income level increase, the inclusion level is 
higher. Putting it differently, the proportion of low inclusion level is smaller in high 
income countries and vice versa. Moreover, except for high income countries, CIFI 
results show that the trend is relatively the same for all levels of countries‘ income, 
i.e., the percentages of countries under the low inclusion level are still dominant. 
However, the level of inclusion is improving for upper middle and high income 
countries. 
 
With regards to the types of financial system, the distributions show interesting 
results. The proportions of low inclusion levels are striking (i.e., in the countries with 
Islamic banking presence as compared to its counterpart). In contrast, in countries 
without Islamic banking presence, the proportion of medium CIFI level is higher. This 
relatively illustrates the type of financial system affect financial inclusion. 
5.5.2.2  Distribution based on marginal differences 
Empirical distribution based on marginal differences is added in the present study. 
Bearing in mind that financial inclusion is a complex issue
40
, there are too many 
issues that need to be studied. Hence, changes over years is considered an important 
matter to gauge the progress of financial inclusion rather than examining this issue 
based on solely on the level of inclusion.   
 
                                              
40
There are many perspectives in the discussion of financial inclusion -  types of financial services 
affected (World Bank, 1995), financial services providers who responsible to it, different factors from 
different dimensions associated to it (demand, supply and economic factors), both households and 
small firms affected from it, different approach of the study (i.e., micro and macro) and so on so forth. 
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The empirical distribution of CIFI based on marginal differences is described in 
Figure 5.4. This illustrates that the distribution is mixed and various, despite the 
distribution between year 2008 and 2010 shows substantial variation with more 
countries experienced more than 5% decline in CIFI values. The variation, both in 
terms of the CIFI values across countries and the changes of CIFI values, is 
noticeable. A cross-sectional assessment shows that thecountries‘ CIFI values 
decrease considerably from year 2008 to 2010 with the percentages of decline almost 
30%. It also appears that majority of the countries have more than 25% increase in 
CIFI values in the year 2011. Over the countries, there is a disparity in the positive 
percentage of change in CIFI values in the year 2011 as opposed to negative 
percentages changes in CIFI values in year 2008. The cross-sectional variation in the 
percentage changes of CIFI values can better be explained by the various factors 
which are further examined in Chapter 7 and 8 (e.g., regulatory restrictions, physical 
infrastructure, interest rates and legal origin).  
 
Figures 5.5 further depicts the percentage changes of CIFI values based on countries‘ 
income level (i.e., based on GNP per capita). Both low income and lower middle 
income countries show considerable striking changes in CIFI values throughout the 
year of study as opposed to upper middle and high income countries, which recorded 
relatively marginal changes in the CIFI values in the same year. Overall, these results 
indicate that lower income countries are prone to any changes in the economy, which 
in turn affect the level of financial inclusion.  
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Figure 5.4 Empirical distribution of marginal differences in CIFI values 
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As far as the types of financial system are concern, the variation of indices values 
over years is also interesting to be examined. This is due to the fact that the growth of 
the Islamic financial sector between  the year of  2006 and 2010 has surpassed the 
growth of the conventional financial sector in all segments of the market in several 
Muslim-majority countries (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2013). Figure 5.6 illustrates the 
marginal differences of CIFI values according to type of financial system classified in 
this study. This shows that there is some significant difference in terms of the 
variation between the two types of financial system. The cross-sectional comparison 
shows that countries without Islamic banking presence experienced more increasing 
in CIFI values in between year 2008 to 2011 as compared to countries with Islamic 
banking presence. This suggests that the growth of Islamic finance industry is not 
necessarily drive financial inclusion. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides methodology in the computation of financial inclusion index. 
Due to data constraints, out of the four basic types of financial services put forward by 
the World Bank, only two are included i.e., credits and deposits, with the outreach and 
usage dimensions. Apart from the index validity and reliability, results of the index 
computation are also discussed in detail. All areas of the index‘s discussions play an 
important role in conducting the present study.  
 
 
 134 
 
Figure 5.5 Empirical distribution of marginal differences in CIFI values based on GNP per capita 
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Chapter 6  
RESEARCH METHOD III: ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL-BASED 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the procedures and method of identifying indicators to proxy 
for the Islamic type of financial system. This chapter starts by discussing the basis of 
existing classification of financial system in section 6.2. Next, the comprehensive 
conceptual framework concerning the financial system classification is presented in 
section 6.3. In this section, Islamic banking presence indicators and the context of 
definition for the Islamic and conventional-based financial system are described. 
Variables and data collections are further discussed in section 6.4 and section 6.5, 
respectively. The outcome of financial system based on Islamic and purely 
conventional approach is presented in section 6.6. Section 6.7 summarizes the 
chapter.  
6.2 Basis of Financial System Classification 
The idea of classifying financial system is not something new. Generally, 
conventional wisdom holds that there are basically two types of financial systems, 
namely bank-based and market-based. Bank-based and market-based financial 
systems is concerning about financial structure in development of economics which 
focus on the relation between a country‘s financial system (i.e., bank-based or market-
based) and its economic development (see for example, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
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Maksimovic, 2002; Levine, 2002; Beck & Levine, 2002). Principally, this 
classification is based on financial market structure (Veysov & Stolbov, 2012). Some 
research, however, argues that classifying countries as bank-based or market is not a 
very fruitful way to distinguish financial systems (Levine, 2002), since it not 
primarily important for policy-making activities (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
2002) and, to a certain extent, even out-dated (Veysov & Stolbov, 2012). In this 
regard, this can be suggested that to certain extent, the bank-based and market-based 
classification are not very well accepted.  
 
Apart from that, La Porta et.al (1997, 1998) add the law and finance perspective on 
top of the bank-based versus market-based debate. Based on legal origin, they argue 
that a country‘s legal system is a primary determinant of the effectiveness of its 
financial system. As mentioned by La Porta et. al (2000, p. 19), ―… bank-versus 
market-centeredness is not an especially useful way to distinguish financial systems‖. 
Therefore, these authors stress the role of the legal system in creating a growth-
promoting financial sector. From this perspective, a well-functioning legal system 
facilitates the operation of both markets and intermediaries. Hence, La Porta et. al 
(2000) clearly argued that laws and enforcement mechanisms are a more useful way 
to distinguish financial systems rather than focusing on whether countries are bank-
based or market-based. With regard to financial inclusion, Qian & Strahan (2007) and 
Ge et al. (2012) confirm that legal differences shape the ownership and terms of bank 
loans across the world. However, La Porta et.al  (1997, 1998) method of classification 
is merely focusing on law. 
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Based on the development and increased attention of Islamic finance, the present 
study focuses on the Islamic and conventional types of financial system classification. 
Despite voluminous studies on the comparison between  the two, there is a dearth of  
studies carried out on the relationship between financial inclusion and  Islamic based 
financial systems. The idea of comparison between Islamic and conventional financial 
system is not something new. In fact, there is voluminous of literature differentiating 
the two systems on different aspects (e.g., Samad, 2004; Olson & Zoubi, 2008; Ariss, 
2010; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). However, it is worth noted that all 
the studies are more focused on the firm-level analysis where comparisons are made 
between particular Islamic and conventional financial institutions per se (e.g., banks, 
insurance providers, unit trusts). Although some of the studies are cross-country 
analysis, the basis is the same, i.e.,  to explain which aspects of the Islamic banking 
sector are different from its counterpart. This would suggest that there is no attempt 
has been made so far in classifying countries based on the Islamic and conventional-
based financial system. These considerations warrant a tractable framework that 
allows for a systematic approach in classifying financial system using Islamic versus 
conventional-based financial systems.      
6.3 Conceptual Framework of Islamic-based Financial System  
This section outlines the conceptual framework in categorizing financial system using 
Islamic-based approach. Proxy is set up, followed by putting the definition for both 
types of financial system.  
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6.3.1 Islamic banking presence as proxy for Islamic financial sector  
Islamic banking presence is the main proxy used in this present study to gauge the 
type of Islamic-based and conventional types financial system. Islamic finance is 
generally associated with Islamic banking practice. As a matter of fact, all the earlier 
references to commercial or mercantile activities conforming to Islamic principles 
were made under the umbrella of Islamic banking (Iqbal, 1997). This would suggest 
that Islamic banking practices could give an indication of the implementation of 
Islamic finance.  
 
In addition, the role of banking activity as the first main institution in financial system 
is also highlighted in the history of banking. In the ancient world, the history of 
banking begins with the first prototype banks of merchants that made grain loans to 
farmers and traders who carried goods between cities. This commenced around 2000 
before centuries in Assyria and Babylonia. This followed by ancient Greece and 
during the Roman Empire, where lenders based in temples made loans and added two 
fundamental innovations; they established deposits and changed money. On top of 
that, during the ancient China and India, money lending activity is also proved exist 
by archaeology from this period. These indicate the role of banking activity as the 
first main institution in financial system before the emergence of other type of 
financial intermediaries and capital market
41
.  
 
In general, a number of financial ratios are used to assess banking activity and 
performance. The financial ratios usually provide a broader understanding of the 
                                              
41
This is in line with the context of the study which focusing on retail financial services offered by 
formal financial institution especially banking whereby individuals should access to its basic products 
and services. 
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bank‘s financial condition since they are constructed from accounting data obtained 
from the bank‘s balance sheet and financial statement. Specifically, Islamic banking 
presence can be assessed through three main indicators: the number of Islamic banks 
operating in the country, the size of the Islamic banks‘ assets as well as the 
profitability of these banks. Except for the number of Islamic banks indicator [i.e., 
employed in Ben Naceur et al., (2015)], the size and profitability of Islamic banks are 
the common indicators used in Islamic banking and finance literature in measuring 
efficiency and profitability (e.g., Abdul-Majid, Saal, & Battisti, 2010; Čihák & Hesse, 
2010; Haron, 2004; Metwally, 1997).   
 
In short, countries where Islamic banking institution or Islamic banking service does 
not exist would signify adopting purely conventional financial system and 
automatically report as ―0‖ in Islamic banking presence variables. 
6.3.2 The context of definitions for Islamic and conventional-based financial 
system 
Applying the above proxy, (i.e., using Islamic banking presence indicators), definition 
of each type of financial system is formulated in order have a better understanding on 
the subject matter. The definitions are discussed as follows: 
6.3.2.1  Islamic financial system 
Islamic financial system in this present study is defined as a financial system which 
fully conducts financial transactions and runs operations accordance to the ordinances 
and values of the Islamic laws. 
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From the above definition, there are some features that can be observed. The word 
‗fully‘ implies only Islamic banks/institutions are exist in the country, with no 
conventional forms of transactions are operating in the system. In other words, there 
is no conventional institution as well as Islamic window operates within the system. 
 
There are three prominent examples of the trajectory fully Islamic financial system, 
namely Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan (see for example, Chapra & Khan, 2000; Zaher 
&Hasan, 2001; Solé, 2008). Iran pursued the full Islamization of its financial system 
with the proclamation of the 1983 Usury Free Banking Law, which abolished interest-
based banking operations. Likewise, Sudan‘s transition towards a fully Islamic 
financial system started with the enactment of the 1992 Banking Law, which aimed at 
eliminating interest from banking, as well as from all government transactions
42
. In 
Pakistan, although efforts towards full Islamization can be dated back to the 1960s, a 
key development took place in 1999, when the Shariat Appellate Bench (SAB) of the 
Supreme Court ruled that all laws allowing interest should be eliminated before June 
30, 2001. Nevertheless, because of some appellations and petitions, the process was 
ceased in 2002 and Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was been requested by SAB to re-
examine the case. As of today, the FSC has not issued a decision on the status of riba-
based banking in Pakistan (Nienhaus, 2007; Solé, 2008). 
 
Admittedly, except for Iran, there is no other country adopting a fully fledged Islamic 
financial system. However, as many countries have made significant progress in the 
                                              
42
 However, the landscape of its financial system is changed when the new promulgation of Bank of 
Sudan Act 2002 is enacted. This matter is clearly stated in the Chapter II of the Act: The Sudanese 
banking system shall consist of dual banking system; one of which is Islamic, in Northern Sudan, and 
the other Conventional, in Southern Sudan. In addition, since the signature of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), conventional banks have been allowed to operate in this country (Solé, 2008).   
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Islamic finance practices, it is therefore reasonable for  the present study to use the 
term ‗countries with Islamic finance sector‘ to define the practices of Islamic banking 
operation in dual financial sector and conventional financial system with Islamic 
windows. The practices are explained and discussed as follows: 
 
i. Dual financial sector 
 
In this study, dual financial system is referred to the two parallel systems prevailing 
simultaneously or coexist, namely the conventional and Islamic financial systems. 
Both systems conducting their financial transactions and operations according to 
conventional and Islamic form, respectively. 
 
It is worth mentioning that both systems are complete in their own right, in the sense 
that each can exist independent of the other. The two systems, despite being different, 
continue to interact with each other, although such interactions are less than mutual. 
They both complement and substitute each other in different areas especially in 
matters pertaining to Shariah compliance transactions (Salleh & Che Hamat, 1997; 
Bakar, 2003). Significantly, these give positive impacts in terms of the cost and speed 
up the Islamic banking system practice. The Islamic finance products and services 
offered in dual system which cover  wider range as well as much more comprehensive 
and sophisticated as compared to products and services offered in conventional-plus 
system
43
 (Bakar, 2003). In addition, in dual financial system, all conventional banks 
have the opportunity to open Islamic windows (Nienhaus, 2007). 
 
                                              
43
 Description on this type of financial system is discussed in the next sub-section. 
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In short, there are a few advantages of dual financial system as follows (Bakar, 2003): 
a. As Islamic banks in a dual banking system have to provide all the services 
offered by conventional counterpart, the scope of Islamic banking services in 
this system tends to be wider as compared to the products and services in a 
single Islamic system. 
b. It also expected that the Islamic banking products in the dual system are more 
sophisticated as compared to the Islamic banking products in the single 
Islamic system.  
 
Malaysia and Bahrain are the two examples of countries that are referred in many 
literature adopting dual financial system (see, for example, Kaleem, 1999; Zaher & 
Hasan, 2001; Samad, 2004; Samad, Gardner, & Cook, 2005; Solé, 2008; Abduh, 
Brahim, & Omar, 2012). These two countries have separate regulations for both 
Islamic and conventional banking system. As previously mentioned, in the case of 
Malaysia for example, Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA) and Islamic Financial 
Services Act 2013 (IFSA) are the two separate regulations govern by the Malaysian 
government to serve the needs of the two systems. The FSA and IFSA amalgamate 
several separate laws to govern the financial sector under a single legislative 
framework for the conventional and Islamic financial sectors respectively, namely, the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA), Islamic Banking Act 1983, 
Insurance Act 1996 (IA), Takaful Act 1984, Payment Systems Act 2003 and 
Exchange Control Act 1953. On top of that, the Shariah Advisory Council of Central 
Bank of Malaysia (SAC) was established in May 1997 as the highest Shariah 
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authority in Islamic finance in Malaysia.
44
 
 
ii. Conventional financial system with Islamic windows 
 
This system is described in this present study as a conventional banking with a few 
Islamic finance products/services offered within the fringe of the conventional 
banking (Bakar, 2003; Yakcop, 2003). 
 
As opposed to dual financial sector, the services offered in Islamic institutions are 
neither as comprehensive nor as sophisticated as the conventional system (Bakar, 
2003). Furthermore, this system is also associated with the Islamic window. Setting 
up Islamic window, according to Solé (2007), is the first phase in introducing Islamic 
bank within the conventional system. An Islamic window is simply a window within a 
conventional bank via which customers can conduct business utilizing only Shariah 
compatible instruments. At the beginning of the Islamic window, the products that 
typically offered are safekeeping deposit (i.e., on the liability side of the bank) and 
Islamic trade-finance products for small and medium companies. Establishing 
appropriate firewalls are essential upon opening Islamic window to prevent the 
commingling of Islamic and conventional funds (Solé, 2007). 
 
Among countries that adopting this type of financial system are Bangladesh, 
                                              
44
 The SAC has been given the authority for the ascertainment of Islamic law for the purposes of 
Islamic banking business, takaful business, Islamic financial business, Islamic development financial 
business, or any other business, which is based on Shariah principles and is supervised and regulated 
by Bank Negara Malaysia. As the reference body and advisor to Bank Negara Malaysia on Shariah 
matters, the SAC is also responsible for validating all Islamic banking and takaful products to ensure 
their compatibility with the Shariah principles. In addition, it advises Bank Negara Malaysia on any 
Shariah issue relating to Islamic financial business or transactions of Bank Negara Malaysia as well as 
other related entities. For more detail, refer http://www.bnm.gov.my/. 
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Indonesia, Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (Bakar, 2003).  
6.3.2.2  Conventional financial system 
Conventional financial system in this present study means a financial system, which 
conducts financial transactions based on conventional customs, other than by Islamic 
form. In the sphere of purely conventional financial system, there is no Islamic 
financial institution is operated nor Islamic product and service is offered. Argentina, 
France, Greece, Japan, Mexico, Spain and Sweden are examples of countries, which 
fall under this type of financial system category. Table 6.1 overleaf summarizes the 
definition and features of the financial system classification.  
6.4 Variables Definitions 
This section describes the variables for Islamic banking presence indicators as the 
proxy for Islamic financial system. Table 6.2 provides a summary of description, 
indicators and definition of each variable. Based on the basic indicators, three main 
variables are included by virtue of their potential to have indicatory power in 
examining Islamic banking presence. 
 
Table 6.2 Descriptions of variables for Islamic banking presence indicators 
 
Description Indicator Variable 
IB quantity 
Number of Islamic 
banks 
 Total number of Islamic banks divided by total number 
of banks in the banking system 
IB size Size of Islamic banks 
 Average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic 
banks 
IB 
profitability 
Profitability of 
Islamic banks 
 Average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total 
assets of the Islamic bank 
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Table 6.1 Definition and features of the financial system classification 
 
Type of financial system Definition 
Feature/Description 
Examples of countries 
General Islamic banking presence 
Is
la
m
ic
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
sy
st
em
 
Purely Islamic 
Fully conducts financial transactions and 
runs operation accordance to the ordinances 
and values of the Islamic laws.  
 
 Only Islamic banks/institutions are exist, with 
no conventional forms of transactions are 
operating in the system 
 Only Islamic 
bank/institution 
Iran, Sudan and 
Pakistan 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 w
it
h
 I
sl
am
ic
 f
in
an
ci
a
l 
se
ct
o
r 
Dual 
Two parallel systems prevailing 
simultaneously or coexist, that is the 
conventional and Islamic financial systems. 
 Both systems conducting their financial 
transactions and operations according to 
conventional and Islamic form, respectively. 
 Both systems are complete in their own right, 
in the sense that each can exist independent of 
the other. 
 The scope of Islamic banking services in dual 
system tends to be wider when compared to the 
products and services in a single Islamic 
system. 
 Islamic banking products in the dual system are 
more sophisticated as compared to the Islamic 
banking products in the single Islamic system. 
 
 Sophisticated conventional 
bank/institution 
 Sophisticated Islamic 
bank/institution 
 Islamic windows 
Malaysia and Bahrain 
Conventional 
financial system with 
Islamic windows 
 
A conventional system with a few Islamic 
finance institutions operated within the 
fringe of the conventional system 
 The services offered in Islamic institutions are 
neither as comprehensive nor as sophisticated 
as the conventional system. 
 Usually begins with the establishment of 
Islamic windows within its conventional 
system. 
 
 Sophisticated conventional 
bank/institution 
 Less sophisticated Islamic 
bank/institution with less 
comprehensive services 
offered. 
 Islamic windows 
 
Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Jordan, 
Tunisia, Turkey and 
United Arab Emirates 
Purely conventional financial 
system 
A financial system, which conducts 
financial transactions based on conventional 
customs, other than by Islamic forms. 
 There is no Islamic finance service offered 
within the system. 
 Only conventional 
bank/institution 
Argentina, France, 
Greece, Japan, 
Mexico, Spain and 
Sweden 
 146 
 
The presence of Islamic banking can be assessed, firstly by the number of Islamic 
banks operating in the country. This indicator is scaled by total assets of the banking 
system. This indicator measures the effect of Islamic banking quantity to the banking 
system‘s activity. This variable could give a raw idea of how the existence of Islamic 
bank could give an impact on financial inclusion.  
 
Secondly, is the size of Islamic banking assets. The total assets of Islamic banks 
measure the Islamic banking size in a particular country. Due to data availability 
constraint (i.e., not all the Islamic banks in the sample of the study specifically report 
asset under profit and loss sharing through mudharabah or musharakah), total assets 
of the Islamic banks are employed to gauge how the Islamic-based 
contracts/transactions under the banks‘ operation in general, give an influence to 
financial inclusion. 
 
Thirdly, Islamic banking profitability is also employed to gauge to what extent those 
who are financially excluded could benefit from Islamic banking profitability under 
its social welfare paradigm. There could be two possibilities in gauging the impact of 
Islamic banking profitability on financial inclusion. On the one hand, the low 
profitability of Islamic banking might be caused by the utilization of potential assets 
in providing impactful deals with its clients. By providing those deals by aiming 
social well-being and empowerment, Islamic banks might experienced lower 
profitability in their operations as compared to the other profit-making financial 
institution. On the other hand, by having higher profitability, Islamic banks are 
assumed to utilize and make use of the profit in providing better financial and social 
welfare. Both situations could certainly lead to inclusive financial system. This 
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indicator is measured by the average before tax profit (and zakat), i.e., ratio of average 
before tax profit to total assets.  This ratio measures the effect of total expenditure on 
an Islamic bank‘s profitability. It is worth noted that, to my knowledge, the use of 
Islamic banking profitability as potential determinant of financial inclusion is the first 
of its kind in the literature. 
6.5 Data Collection 
The Islamic banking presence data used in this present study is cross-country bank-
level data, compiled from income statements and balance sheets of the Islamic banks 
in 20 countries for each year in the 2007 to 2011. Sharing the similar situation, as 
mentioned in Ben Naceur et al. (2015), the data on Islamic banking are relatively 
inadequate since there is no single accepted definition of an Islamic bank as well as 
databases that specifically and comprehensively measuring Islamic banking. 
Therefore, this study calibrates the indicators using data from three main sources as 
following: 
i. Bankscope, which provides balance sheet and income statement information 
for Islamic banks
45
.  
ii. The Islamic Banking Database created by the World Bank
46
, which lists a 
wider coverage of Islamic financial institutions (i.e., 55 countries), including 
banks that offer both conventional and Islamic banking products and services 
(i.e., Islamic windows). However, the database does not cover yearly data. 
                                              
45
 As of December 2015, there are 35 countries reported in the Bankscope which have Islamic banks. In 
order to avoid double count subsidiaries of international banks, we use unconsolidated data when 
available. However, consolidated is used if unconsolidated data are not available. 
46
 See http://go.worldbank.org/AE0U8AYQ20. The version consulted for this present study had been 
updated as of February, 2014. 
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iii. Whenever possible, various Islamic banks and central banks of the 
corresponding countries are also examined to minimize the gap
47
. The data are 
extracted in US dollars (USD) having been converted from own currencies by 
end of accounting year exchange rates. The exchange rate values are drawn 
from the International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
The Islamic Banking Database is employed to check and balance the information 
extracted from the Bankscope. All the Islamic banks listed in the Bankscope are also 
listed in the Islamic Banking Database. Out of 80 countries in the sample of present 
study, 20 countries are reported having Islamic banking. In short, the following Table 
6.3 summarized the Islamic banking presence data used in the present study. 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of data selection for Islamic banking presence  
 
Item 2007-2011 
Number of Islamic banks in Bankscope 178  
Number of countries with Islamic banks in Bankscope 
 
35  
Number of Islamic financial institutions in Islamic Banking Database 394  
Number of countries with Islamic banks in Islamic Banking Database 
 
55  
Less: Data to fit the sample country of the present study  35 
Less: Data on Islamic banks which is not available 
 
 240 
Total balanced panel sample: 
Number of Islamic banks 
 
154 
 
Number of countries with Islamic banks 20  
                                              
47
 Similar to Ben Naceur et al. (2015), two aspects of data imperfections are identified. First, although 
the Bankscope data is rich in the sense that the income statement and balance sheet information is 
available for almost all the reporting institutions, it might underestimate the number, total assets as well 
as profit before tax of Islamic banks because of non-reporting Islamic banks or because of the narrow 
definition of Islamic banks.  Second, although the World Bank Islamic Database seems to list all the 
Islamic financial institutions more accurately (i.e., in terms of the number of Islamic financial 
institutions in a particular country that offers Islamic financial services), the data on the total assets and 
profit before tax on yearly basis is absent. Therefore, an effort was made to supplement these two 
sources with official country data and bank level data, but gaps remain.  
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6.6 Results of Islamic Banking Presence Indicators 
This section presents the results of the Islamic banking presence variables. General 
descriptive statistics of the variables is presented.  
 
Table 6.4 presents the summary of Islamic banking presence indicators for the years 
2007-2011 while Figure 6.1 present the mean distribution of countries based on 
Islamic banking presence indicators. As evident from the table and figure, as 
expected, different countries relatively report different levels of number, size and 
profitability of Islamic banks. Basically, in countries where Muslim is the majority, 
the number of Islamic banks is higher, for example in Indonesia and Malaysia, there 
are 37 and 20 Islamic banks respectively in 2011.  
 
However, when compared to the rest of the banks in the banking system, the ratio of 
Islamic banks in the countries is relatively still low. With regards to the size of 
Islamic bank, Iranian banks are reported to have the biggest size of assets with 
average amount of 309 million USD. To a certain extent, this explain the practice of 
pure Islamic banking system operated in the country. Overall, the size of Islamic 
banks in the countries has increase from year to year, indicating that the Islamic banks 
are progressing well across countries. Profitability wise, Islamic banks in all 20 
countries relatively not making much money and some of them even making loss. As 
the sample of present study is between 2007 to 2011, to a certain extent, this could be 
explained by the impact of the global financial crisis on the performance of Islamic 
banks as mentioned by Hasan & Dridi (2011). They found that Islamic banks 
experienced a significant decline in profitability during the global financial crisis 
period. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of Islamic banking presence variables  
 
No Country Item 
Year 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean  
1. Albania Number of Islamic banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Total assets (mil USD) 40.424 36.771 37.358 37.531 51.071 40.631 
  IB quantity 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
  IB size 3.699 3.605 3.621 3.625 3.933 3.697 
  IB profitability  -0.009 -0.020 -0.078 -0.089 -0.047 -0.049 
         
2. Bangladesh Number of Islamic banks 9 9 9 9 9 9 
  Total assets (mil USD) 1,837.701 6,083.888 7,574.526 9,638.752 12,013.481 7,429.670 
  IB quantity 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 
  IB size 5.175 5.870 6.032 6.188 6.562 5.965 
  IB profitability  0.041 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.022 0.030 
         
3. Bosnia and Herzegovenia Number of Islamic banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Total assets (mil USD) 90.032 112.392 139.921 177.497 193.809 142.730 
 IB quantity 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 IB size 4.500 4.722 4.941 5.179 5.267 4.922 
 IB profitability  0.009 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.007 0.010 
         
4. Egypt Number of Islamic banks 7 7 7 7 7 7 
  Total assets (mil USD) 38,484.361 43,127.499 47,878.262 54,051.337 54,138.756 47,536.043 
  IB quantity 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 
  IB size 6.497 6.571 9.309 5.738 5.770 6.777 
  IB profitability  0.009 0.023 0.122 0.123 0.135 0.083 
         
5. Germany Number of Islamic banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Total assets (mil USD) 1,320.024 1,955.645 2,330.517 3,280.988 4,970.089 2,771.453 
  IB quantity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  IB size 7.185 7.578 7.754 8.096 8.511 7.825 
  IB profitability  0.022 0.020 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.021 
         
6. Indonesia Number of Islamic banks 32 32 34 37 37 34.4 
  Total assets (mil USD) 17,305.714 8,066.230 1,1160.175 1,5741.161 24,563.302 15,367.316 
  IB quantity 0.232 0.232 0.246 0.268 0.268 0.249 
  IB size 4.393 4.038 4.486 4.783 5.455 4.631 
  IB profitability  -0.022 0.018 0.006 0.019 0.029 0.010 
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No Country Item 
Year 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean  
7. Iran Number of Islamic banks 16 16 16 16 16 16 
  Total assets (mil USD) 274,587.158 286,176.567 294,557.979 341,999.915 347484.556 308,961.235 
  IB quantity 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 
  IB size 9.050 9.162 9.489 9.749 9.690 9.428 
  IB profitability  0.017 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.016 0.016 
         
8. Jordan Number of Islamic banks 5 5 5 5 5 5 
  Total assets (mil USD) 3,077.496 4,179.621 5,040.755 5,589.462 6,163.660 4,810.199 
  IB quantity 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227 
  IB size 7.221 6.901 6.579 7.162 7.295 7.032 
  IB profitability  0.024 0.022 0.029 0.014 0.014 0.021 
         
9. Kenya Number of Islamic banks 2 3 3 3 3 2.8 
  Total assets (mil USD) 28.171 64.340 102.201 118.810 151.822 93.069 
  IB quantity 0.035 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.049 
  IB size 3.338 4.164 4.627 4.778 5.023 4.386 
  IB profitability  -0.155 -0.076 -0.021 0.005 0.012 -0.047 
         
10. Kuwait Number of Islamic banks 10 10 10 11 11 10.4 
  Total assets (mil USD) 56,353.372 63,725.793 63,123.399 64,812.893 70,141.271 63,631.346 
  IB quantity 0.256 0.256 0.256 0.282 0.282 0.267 
  IB size 7.730 7.762 7.658 7.618 7.466 7.647 
  IB profitability  0.068 -0.022 -0.081 -0.022 0.001 -0.011 
         
         
11 Lebanon Number of Islamic banks 5 5 5 5 5 5 
  Total assets (mil USD) 397.178 356.363 450.205 456.176 241.260 380.237 
  IB quantity 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 
  IB size 4.359 4.399 4.491 4.544 4.362 4.431 
  IB profitability  0.003 -0.009 -0.015 -0.027 -0.006 -0.011 
         
12. Malaysia Number of Islamic banks 19 19 20 20 20 19.6 
  Total assets (mil USD) 39,209.974 49,027.485 58,951.935 65,296.845 86,956.226 59,888.493 
  IB quantity 0.174 0.174 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.180 
  IB size 7.158 7.398 7.647 7.597 7.980 7.556 
  IB profitability  0.061 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.014 0.032 
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No Country Item 
Year 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean  
13. Pakistan Number of Islamic banks 19 19 19 19 19 19 
  Total assets (mil USD) 3,200.254 3,767.837 4,876.022 6,530.036 8,032.345 5,281.299 
  IB quantity 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 
  IB size 4.176 4.419 4.564 4.800 5.055 4.603 
  IB profitability  0.019 0.017 0.013 -0.009 0.021 0.012 
         
14. Singapore Number of Islamic banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Total assets (mil USD) 618.000 735.000 725.000 532.000 366.000 595.200 
  IB quantity 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  IB size 6.426 6.600 6.586 6.277 5.903 6.358 
  IB profitability  0.006 0.013 -0.106 -0.084 0.031 -0.028 
         
15. South Africa Number of Islamic banks 2 2 2 2 2 2 
  Total assets (mil USD) 248.000 201.042 322.575 425.991 398.593 319.240 
  IB quantity 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
  IB size 5.513 5.304 5.776 6.054 5.988 5.727 
  IB profitability  0.016 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.011 
         
16. Thailand Number of Islamic banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  Total assets (mil USD) 497.820 682.985 1360.841 3277.769 4162.297 1996.342 
  IB quantity 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
  IB size 6.210 6.526 7.216 8.095 8.334 7.276 
  IB profitability  -0.017 0.000 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.001 
         
17. Tunisia Number of Islamic banks 1 1 2 2 2 1.6 
  Total assets (mil USD)          418.30           461.31           523.26            597.10           592.30  518.455 
  IB quantity 0.027 0.027 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.043 
  IB size 6.036 6.134 6.260 6.392 6.384 6.241 
  IB profitability  0.018 0.034 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.029 
         
18. Turkey Number of Islamic banks 5 5 5 5 5 5 
  Total assets (mil USD) 15,259.350 16,770.180 22,231.350 28,386.978 32,160.898 22,961.751 
  IB quantity 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
  IB size 7.918 8.063 8.319 8.575 8.737 8.323 
  IB profitability  0.029 0.027 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.024 
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No Country Item 
Year 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean  
19. United Kingdom Number of Islamic banks 7 9 9 9 9 8.6 
  Total assets (mil USD) 29,591.414 31,315.801 30,645.626 33,256.866 35,312.595 32,024.460 
  IB quantity 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 
  IB size 6.775 6.345 6.340 6.248 6.482 6.438 
  IB profitability  -0.007 -0.030 -0.076 -0.040 -0.024 -0.035 
         
20. Yemen Number of Islamic banks 4 4 4 4 4 4 
  Total assets (mil USD) 1,669.951 2,297.267 2,628.716 2,742.652 2,592.441 2,386.205 
  IB quantity 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 
  IB size 5.889 5.714 5.868 6.399 5.838 5.942 
  IB profitability  0.011 -0.003 0.004 0.006 -0.007 0.002 
   Source: Data on the countries‘ Islamic banking is ccompiled from Bankscope database, Islamic banking database (World Bank), websites of respective central banks/monetary 
authorities as well as bank-specific annual reports which can be publicly accessed via the websites of the particular Islamic bank. IB quantity, IB size and IB profitability are figures 
based on author‘s calculation using the databases. IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the 
average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. 
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Figure 6.1 Summary of Islamic banking presence, by mean 
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In addition, the descriptive summary for Islamic banking variables is also presented in 
bar charts for ease of comparison. Figure 6.2 overleaf presents the Islamic banking 
presence indicators for country comparison from year 2007 to 2011.  
 
Apart from this, comparison of mean Islamic banking presence indicators based on 
region and legal origin can be viewed in Figure 7.5 for legal origin comparison and 
Figure 7.6 for regional comparison in Chapter 7. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodology in classification of Islamic and conventional-
based financial system. Basis of financial system classification is reviewed and 
conceptual framework of Islamic-based financial system classification is developed.  
Lastly, the results of the Islamic banking presence as the proxy for Islamic financial 
system are presented. Islamic banking presence as the proxy for Islamic financial 
system is important in conducting the present study. 
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Figure 6.2 Summary of Islamic banking presence from year 2007 to 2011 
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Chapter 7  
RESULTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION DETERMINANTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the determinants of financial inclusion 
within the institutional settings as well as other factors. As far as the determinants of 
financial inclusion are concerned, there are voluminous of literature in this area (e.g., 
Kempson & Whyley, 1999; Claessens, 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2007; Qian 
& Strahan, 2007; Sarma & Pais, 2011; Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot, 2012). However, the 
understanding of the factors remains mixed and incomplete with respect to their 
impact on financial inclusion. Apart from the existing barriers studied by previous 
research, this chapter particularly investigates another important institutional 
variables, namely the Islamic banking presence (i.e., the proxy for countries with 
Islamic financial sector), as one of the important determinants in shaping financial 
inclusion.  
 
A balanced sample of countries over the period of 2007 through 2011 is used in the 
investigation. Initial sample was 213 countries (or 1,065 country-year observations). 
Countries with index variable not available were removed from the initial sample.  A 
total of 132 countries (or 660 country-year observations) were removed due to the 
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data availability constraint
48
. The final sample contains a balanced panel of 80 
countries or 400 country-year observations. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
key variables, followed by a brief description of the univariate results in Section 7.3. 
The main results based on the multivariate analysis are discussed in Section 7.4. The 
robustness checks and regression diagnostics are explained in Section 7.5 and 7.6, 
respectively. Section 7.7 summaries the chapter. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 7.1. The overall 
mean (median) level of CIFI is 0.2324 (0.2309). The close mean-median difference of 
the index reflects the approximately normal distribution of countries in the sample. 
Putting this figure into perspective, the mean (median) of inclusion index (i.e., CIFI) 
stands at low level i.e., between 0.00 to 0.29
49
. Panel B of Table 7.1 gives clear 
example to support this case. In the group of 80 countries, 70% countries are reported 
belong to low CIFI mean values. For example, Algeria (0.17), Cambodia (0.12), Iran 
(0.21) and Zambia (0.05). Even, this can be further supported by mean values of CIFI 
based on legal origin and region as shown in Panel C and D, respectively, of Table 
7.1. As for the legal origin, English, French and Socialist origin are at the low level of 
inclusion which are 0.24, 0.21 and 0.13 respectively. Except for East Asia & Pacific  
                                              
48
 This issue is presents in many studies ( for example Claessens, 2006; Beck et al., 2008; Sarma & 
Pais, 2011).  Following this, about 38% data is chosen because of data consistency for the period of 
study. 
49
 These levels of CIFI are defined in section 5.2.1, with further explanation of empirical distribution in 
section 5.5.2.1 of Chapter 5. 
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 Table 7.1 Summary statistics of key variables 
 
 Panel A: Overall sample description 
Variable nc nf Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Financial Inclusion Index          
CIFI  400 - 0.2324 0.2309 0.1431 0.0156 0.9791 1.0967 3.2988 
Islamic banking variables           
IB quantity  (number) 100 - 7.5200 5.0000 8.0220 1.0000 35.0000 1.7820 3.0419 
IB quantity  (of total banks in banking system) 100 - 0.1461 0.0643 0.1588 0.0005 0.7619 1.8390 4.1824 
IB size (ln TA) 100 - 6.2602 6.2540 1.5499 3.3383 9.7491 0.2182 -0.6111 
IB size (USD million) 100 - 45.2550 4.9701 0.09511 0.0282 425.9907 2.7015 6.3336 
IB size (of total assets in banking system) 100 - 0.0863 0.0181 0.1438 0.0001 0.6970 2.2903 5.3816 
IB profitability 100 - 0.0051 0.0121 0.0404 -0.1555 0.1352 -0.5742 4.4689 
IB size (ln TA) - 675 6.3293 6.4799 2.3161 -0.4363 11.1192 -0.0996 -0.7326 
IB size (USD billion) - 675 4.2818 0.6579 9.734 0.0065 67.4535 3.6543 14.5079 
IB profitability - 667 0.0148 0.0129 0.0859 -0.9295 0.8832 0.9318 58.0119 
Macroeconomics variable          
GDP per capita (ln GDP) 400 - 8.7477 8.6744 1.5304 5.0927 11.5038 -0.2545 2.1376 
GDP per capita (USD mill) 400 - 15.7011 5.8510 19.1360 162.8275 99.0911 1.5507 2.0503 
Overall institutional environment variable          
Governance index 400 - 0.1433 -0.1393 0.8717 -1.3719 1.8474 0.4016 1.9807 
Contractual and informational framework variables          
Legal rights index 400 - 5.8938 6.0000 2.4467 0.0000 10.0000 -0.0494 1.9261 
Credit information index 400 - 3.8519 4.0000 1.9160 0.0000 6.0000 -0.8899 2.6432 
Cost of enforcing contracts 400 - 0.3267 0.2650 0.2459 9.9000 142.500 2.9979 12.6409 
Regulatory restrictions variable   -        
Banking restrictions index 400 - 54.7654 50.0000 17.0978 0.0990 90.0000 -0.2366 3.0280 
Physical infrastructure variables          
Paved road (in km) 400 - 60.9152 70.2000 32.8827 6.2900 100.0000 -0.2839 1.5257 
Phone (land line and mobile subscription) 400 - 23.4892 20.3225 18.4473 0.1676 65.5523 0.4578 2.0633 
Internet (users per 1000 people) 400 - 38.0800 34.3300 27.7664 0.4900 94.0000 0.3153 1.7772 
Interest rates variables          
Deposit interest rate 400 - 0.0549 0.0453 0.0405 -0.0012 0.2291 1.1157 4.5605 
Lending interest rate 400 - 0.1152 0.1031 0.0747 0.0050 0.5250 1.6293 8.4305 
Legal origin variables          
English origin  400 - 0.2840 0.0000 0.4515 0.0000 1.0000 0.9583 1.9183 
French origin  400 - 0.4074 0.0000 0.4920 0.0000 1.0000 0.3769 1.1420 
German origin  400 - 0.1852 0.0000 0.3889 0.0000 1.0000 1.6209 3.6273 
Scandinavian origin  400 - 0.0247 0.0000 0.1554 0.0000 1.0000 6.1258 38.5253 
Socialist origin  400 - 0.0988 0.0000 0.2987 0.0000 1.0000 2.6897 8.2346 
Region variables          
Africa (AF) 400 - 0.1605 0.0000 0.3675 0.0000 1.0000 1.8499 4.4219 
East Asia & Pacific(EAP) 400 - 0.0988 0.0000 0.2987 0.0000 1.0000 2.6897 8.2346 
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Variable nc nf Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Europe & Central Asia (ECA) 400 - 0.4074 0.0000 0.4920 0.0000 1.0000 0.3769 1.1420 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) 400 - 0.1358 0.0000 0.3430 0.0000 1.0000 2.1262 5.5208 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 400 - 0.1235 0.0000 0.3294 0.0000 1.0000 2.2893 6.2408 
South Asia (SA) 400 - 0.0741 0.0000 0.2622 0.0000 1.0000 3.2527 11.5800 
 
Panel B: Financial inclusion and country-level data: mean by country 
 Country No. 
of  
IB 
Region Legal origin CIFI IB 
quantity  
 (of total 
banks in 
banking 
system) 
IB 
size  
(ln 
TA) 
IB size 
(USD 
bill) 
IB size  
 (of total 
assets of 
banking 
system) 
IB 
profit-
ability 
GDP 
per 
capita  
(ln 
GDP) 
GDP 
per 
capita  
(USD 
mill) 
Gover-
nance  
index 
Legal 
rights 
index 
Credit 
infor-
mation 
 index 
Cost of 
enforcing  
contracts 
Financial  
restrictions  
index 
Paved 
road 
Phone Internet Deposit 
interest  
rate 
Lending 
 interest  
rate 
1 Albania 1 ECA French 0.27 0.05 3.70 0.04 0.00 -0.05 8.20 4.19 -0.21 9.00 3.00 38.10 70.00 39.00 10.51 34.82 0.06 0.13 
2 Algeria 0 MENA French 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.25 4.40 -0.84 3.00 2.00 21.90 28.00 74.38 8.42 11.47 0.02 0.08 
3 Angola 0 AF French 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.14 4.28 -1.06 3.00 3.00 44.40 40.00 10.40 1.19 7.72 0.08 0.17 
4 Argentina 0 LAC French 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.03 10.65 -0.28 4.00 6.00 16.50 36.00 30.00 24.32 36.81 0.10 0.14 
5 Armenia 0 ECA Socialist 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.03 3.29 -0.28 6.00 4.60 19.00 70.00 92.06 19.58 16.91 0.08 0.18 
6 Australia 0 EAP English 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.62 49.46 1.61 9.00 5.00 20.70 90.00 42.34 46.63 74.17 0.04 0.08 
7 Austria 0 ECA German 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.72 47.05 1.59 7.00 6.00 15.88 70.00 100.00 40.00 74.13 0.01 0.03 
8 Azerbaijan 0 ECA Socialist 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.26 5.48 -0.78 6.00 4.60 18.50 36.00 50.60 15.76 31.00 0.12 0.20 
9 Bangladesh 10 SA English 0.27 0.20 6.02 0.88 0.19 0.03 6.15 0.60 -0.87 7.00 2.00 66.80 20.00 9.50 0.82 3.22 0.09 0.15 
10 Belarus 0 ECA Socialist 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.46 5.68 -0.92 2.20 4.20 23.40 10.00 87.30 40.93 28.31 0.10 0.10 
11 Belgium 0 ECA French 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.67 44.82 1.30 6.00 4.00 17.70 76.00 78.20 44.11 70.69 0.01 0.03 
12 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 ECA German 0.25 0.03 4.92 0.14 0.01 0.01 8.28 4.46 -0.39 5.00 5.00 32.40 60.00 92.10 26.81 42.46 0.03 0.07 
13 Botswana 0 AF English 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.65 6.26 0.67 6.00 4.00 39.80 70.00 32.60 7.11 6.34 0.07 0.14 
14 Bulgaria 0 ECA German 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.63 6.55 0.20 9.00 5.80 23.80 60.00 98.48 29.90 43.11 0.04 0.11 
15 Burundi 0 AF French 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.09 0.20 -1.13 3.00 1.00 38.60 30.00 10.44 0.38 0.90 0.08 0.15 
16 Cambodia 0 SA French 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.44 0.75 -0.84 4.80 0.00 103.12 50.00 6.29 1.44 1.18 0.02 0.16 
17 Canada 0 LAC English 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.70 46.15 1.61 7.00 6.00 22.30 78.00 39.87 54.56 78.70 0.01 0.04 
18 Chile 0 LAC French 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.25 11.68 1.16 4.00 5.00 28.60 70.00 22.46 20.51 42.40 0.04 0.09 
19 Costa Rica 0 LAC French 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.68 7.07 0.54 3.00 5.00 24.30 46.00 25.74 30.01 34.73 0.05 0.16 
20 Croatia 0 ECA German 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.50 14.16 0.37 6.80 2.80 13.80 60.00 89.58 41.76 50.49 0.02 0.10 
21 Czech 
Republic 
0 ECA German 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.77 19.53 0.89 6.40 5.00 33.00 80.00 100.00 23.21 64.22 0.01 0.06 
22 Dominican 
Republic 
0 LAC French 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.37 4.85 -0.37 3.00 6.00 40.90 40.00 49.40 10.04 27.24 0.08 0.16 
23 Egypt 7 MENA French 0.30 0.18 7.63 6.79 0.24 0.09 7.47 2.43 -0.56 3.00 4.60 26.20 44.00 89.52 13.02 26.20 0.06 0.12 
24 France 0 ECA French 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.61 41.37 1.24 6.80 4.00 17.40 68.00 100.00 61.31 73.61 0.02 0.04 
25 Georgia 0 ECA Socialist 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.75 2.70 -0.10 5.80 5.00 29.90 62.00 94.10 19.44 20.36 0.11 0.23 
26 Germany 1 ECA German 0.13 0.00 7.82 2.77 0.00 0.02 10.61 41.91 1.45 7.40 6.00 14.40 58.00 100.00 63.57 79.43 0.02 0.07 
27 Greece 0 ECA French 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.22 27.81 0.49 4.00 4.40 14.40 52.00 69.24 50.09 42.78 0.03 0.10 
28 Honduras 0 LAC French 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.44 1.98 -0.58 6.00 5.80 35.20 62.00 20.40 9.83 11.16 0.09 0.18 
29 Hungary 0 ECA German 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.51 13.61 0.76 7.00 5.00 15.00 68.00 37.90 30.63 62.26 0.07 0.09 
30 India 0 SA English 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.97 1.24 -0.26 7.80 4.80 39.60 36.00 49.24 3.02 6.20 0.04 0.11 
31 Indonesia 33 EAP French 0.15 0.24 4.44 0.52 0.04 0.01 7.53 2.55 -0.48 5.00 3.40 139.40 40.00 56.56 13.78 8.76 0.08 0.14 
32 Iran 16 MENA English 0.21 0.66 9.42 20.88 0.57 0.02 8.29 5.30 -1.12 4.00 3.20 17.00 10.00 77.14 34.99 13.30 0.12 0.12 
33 Ireland 0 ECA English 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.99 52.57 1.51 9.00 5.00 26.90 84.00 100.00 48.74 67.99 0.04 0.05 
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34 Israel 0 MENA English 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.10 28.93 0.57 9.00 5.00 25.30 64.00 100.00 45.56 61.41 0.02 0.05 
35 Italy 0 ECA French 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.50 36.60 0.54 3.00 5.00 29.90 60.00 100.00 37.11 48.93 0.01 0.05 
36 Jamaica 0 LAC English 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.48 4.94 -0.01 8.00 0.00 45.60 58.00 73.30 11.17 26.83 0.06 0.18 
37 Japan 0 SA German 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.44 40.17 1.20 7.00 6.00 32.20 50.00 78.22 46.91 76.99 0.01 0.02 
38 Jordan 4 MENA English 0.42 0.20 6.99 1.60 0.04 0.02 8.01 3.98 -0.01 2.00 2.00 31.20 60.00 100.00 8.45 26.22 0.05 0.09 
39 Kenya 3 AF English 0.20 0.05 4.39 0.09 0.00 -0.05 6.58 0.78 -0.71 10.00 3.60 39.40 50.00 14.38 1.24 13.73 0.05 0.14 
40 Korea 0 EAP German 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.05 21.64 0.76 8.00 5.60 10.30 62.00 78.94 55.13 81.78 0.05 0.06 
41 Kuwait 10 MENA English 0.29 0.27 7.65 6.77 0.27 -0.01 10.71 45.62 0.20 3.00 3.80 18.80 50.00 85.00 19.92 52.64 0.04 0.06 
42 Kyrgyz 
Republic 
0 SA Socialist 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.58 0.91 -0.89 8.20 3.60 37.00 50.00 91.10 9.36 17.03 0.05 0.28 
43 Latvia 0 ECA German 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.48 13.18 0.62 10.00 4.40 18.84 60.00 20.70 25.16 65.90 0.05 0.11 
44 Lebanon 5 MENA French 0.22 0.07 4.44 0.11 0.00 -0.01 8.69 7.80 -0.70 3.00 5.00 30.80 64.00 84.90 18.89 33.42 0.07 0.09 
45 Lesotho 0 AF English 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.71 0.962 -0.19 6.00 0.00 31.30 44.00 53.00 1.92 3.77 0.05 0.13 
46 Macedonia 0 ECA German 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.27 4.48 -0.11 7.00 3.60 29.66 60.00 57.10 21.33 48.54 0.06 0.10 
47 Madagascar 0 AF French 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.94 0.43 -0.54 2.00 0.40 42.40 50.00 14.34 0.76 1.51 0.12 0.47 
48 Malawi 0 AF English 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.58 0.33 -0.31 7.00 0.00 132.74 50.00 45.02 1.00 1.67 0.04 0.25 
49 Malaysia 18 EAP English 0.41 0.16 7.56 3.36 0.19 0.03 8.88 8.35 0.29 10.00 6.00 27.50 44.00 84.20 16.12 56.94 0.03 0.05 
50 Mexico 0 LAC French 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.13 9.03 -0.17 5.00 6.00 32.00 60.00 35.16 17.80 26.97 0.02 0.07 
51 Moldova 0 ECA Socialist 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.12 1.61 -0.40 8.00 0.00 18.32 50.00 85.94 31.49 28.33 0.13 0.18 
52 Morocco 0 MENA French 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.79 2.79 -0.33 3.00 2.80 25.20 50.00 67.02 10.23 40.18 0.04 0.06 
53 Mozambique 0 AF French 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.89 0.42 -0.29 3.00 3.60 128.40 50.00 20.38 0.36 2.72 0.11 0.18 
54 Netherlands 0 ECA French 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.77 49.11 1.65 6.00 5.00 24.40 84.00 90.00 43.90 89.18 0.03 0.03 
55 New Zealand 0 EAP English 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.37 32.04 1.76 10.00 5.00 22.16 80.00 65.98 42.21 78.10 0.06 0.07 
56 Nicaragua 0 LAC French 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.20 1.50 -0.59 3.00 5.00 26.80 52.00 12.22 4.56 7.42 0.05 0.13 
57 Norway 0 ECA Scandinavian 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.33 88.48 1.69 6.00 4.00 9.90 56.00 80.62 36.65 91.39 0.03 0.04 
58 Pakistan 18 SA English 0.13 0.30 4.60 0.29 0.09 0.01 6.83 1.03 -1.10 6.00 4.00 23.80 38.00 69.44 3.18 7.66 0.07 0.14 
59 Peru 0 LAC French 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.19 4.57 -0.29 7.00 6.00 35.70 60.00 13.90 11.34 31.59 0.03 0.21 
60 Poland 0 ECA German 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.32 12.41 0.70 8.40 5.40 19.00 58.00 69.10 22.47 57.58 0.03 0.06 
61 Portugal 0 ECA French 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 22.44 0.98 3.00 5.00 13.72 56.00 86.00 40.78 49.11 0.01 0.03 
62 Russia 0 ECA Socialist 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.12 10.70 -0.73 3.00 3.60 13.40 40.00 67.40 31.48 34.50 0.06 0.11 
63 Rwanda 0 AF French 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.92 0.48 -0.37 4.00 2.40 78.70 40.00 19.00 0.29 5.86 0.07 0.16 
64 Singapore 2 EAP English 0.85 0.03 6.36 0.60 0.00 0.03 10.58 43.39 1.49 10.00 3.20 22.60 52.00 100.00 39.42 69.98 0.00 0.05 
65 Slovak 
Republic 
0 ECA German 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.66 16.79 0.76 8.00 3.80 27.42 74.00 87.06 21.92 69.60 0.02 0.15 
66 Slovenia 0 ECA German 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.06 24.38 0.97 4.40 3.40 16.24 50.00 100.00 46.52 63.55 0.03 0.06 
67 South Africa 2 AF English 0.29 0.03 5.73 0.32 0.00 0.01 8.67 6.41 0.28 7.00 5.80 33.20 60.00 17.30 8.71 16.89 0.08 0.12 
68 Spain 0 ECA French 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.37 31.75 0.86 6.00 5.00 17.20 80.00 99.00 44.37 62.10 0.02 0.03 
69 Sweden 0 ECA Scandinavian 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.83 50.61 1.77 7.40 4.00 31.26 78.00 25.30 54.20 89.40 0.01 0.03 
70 Switzerland 0 ECA German 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.00 69.49 1.72 8.00 5.00 22.88 78.00 100.00 62.30 81.36 0.00 0.03 
71 Tanzania 0 AF English 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.04 0.50 -0.36 7.00 0.00 14.30 50.00 12.15 0.37 9.84 0.08 0.15 
72 Thailand 1 EAP English 0.35 0.02 7.28 2.00 0.00 0.00 8.23 4.37 -0.30 5.00 5.00 15.00 60.00 98.50 10.26 20.89 0.02 0.07 
73 Tunisia 2 MENA French 0.30 0.05 6.24 0.52 0.01 0.03 8.24 4.16 -0.15 3.00 4.00 21.80 30.00 73.64 12.16 30.92 0.02 0.04 
74 Turkey 5 ECA French 0.23 0.04 8.32 4.60 0.03 0.02 9.14 9.81 -0.04 4.00 5.00 27.42 50.00 88.90 23.32 36.46 0.19 0.14 
75 Uganda 0 AF English 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.99 0.44 -0.57 7.00 0.80 44.90 64.00 23.00 0.83 9.37 0.10 0.21 
76 Ukraine 0 ECA Socialist 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.03 3.21 -0.50 9.00 2.00 43.80 40.00 97.84 28.31 17.49 0.10 0.17 
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77 United 
Kingdom 
7 ECA English 0.41 0.01 6.43 4.71 0.00 0.07 10.75 40.21 1.39 10.00 6.00 40.40 86.00 100.00 54.45 81.78 0.04 0.02 
78 Venezuela 0 LAC French 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.03 11.07 -1.23 2.00 0.60 43.70 30.00 33.60 23.03 31.40 0.15 0.19 
79 Yemen 4 MENA English 0.03 0.33 5.92 0.66 0.18 0.00 7.10 1.30 -1.19 2.00 0.80 26.50 30.00 8.70 4.37 9.82 0.15 0.21 
80 Zambia 0 AF English 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.86 1.15 -0.33 9.00 1.60 38.70 50.00 22.00 0.75 7.65 0.07 0.20 
Panel C: Financial inclusion and country-level data: mean by legal origin 
 Legal origin No. 
of IB 
CIFI IB 
quantity  
 (of total 
banks in 
banking 
system) 
IB size  
(ln TA) 
IB_size 
(USD 
bill) 
IB size  
 (of total 
assets in 
banking 
system) 
IB 
profit-
ability 
GDP per 
capita  
(ln GDP) 
GDP per 
capita  
(USD mill) 
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rights 
 index 
Credit 
information 
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Cost of 
enforcing  
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Banking  
restrictions  
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Paved 
road 
Phone Internet Deposit 
interest  
rate 
Lending 
 interest  
rate 
1 English origin 8.08 0.24 0.20 6.76 6.39 0.12 0.02 8.37 14.64 0.17 7.51 3.34 35.50 55.13 54.16 19.02 31.58 0.06 0.12 
2 French origin 8.00 0.21 0.14 5.63 2.61 0.08 0.13 8.60 12.83 -0.07 4.05 3.87 38.59 52.44 53.28 19.26 31.47 0.06 0.12 
3 German origin 1.00 0.29 0.01 6.37 1.46 0.00 0.02 9.76 23.32 0.77 7.29 4.85 21.65 63.20 80.61 37.17 64.09 0.03 0.07 
4 Scandinavian origin 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 4.20 1.73 6.70 4.00 20.58 67.00 52.96 45.42 90.40 0.02 0.03 
5 Socialist origin 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.09 69.54 -0.57 6.03 3.45 25.42 44.75 83.29 24.55 24.24 0.09 0.18 
 
Panel D: Financial inclusion and country-level data: mean by region 
 Region No. of IB CIFI IB 
quantity  
 (of total 
banks in 
banking 
system) 
IB size  
(ln TA) 
IB_size 
(USD bill) 
IB size  
 (of total 
assets in 
banking 
system) 
IB 
profit-
ability 
GDP per 
capita  
(ln 
GDP) 
GDP per 
capita  
(USD 
mill) 
Gover-
nance  
index 
Legal 
rights 
 index 
Credit 
information 
 index 
Cost of 
enforcing  
contracts 
Banking  
restrictions  
index 
Paved 
road 
Phone Internet Deposit 
interest  
rate 
Lending 
 interest  
rate 
1 Africa 2.40 0.10 0.04 5.06 0.21 0.00 -0.02 6.77 1.74 -0.38 5.69 2.02 54.37 49.85 22.74 1.92 6.77 0.08 0.19 
2 East Asia & Pacific 13.50 0.40 0.11 5.66 1.58 0.06 0.02 9.58 23.11 0.73 8.14 4.74 36.81 61.14 75.22 31.94 55.80 0.04 0.07 
3 Europe & Central Asia 3.00 0.26 0.03 6.88 3.91 0.01 0.04 9.64 28.86 0.58 6.50 4.38 22.95 61.94 81.32 36.12 55.08 0.05 0.09 
4 Latin America & Caribbean 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.81 10.32 -0.02 4.73 4.67 31.96 53.82 32.37 19.74 32.30 0.06 0.14 
5 Middle East & North Africa 6.94 0.28 0.28 7.54 10.10 0.19 0.18 8.64 10.67 -0.41 3.50 3.32 24.47 43.00 76.03 17.60 30.56 0.06 0.09 
6 South Asia 14.00 0.22 0.25 5.05 0.48 0.14 0.02 7.41 7.45 -0.46 6.80 3.40 50.42 40.67 50.63 10.79 18.71 0.04 0.14 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011) which denoted as nc. For Islamic banking variables, the sample consists of 100 country-year observations (i.e., 20 countries with 
Islamic banking presence, with year observations from 2007 to 2011) which also indicated as nc. The sample of Islamic banking variables is also presented based on firm-year observations (i.e., Islamic banks and Islamic banking windows, with 
year observations from 2007 to 2011) which presented as nf. The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity (number) is the number 
of Islamic bank in a particular country. IB quantity (of total banking system) is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size (ln TA) is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of 
Islamic banks. IB size (of total banking system) is equal to total assets of Islamic banks divided by the total assets of banks in the banking system. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic 
bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total 
enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values 
indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is 
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number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of 
the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal 
system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law 
origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. 
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region (i.e., belong to medium CIFI with value 0.40), other regions can be classified 
under low level of inclusion. 
 
Compared to other prior studies which propose inclusion indexes, the level of 
financial inclusion of the sample countries is relatively similar (i.e., at the lower 
level). Arora's (2010) study found that the countries‘ inclusion index level in 2007 is 
relatively the same i.e., 0.1437. In contrast, estimates in a recent study by Sarma 
(2012) of cross-country analysis show that the mean of inclusion index are at the 
medium level - 0.373, 0.402, 0.421, 0.433, 0.421, 0.423 and 0.478 for years 2004 to 
2010 respectively. Apart from the sample period‘s difference, the difference is also 
due to the dimensions used in computing the index where the author also added cost 
and ease dimensions. Despite using different dataset (i.e., using different set of 
countries and period of years) and  applying different index computation (i.e., 
computed using different type of financial services, dimensions and formula), the 
results are considerably similar.   
 
Beside that, the descriptive statistics for CIFI and Islamic banking variables are 
presented in bar charts for ease of comparison. These are presented in Figure 7.1 for 
country comparison, Figure 7.2 for legal origin comparison and Figure 7.3 for 
regional comparison. 
7.3 Univariate Results 
Table 7.2 further examines the aggregate correlation between all variables. As far as 
Islamic banking variables are concerned, the correlation coefficient between IB size 
and inclusion index has the predicted positive and highly significant, with relatively  
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Figure 7.1 Cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) and Islamic banking presence indicators, mean by country  
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Figure 7.2 Cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) and Islamic banking presence indicators, mean by legal origin  
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                 Figure 7.3 Cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) and Islamic banking presence indicators, mean by region  
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Table 7.2 Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables for CIFI 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CIFI  1             
(2) IB quantity -0.0043 1            
(3) IB size 0.2396*** 0.6677*** 1           
(4) IB profitability 0.0615 0.2373*** 0.2645*** 1          
(5) GDP  0.5318*** -0.1366*** -0.0180 -0.0660 1         
(6) Governance 0.5037*** -0.3181*** -0.1535*** -0.0969* 0.8018*** 1        
(7) Legal rights  0.2661*** -0.1957*** -0.0664 -0.2094*** 0.2143*** 0.4279*** 1       
(8) Credit information 0.2812*** -0.1034** 0.0775* 0.0534 0.5574*** 0.4393*** 0.1525*** 1      
(9) Cost contracts -0.2621*** 0.0530 -0.0161 -0.0022 -0.5135*** -0.3083*** -0.0771 -0.3316*** 1     
(10) Banking restrictions 0.2426*** -0.4076*** -0.2294*** -0.1781*** 0.5144*** 0.7172*** 0.4432*** 0.3418*** -0.1734*** 1    
(11) Paved road 0.4450*** 0.0276 0.1937*** 0.0863* 0.5401*** 0.3785*** 0.1478*** 0.2850*** -0.3578*** 0.2320*** 1   
(12) Phone 0.4550*** -0.1477*** -0.0859* -0.0582 0.8528*** 0.7489*** 0.2642*** 0.4444*** -0.4453*** 0.4387*** 0.5707*** 1  
(13) Internet 0.5345*** -0.2163*** -0.0692 -0.0791 0.8842*** 0.8458*** 0.3724*** 0.5194*** -0.4591*** 0.5836*** 0.4940*** 0.8341*** 1 
(14) Deposit interest rate -0.4436*** 0.2618*** 0.1306*** 0.0937* -0.4735*** -0.5656*** -0.2576*** -0.2933*** 0.1692*** -0.4206*** -0.3227*** -0.3817*** -0.5170*** 
(15) Lending interest rate -0.5540*** 0.0213 -0.1294*** 0.0107 -0.6980*** -0.6092*** -0.1632*** -0.4563*** 0.3658*** -0.3287*** -0.4589*** -0.6009*** -0.6662*** 
(16) English  0.0798 0.2580*** 0.2713*** -0.0535 -0.1631*** 0.0116 0.4137*** -0.1729*** 0.0705 0.0113 -0.1511*** -0.1626*** -0.1554*** 
(17) French  -0.1070** -0.0160 -0.0118 0.0580 -0.0869* -0.2030*** -0.6225*** 0.0027 0.1927*** -0.1135** -0.2075*** -0.1984*** -0.2028*** 
(18) German  0.1681*** -0.1637*** -0.1219** 0.0129 0.3124*** 0.3385*** 0.2698*** 0.2475*** -0.2159*** 0.2343*** 0.2813*** 0.3508*** 0.4452*** 
(19) Socialist -0.2045*** -0.1202** -0.1851*** -0.0247 -0.1462*** -0.2771*** 0.0146 -0.0715 -0.0991** -0.1955*** 0.2227*** 0.0147 -0.1696*** 
(20) Scandinavian 0.0770 -0.0577 -0.0889* -0.0118 0.2451*** 0.2894*** 0.0512 0.0114 -0.0789 0.1135** -0.0423 0.1887*** 0.3001*** 
(21) Africa -0.3658*** -0.1326*** -0.1230** -0.0924* -0.5722*** -0.2668*** -0.0405 -0.4231*** 0.3853*** -0.1277** -0.5270*** -0.5219*** -0.5014*** 
(22) East Asia & Pacific 0.3851*** 0.0831* 0.2334*** 0.0110 0.1644*** 0.2060*** 0.2813*** 0.1418*** 0.0508 0.1139*** 0.1300*** 0.1380*** 0.1945*** 
(23) Europe &Central Asia 0.1249** -0.2685*** -0.1842*** -0.0989* 0.4811*** 0.4074*** 0.2003*** 0.2263*** -0.3326*** 0.3471*** 0.5089*** 0.5641*** 0.5045*** 
(24) Latin America & Caribbean -0.1837*** -0.1440*** -0.2217*** -0.0295 0.0124 -0.0780 -0.1940*** 0.1682*** -0.0128 -0.0234 -0.3581*** -0.0865* -0.0873* 
(25) Middle East & North Africa 0.0998** 0.5219*** 0.4271*** 0.2094*** -0.0310 -0.2448*** -0.3730*** -0.1066** -0.1268** -0.2602*** 0.1681*** -0.1258* -0.1063*** 
(26) South Asia -0.0194 0.1313*** 0.0198 0.0781 -0.2514*** -0.1993*** 0.1026** -0.0685 0.2035*** -0.2347*** -0.0956* -0.2002*** -0.2016*** 
 
Variable (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(14) Deposit interest rate 1             
(15) Lending interest rate 0.6411*** 1            
(16) English  0.0482 0.0228 1           
(17) French  0.0470 0.0687 -0.5187*** 1          
(18) German  -0.2968*** -0.2682*** -0.3052*** -0.3922*** 1         
(19) Socialist  0.3035*** 0.2924*** -0.2117*** -0.2722*** -0.1601*** 1        
(20) Scandinavian -0.1284** -0.1731*** -0.1017** -0.1307*** -0.0769 -0.0534 1       
(21) Africa 0.2476*** 0.4384*** 0.3191*** -0.0138 -0.2116*** -0.1468*** -0.0705 1      
(22) East Asia & Pacific -0.1239** -0.1706*** 0.2920*** -0.1625*** -0.0354 -0.1032** -0.0496 -0.1364*** 1     
(23) Europe &Central Asia -0.1399*** -0.2998*** -0.4201*** -0.2177*** 0.4432*** 0.3132*** 0.1911*** -0.3691*** -0.2595*** 1    
(24) Latin America & Caribbean 0.0638 0.1349*** -0.0932* 0.3408*** -0.1918*** -0.1331*** -0.0639 -0.1759*** -0.1236** -0.3346*** 1   
(25) Middle East & North Africa 0.0305 -0.1161** 0.0104 0.2315*** -0.1816*** -0.1260** -0.0605 -0.1665*** -0.1170** -0.3167*** -0.1509*** 1  
(26) South Asia -0.0742 0.0989** 0.1337*** -0.1356*** -0.0152 0.0633 -0.0456 -0.1254** -0.0882* -0.2386*** -0.1137** -0.1076** 1 
The correlations are based on 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), 
calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm 
of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP 
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in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where 
scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement 
cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where 
higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) 
subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the 
bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is 
where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist 
is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, 
Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. 
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moderate association (0.2396). Notwithstanding, its association with the other two 
Islamic banking variables (i.e., IB quantity and IB profitability) are not significant. 
The correlation coefficient between inclusion index and other variables (i.e., 
macroeconomics, overall institutional environment, contractual and informational 
framework, regulatory restrictions and physical infrastructure) generally has the 
predicted positive/negative signs and significant.  In general, the correlations among 
all independent variables are reasonably modest. The highest correlation of 0.8842 
between GDP and internet variables is relatively moderate. These suggest that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue in the regressions. 
 
A moderate significant correlation between the inclusion index and IB size as well as 
low insignificant correlation between inclusion index and the other two Islamic 
banking variables (i.e., IB quantity and IB profitability) may infer the presence of 
heterogeneity in the sample thereby justifying a further examination on the sub 
sample of countries with Islamic banking presence (i.e., discussed further in Chapter 
8). Using a single central tendency measure (i.e., mean) in an analysis is argued to be 
misleading and inadequate. Principally, institutional theory attempts to describe the 
deeper and more resilient aspects of how institutions are created, maintained, changed 
and dissolved (Scott, 2004). This suggests that the incidence of financial inclusion 
involves institutional processes and structures (Buckland, 2012) that created and 
shaped various levels of financial inclusion. Given the complex nature of financial 
inclusion, comprehending it processes would require good understanding of the 
dynamic of the factors at different levels of financial inclusion. In particular, we are 
interested in understanding the differences between the determinants of lower and 
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higher financial inclusion, especially the role of institutional settings in creating and 
shaping those difference levels of inclusion. 
 
Further, t-tests of differences in means are computed to specifically observe 
differences across a few groups of variables. Table 7.3 shows that there is statistically 
significant difference of inclusion index between countries with and without Islamic 
banking.  
 
While Islamic banking coefficient is significant; it does have zero (0) coefficient. This 
could suggest that there is relatively no difference in terms of the contribution 
between  
Table 7.3 Differences in means comparisons 
  
Variable 
Tests of means 
(P-values) 
Islamic banking 
presence 
Country with Islamic banking vs.  
country without Islamic banking 
0.0000*** 
Legal origins 
English origin vs. other legal origins 0.1109 
French origin vs. other legal origins 0.0324** 
German origin vs. other legal origins 0.0007*** 
Socialist origin vs. other legal origins 0.0000*** 
Scandinavian origin vs. other legal origins 0.1242 
Regions 
Africa vs. other region 0.0000*** 
East Asia & Pacific vs. other region 0.0000*** 
Europe &Central Asia vs. other region 0.0124** 
Latin America & Caribbean vs. other region 0.0002*** 
Middle East & North Africa vs. other region 0.0460** 
South Asia vs. other region 0.6984 
Year 
2007 vs. 2008 1.0000 
2008 vs. 2009 1.0000 
2009 vs. 2010 1.0000 
2010 vs. 2011 1.0000 
Income level 
Low vs. other level 0.0000*** 
Lower middle vs. other level 0.0000*** 
Upper middle vs. other level 0.0213** 
High vs. other level 0.0000*** 
                    ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 
Islamic banking and conventional banking towards financial inclusion. With a few 
exceptions, the results also demonstrate that there are statistically significant 
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difference of financial inclusion with respect to legal origins and regions. Meanwhile, 
there is no significant difference across the time periods, hence suggesting that 
financial exclusion is a natural phenomenon which could not be cured within short 
periods of time. In addition, the results indicate that there is also statistically 
significant difference of inclusion index with regards to income level. This further 
suggests that there is the relationship between income level and financial inclusion. 
7.4 Multivariate Results 
Table 7.4 presents the analysis of panel data (i.e., fixed effects and random effects) 
and OLS results of the investigation of the determinants of financial inclusion. Since 
there are arguments that OLS results may be biased due to the failure to control time-
invariant heterogeneity [see, for example, Bevan & Danbolt (2004)], the results of 
panel data analysis is therefore conducted for the present study. This argument is 
confirmed where, based on the fixed effects estimate, it is showed that one can reject 
the null hypothesis of no unobservable time-invariant country-specific effects (i.e., 
µi= 0) in the sample, at less than 1% level [F-statistic = 29.59, 31.73, 29.37 and 32.13 
for Models 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively]. This is a clear indicator that bias and 
inefficacy may appear in the concurrently reported OLS estimates, which indicate its 
estimation is no longer the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Hence, the results 
of panel data analysis are adopted for the present study. 
 
Nonetheless, it ―is not as easy as a choice as it might seem‖ (Baltagi, 2005, p.19)  to 
select between the fixed effects and the random effects. The formal Hausman 
specification test for fixed versus random effects panel estimation cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that difference in coefficients is not systematic (or random) and thus  
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Table 7.4 Multivariate results of the determinants of financial inclusion 
 
Independent variables Exp. 
sign 
Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
IB quantity ? 2.2497 -1.8082   -1.4518 -1.2955   -2.4956*** -1.3151***   
  (0.71) (-1.08)   (-0.99) (-1.03)   (-5.02) (-2.69)   
IB size ? 0.1284**  0.0870***  0.0378**  0.0396**  0.0478***  0.0328**  
  (2.22)  (2.6)  (1.99)  (2.26)  (3.11)  (2.05)  
IB profitability ? 1.7283   1.3638 2.1249   1.0335 2.1781   -1.4744 
  (0.94)   (0.94) (1.33)   (0.73) (1.14)   (-1.08) 
IB quantity x  size ? -0.3034 0.2130 -0.0386  0.1167 0.1328 -0.0606  0.1449*** 0.1065** -0.0814**  
  (-0.78) (1.06) (-0.53)  (0.67) (0.88) (-1.17)  (2.88) (2.03) (-2.46)  
IB quantity x profitability ? -0.6475 -0.9922  -12.7070* -3.0036 -1.9143  -11.6287 31.4982*** 2.4615  -0.6703 
  (-0.07) (-0.27)  (-1.72) (-0.36) (-0.55)  (-1.62) (2.67) (0.93)  (-0.05) 
IB size x profitability ? -0.2883  -0.0222 0.1488 -0.2945  -0.0207 0.1339 -1.1677**  -0.0923 0.2314 
  (-0.66)  (-0.22) (0.49) (-0.79)  (-0.22) (0.45) (-2.37)  (-1.03) (0.53) 
GDP  + -0.1697 -0.1620* -0.1782* -0.1525* -0.0782 -0.0707 -0.0725 -0.0690 0.0436 0.0386 0.0382 0.0348 
  (-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.95) (-1.66) (-1.42) (-1.28) (-1.33) (-1.25) (1.63) (1.43) (1.42) (1.28) 
Governance + 0.1233 0.1144 0.1091 0.1213 0.1494* 0.1262 0.1578* 0.1287 0.1730*** 0.1321** 0.1578*** 0.1472*** 
  (0.95) (0.88) (0.85) (0.94) (1.77) (1.5) (1.89) (1.53) (3.32) (2.4) (2.88) (2.9) 
Legal rights  + 0.0228* 0.0204 0.0225* 0.0205 0.0213* 0.0199* 0.0206* 0.0211* 0.0225** 0.0266** 0.0278*** 0.0281** 
  (1.81) (1.6) (1.78) (1.62) (1.87) (1.75) (1.82) (1.85) (2.04) (2.53) (2.75) (2.54) 
Credit information + -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0066 -0.0042 -0.0233* -0.0100 -0.0196 -0.0120 
  (-0.6) (-0.59) (-0.6) (-0.57) (-0.5) (-0.39) (-0.6) (-0.39) (-1.76) (-0.84) (-1.44) (-1.03) 
Cost contracts - -1.0481*** -0.9650*** -1.0025*** -1.0222*** -0.4936*** -0.4688*** -0.4914*** -0.5020*** -0.0975 -0.0859 -0.1218* -0.1172* 
  (-4.16) (-3.84) (-4.02) (-4.05) (-3.07) (-2.9) (-3.07) (-3.1) (-1.6) (-1.33) (-1.71) (-1.66) 
Banking restrictions - -0.0045** -0.0039** -0.0044** -0.0040** -0.0041*** -0.0040** -0.0041*** -0.0040** -0.0057** -0.0058** -0.0056** -0.0055** 
  (-2.56) (-2.19) (-2.49) (-2.27) (-2.59) (-2.53) (-2.62) (-2.55) (-2.43) (-2.13) (-2.29) (-2.19) 
Paved road + 0.0027 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027 0.0024* 0.0028* 0.0025* 0.0028* 0.0017*** 0.0025*** 0.0020*** 0.0027*** 
  (1.31) (1.38) (1.34) (1.33) (1.63) (1.92) (1.69) (1.92) (2.62) (3.31) (3.04) (3.71) 
Phone + 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0024 0.0008 0.0005 0.0013 0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0031 
  (0.62) (0.59) (0.6) (0.65) (0.27) (0.18) (0.43) (0.3) (-1.05) (-1.42) (-0.59) (-1.34) 
Internet + 0.0061*** 0.0060*** 0.0062*** 0.0059*** 0.0056*** 0.0052*** 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.0017 0.0026 0.0020 0.0027 
  (3.01) (2.96) (3.11) (2.99) (3.1) (2.88) (2.98) (2.93) (0.96) (1.44) (1.11) (1.5) 
Deposit interest rate ? 0.0749 -0.0253 0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0309 0.0574 -0.0424 0.0231 -0.6962 -0.5454 -0.9942 -0.8411 
  (0.1) (-0.03) (0.01) (0) (-0.05) (0.09) (-0.06) (0.04) (-1.08) (-1) (-1.57) (-1.48) 
Lending interest rate ? -0.2466 -0.2456 -0.2387 -0.3134 -0.3894** -0.4322 -0.3575 -0.4685 -0.6915** -0.8453*** -0.7238** -0.8397*** 
  (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.6) (-0.84) (-0.94) (-0.78) (-1.01) (-2.1) (-2.57) (-2.06) (-2.6) 
English  ?     0.0639 0.1138 0.0476 0.1132 0.1112 0.1718* 0.1120 0.1489 
      (0.21) (0.37) (0.16) (0.37) (1.2) (1.73) (1.23) (1.44) 
French  ?     0.1973 0.2050 0.1854 0.2142 0.1969** 0.2179** 0.2019** 0.2320** 
      (0.67) (0.69) (0.63) (0.72) (2.17) (2.3) (2.27) (2.46) 
German  ?     -0.0159 -0.0210 -0.0060 -0.0137 0.0918 0.0605 0.0776 0.0739 
      (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.05) (1.4) (0.94) (1.14) (1.16) 
Socialist ?     -0.1301 -0.2015 -0.1078 -0.1681 0.0183 -0.0467 0.0355 0.0126 
      (-0.39) (-0.6) (-0.32) (-0.5) (0.15) (-0.44) (0.3) (0.12) 
Africa ?     0.0131 0.0154 0.0193 0.0405 -0.0431 -0.0001 -0.0070 0.0201 
      (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.22) (-0.73) (0) (-0.12) (0.32) 
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Independent variables Exp. 
sign 
Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
East Asia & Pacific ?     0.4880** 0.5983*** 0.4443** 0.5521*** 0.4817*** 0.5351*** 0.4170*** 0.4815*** 
      (2.32) (2.93) (2.16) (2.74) (4.52) (4.6) (4.09) (4.36) 
Europe & Central Asia ?     0.0568 0.1206 0.0221 0.0963 0.0653 0.1197* 0.0317 0.0711 
      (0.32) (0.7) (0.13) (0.56) (0.93) (1.82) (0.44) (1.14) 
Middle East & North Africa ?     0.1612 0.2568 0.1299 0.2092 0.2571*** 0.2883*** 0.2008** 0.2085*** 
      (0.83) (1.35) (0.68) (1.17) (3.07) (3.92) (2.45) (3.26) 
South Asia ?     0.3076 0.3451 0.2610 0.3076 0.2631*** 0.2677*** 0.1950*** 0.2153*** 
      (1.46) (1.64) (1.26) (1.47) (3.44) (3.5) (2.59) (2.97) 
2007  0.0281 0.0149 0.0231 0.0179 0.0366 0.0261 0.0289 0.0290 0.0000 0.0177 0.0053 0.0170 
  (0.64) (0.34) (0.53) (0.41) (1.02) (0.73) (0.81) (0.81) (0) (0.26) (0.08) (0.24) 
2008  0.0403 0.0302 0.0387 0.0303 0.0393 0.0308 0.0344 0.0317 0.0118 0.0229 0.0142 0.0234 
  (1.19) (0.89) (1.15) (0.9) (1.29) (1.02) (1.14) (1.05) (0.23) (0.45) (0.28) (0.45) 
2009  0.0030 -0.0036 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0128 0.0076 0.0099 0.0090 0.0102 0.0136 0.0065 0.0121 
  (0.09) (-0.11) (-0.04) (-0.03) (0.47) (0.28) (0.37) (0.33) (0.22) (0.29) (0.14) (0.25) 
2010  -0.0070 -0.0106 -0.0092 -0.0100 -0.0043 -0.0067 -0.0059 -0.0068 -0.0088 -0.0083 -0.0134 -0.0104 
  (-0.28) (-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.4) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.3) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.29) (-0.22) 
CONSTANT  1.1377 1.2492 1.2725 1.1868 0.1989 0.1160 0.1684 0.0963 -0.5277** -0.6312*** -0.5448* -0.6005** 
  (1.4) (1.52) (1.58) (1.48) (0.33) (0.19) (0.28) (0.16) (-2.3) (-2.77) (-2.36) (-2.55) 
              
Adj. R2  - - - -  - - - 0.5481 0.4913 0.5154 0.5011 
Joint test statistic (regression)  2.34*** 2.18*** 2.55*** 2.37*** 108.68*** 100.22*** 105.61*** 101.59*** 38.20*** 28.70*** 36.84*** 27.96*** 
Corr (µi, x)  -0.5530 -0.2928 -0.3822 -0.2965 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2560 - - - - 
F-statistic (all µi= 0)  29.59*** 31.73*** 29.37*** 32.13*** - - - - - - - - 
Hausman test FE vs RE   23.65 11.90 16.63 12.78 - - - - - - - - 
R2 within  0.1411 0.1151 0.1319 0.1239 0.1167 0.1007 0.1106 0.1095 - - - - 
R2 between  0.2045 0.1772 0.2176 0.2028 0.5244 0.5137 0.5193 0.5046 - - - - 
R2 overall  0.1971 0.1718 0.2101 0.1962 0.4963 0.4854 0.4911 0.4774 - - - - 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated 
based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total 
assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US 
dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on 
a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, 
including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher 
values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 
1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that 
usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a 
country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where 
a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle 
East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All estimates include observation year dummies. White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
estimation is used to correct for heteroskedasticity in OLS. t-statistics in parentheses for fixed effects and OLS models and z-statistics in parentheses for random effects model. Joint test statistic for fixed effects and 
OLS models is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model is the Wald χ2. Random effects estimate is preferred based on Hausman test.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
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the random effects methods are adopted for all regression tests (i.e., Models 5, 6, 7 
and 8). 
7.4.1 Institutional setting variables 
7.4.1.1  Islamic banking presence 
On the possible empirical relationship between Islamic banking presence and 
financial inclusion, the evidence is mixed.  The magnitude of the coefficients suggest 
that the influence of Islamic banking presence on financial inclusion is relatively 
moderate, with mixed signs and generally not significant except for IB size variable.  
Table 7.4 reports a positive significant link between inclusion level and Islamic 
banking size (at the 5% level), indicating that the presence of Islamic banking as an 
institutional setting, in general, shapes financial inclusion. There is no other prior 
study that could be appropriately compared with, except for the study done by Ben 
Naceur et al. (2015).  They found that Islamic banking has positive relationship with 
the use of credit by households and firms. However, this present results lends supports 
to Čihák & Hesse (2010) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, (2013) studies 
which argues that differences between Islamic and conventional banks are driven by 
the size of Islamic banks (i.e., small Islamic banks are appears more stable). 
Remarkably, though, there is no significant association with Islamic banking quantity 
and its profitability as well as all the interaction terms. 
 
Although the impact of Islamic banking is marginal, this finding helps to improve our 
understanding on the theoretical prediction of a positive association between financial 
inclusion and Islamic banking presence as an institutional setting. Practically, 
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compared with its counterpart, Islamic bank has relatively less advantage in some 
aspects (i.e., in terms of quantity, size and profit) due to economies of scale (Wilson, 
2004; Al-Maraj, 2009; Ahmed, 2013; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). 
Despite having less advantage in terms of size specifically, this study purports that the 
size of Islamic banking matter to improve level of financial inclusion.  The case can 
be exemplified by countries of Kuwait and Pakistan (refer panel B of Table 7.1). With 
share of Islamic banking asset of total banking system in Kuwait is 27%, its level of 
inclusion is 0.29, as  compared to Pakistan that only has 9% share, its level of 
inclusion is lower, i.e., 0.13. Referring to the view put forward by Gimet & Lagoarde-
Segot (2012), on the one hand i.e., at the macro level, this implies that Islamic bank 
needs to have bigger size of assets to exert financial inclusion. With larger size, 
Islamic bank can be better positioned to take advantage of scale economies and 
therefore could contribute more to the society and simultaneously, impose lower 
barrier to access financial services. On the other hand, i.e., at the micro level, smaller 
banks (i.e., in this case, the majority of Islamic banks), can better promote access to 
finance with strong proximity to their customers and offering microfinance to the 
riskier clients. All in all, these results indicates that the institutional setting created by 
Islamic banking system has the potential in driving financial inclusion, both at the 
macro and micro level. However, the affect is mixed. This, to a  certain extent, 
reflects on what Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, & Honohan (2008, p.2) note that ‗financial 
sector reforms that promote inclusive access to financial services are still at the core 
of the development agenda‘. 
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7.4.1.2  Other institutional setting variables 
As for the remaining institutional variables, they behave as predicted. This study 
observes a positive relationship between financial access and governance level, but 
significant only at 10%. However, this is in line with the study by Beck et al., (2007), 
which argues that the quality of the overall institutional environment is important for 
financial outreach. This proves that good institutional environment leads to better 
access in financial system. 
 
As far as contractual and informational framework is concerned, the findings seem to 
support the important of this determinant on financial inclusion. Although have less 
significant (i.e., at 10%), this significant relationship between inclusion index and 
legal rights supports the previous evidence [i.e., Beck, et al., (2007), Qian & Strahan 
(2007), Beck, et al., (2008) and Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012)] that country with 
adequate legal rights could help better in access to finance. While, the highly 
significant negative relationship between financial inclusion and contractual 
framework is consistent with the findings of  Ge et al. (2012) and Beck et al. , (2007). 
This finding supports the notion that cost for enforcing contracts is certainly affect the 
financially excluded.  Altogether, these findings imply that the contractual and 
informational framework triggers financial inclusion. 
 
The strongly negative significant coefficient for banking restrictions is supports the 
evidence that barriers for financial inclusion are higher in countries where there are 
more stringent restrictions on bank activities and entry (Beck et al., 2008). This 
suggests that regulatory restriction never drives financial inclusion.  
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With regard to interest rates, the coefficient of lending rate is negatively and 
significantly (i.e., at 5%) correlated with level of financial inclusion. Apart of 
complementing Sarma & Pais (2011) study (i.e., find the same negative sign for 
interest rate but found no significant association), this finding not only support the 
hypothetical argument that  interest rate may inhibit the expansion of credit and 
increase actual costs paid by consumers (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), 2009), but also support Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) study which found 
negative relationship between the interest spread and credit.  This result indicates that, 
countries that impose higher lending rate inhibit financial inclusion. 
 
Turning to the role of legal origin, it appears that the OLS estimate shows statistically 
significant correlation between inclusion and legal origin (i.e., French). However, the 
effect of the legal origin variable is not significant under the panel data method. The 
relatively small influence of this variable is consistent with the findings of Beck et al., 
(2007), suggesting a less impact of the legal history on financial inclusion.  
 
It is evidenced that that East Asia & Pacific region exerts a positive influence on the 
degree of least-advantaged people and statistically significant for both, OLS estimate 
and panel data method. As for Middle East & North Africa and South Asia, only OLS 
estimate shows the effect of these regions on level of inclusion with statistically 
significant. This finding helps to better understand Kušar (2011) who mentioned that 
―the institutional approach in economic geography is the notion that differences in 
economic development between regions are actually the result of interregional 
differences in institutions‖. Specifically, we could say that financial inclusion is 
regionally-specific.  
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The above findings on the other institutional setting variables seem to support the 
general  notion that institutional framework plays an essential role in expanding 
financial access as remarked by  Beck & Torre (2007) and Beck & Demirguc-Kunt 
(2008).   
7.4.2 Other explanatory variables 
The other variables enter with the expected signs in Table 7.4 regressions. The 
significant positive relationship between inclusion level and both paved road and 
internet are consistent with studies by Beck et al., (2008), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, et 
al., (2007) and Sarma & Pais (2011). This finding further support the importance of 
physical infrastructure in promoting financial access. 
7.5 Robustness Checks 
A number of tests are conducted to examine the robustness of the results obtained in 
this chapter as follows: 
7.5.1 Financial inclusion indicators regression specifications 
In the earlier analyses, this study employs index of financial inclusion (i.e., CIFI) to 
identify the determinants of financial access. This index is computed using four 
variables representing two dimensions, i.e., use and outreach. Considering that the 
measurement/index are not very well supported
50
, it is worth to examine this present 
study using the conventional method as initiated by Beck et al., (2007). For robustness 
                                              
50
 Continuous modifications are being made to find a comprehensive measure of financial inclusion 
since there is no single measurement of financial inclusion can be applied cross-country. For detail, 
refer Chapter 3. 
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purpose, in this section, individual financial inclusion indicator specifications are 
employed. The regression models similar to those in Table 7.4 are rerun with these 
alternative financial inclusion indicators as the dependent variables. These indicators 
regression specifications, which focus on individual outreach and usage dimensions, 
are useful for specifically explaining the impact of country‘s institutional setting on its 
banking facilities (i.e., bank‘s branches and ATMs) and financial services (i.e., 
deposits and loans). However, to the extent that Islamic banking presence affects 
individual banking facilities and financial services, the indicator specifications will 
underestimate the true impact of Islamic banking environment as institutional setting 
as a whole on financial inclusion.  The results are reported in Table 7.5.   
 
With regards to overall institutional settings variables, with a few exceptions, we 
continue to find statistically significant impact of institutional settings on financial 
inclusion using these specifications with the main results. However, for IB size 
variable specifically, the results are mixed (i.e., with mixed signs and generally not 
significant). It appears that most of the OLS estimates of IB size are statistically 
significant. However, the effect of this variable is not significant under the panel data 
method. Interesting though, the impact of profitability is found to be positively 
significant with the level of financial inclusion for both deposits and loans. This 
supports the notion of risk-sharing in promoting financial inclusion (see, for 
examples, Mirakhor & Iqbal, 2012; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu, 2012; 
Mohieldin, 2012; El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013; Martowardojo, 2015; MIFC, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the link between level of financial access with other variables that are 
governance, legal rights, cost contracts, banking restrictions and physical  
 181 
 
 Table 7.5  Multivariate results of the determinants of financial inclusion using financial inclusion indicators as dependent 
variables 
 
Independent 
variable 
Bank branches ATMs Outstanding deposits Outstanding loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE RE RE RE 
IB quantity 
-69.26 7.02   -236.59 537.68   -181.90*** -26.47   -228.91*** -50.16   
(-1.19) (0.22)   (-0.31) (1.08)   (-2.67) (-0.57)   (-2.88) (-0.82)   
IB size 
-0.76  -0.17  -18.20  -16.94*  0.26  0.84  -1.08  -0.71  
(-0.73)  (-0.26)  (-1.48)  (-1.86)  (0.23)  (0.88)  (-0.94)  (-0.72)  
IB profitability 
23.73   -3.08 -226.53   -122.04 140.76***   56.82 156.44**   70.66 
(0.67)   (-0.11) (-0.41)   (-0.27) (2.84)   (1.38) (2.28)   (1.19) 
IB quantity x 9.86 0.75 1.65  34.02 -64.15 8.36  20.31** 2.32 -0.11  25.65*** 4.00 -1.15  
   size (1.37) (0.19) (1.17)  (0.37) (-1.07) (0.39)  (2.43) (0.42) (-0.05)  (2.65) (0.54) (-0.44)  
IB quantity x  109.09 -156.05**  77.95 1273.06 -1024.98  3152.64 498.93* -282.01***  90.14 412.16 -389.50***  80.21 
   profitability (0.6) (-2.24)  (0.55) (0.45) (-0.92)  (1.38) (1.93) (-2.73)  (0.43) (1.14) (-2.65)  (0.27) 
IB size x -11.63  -5.14*** -6.43 -33.50  -37.07 -109.46 -45.31***  -9.35*** -20.42** -48.27***  -12.07*** -25.85** 
  profitability (-1.38)  (-2.62) (-1.1) (-0.25)  (-1.19) (-1.17) (-3.76)  (-3.21) (-2.36) (-2.91)  (-2.97) (-2.08) 
GDP  
8.90*** 9.06*** 9.17*** 8.89*** 34.25 35.13 36.66 33.23 -11.25*** -10.38*** -13.81*** -10.04*** -2.99 -2.22 -1.72 -1.72 
(5.05) (5.13) (5.26) (5.11) (1.33) (1.36) (1.44) (1.31) (-4.81) (-4.38) (-5.28) (-4.32) (-1.03) (-0.76) (-0.59) (-0.6) 
Governance 
-0.21 -0.52 -0.34 0.01 27.39 32.18 28.47 32.99 14.17*** 13.15*** 11.94*** 13.97*** 14.76*** 14.67*** 15.08*** 15.72*** 
(-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.14) (0.01) (0.74) (0.87) (0.78) (0.9) (4.21) (3.88) (3.23) (4.15) (3.43) (3.43) (3.54) (3.68) 
Legal rights  
0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 -5.20 -4.74 -5.15 -4.88 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 -0.25 -0.22 -0.29 -0.26 
(0.57) (0.63) (0.55) (0.55) (-1.34) (-1.22) (-1.33) (-1.26) (0.37) (0.34) (0.22) (0.21) (-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.58) (-0.53) 
Credit 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.99 0.93 1.05 0.86 -0.57* -0.57* -0.63* -0.59* 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 
   information (1.19) (1.19) (1.18) (1.13) (0.27) (0.25) (0.29) (0.23) (-1.71) (-1.67) (-1.86) (-1.74) (1.24) (1.17) (1.14) (1.12) 
Cost  9.94** 9.50** 10.13** 10.30** 192.32*** 172.61** 184.14** 185.55** -10.19 -9.48 -6.93 -9.37 -9.14 -9.50 -8.56 -9.77 
   contracts (2.06) (1.98) (2.11) (2.14) (2.63) (2.38) (2.54) (2.55) (-1.54) (-1.42) (-0.97) (-1.4) (-1.08) (-1.12) (-1.01) (-1.15) 
Financial  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 1.43*** 1.31** 1.42*** 1.37** 0.09* 0.08 0.07 0.09* 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
   restrictions (3.1) (2.88) (3) (3) (2.65) (2.44) (2.64) (2.56) (1.79) (1.58) (1.32) (1.77) (4.6) (4.35) (4.51) (4.56) 
Paved road 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.14** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
(0.6) (0.58) (0.61) (0.52) (0.8) (0.71) (0.8) (0.76) (2.34) (2.36) (2.25) (2.43) (-4.87) (-4.8) (-4.71) (-4.76) 
Phone 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 1.53 1.65 1.56 1.56 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.45 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 
(-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.4) (-0.43) (1.36) (1.46) (1.39) (1.38) (4.72) (4.92) (4.69) (4.94) (3.21) (3.52) (3.53) (3.52) 
Internet 
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -1.52** -1.46** -1.52** -1.46** -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 
(0.57) (0.45) (0.36) (0.34) (-2.48) (-2.39) (-2.51) (-2.42) (-0.11) (-0.4) (-1.03) (-0.61) (0.48) (0.39) (0.1) (0.2) 
Deposit  17.55 18.64 19.17 19.72 105.74 104.87 108.44 103.77 18.27 18.91 24.97 21.56 48.52* 46.03 49.92* 48.96* 
   interest rate (1.26) (1.34) (1.38) (1.42) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.91) (0.92) (1.22) (1.06) (1.71) (1.6) (1.74) (1.71) 
Lending -6.73 -8.17 -7.34 -7.06 -17.96 -22.78 -23.20 -0.70 -28.92** -32.75** -31.11** -31.16** -26.94 -29.03 -27.89 -26.91 
   interest rate (-0.67) (-0.81) (-0.73) (-0.7) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.15) (0) (-1.99) (-2.21) (-2.09) (-2.12) (-1.32) (-1.41) (-1.36) (-1.31) 
English  
62.38 59.70 60.10 60.36 142.62 97.88 140.94 94.43 -25.01 -25.37  -25.76 20.32 17.33 18.04 16.20 
(1.14) (1.09) (1.11) (1.1) (0.5) (0.34) (0.5) (0.33) (-0.98) (-1.01)  (-1.03) (0.96) (0.82) (0.86) (0.77) 
French  
63.78 61.63 61.99 61.72 84.90 62.21 87.05 61.10 -18.92 -20.52  -19.99 17.65 15.30 15.74 15.86 
(1.2) (1.17) (1.19) (1.17) (0.31) (0.23) (0.32) (0.22) (-0.77) (-0.84)  (-0.82) (0.86) (0.75) (0.77) (0.78) 
German  
42.66 41.99 42.31 42.25 163.29 158.30 166.32 155.73 -39.44 -39.36  -38.40 -10.16 -10.05 -9.07 -8.83 
(0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (0.6) (0.58) (0.62) (0.58) (-1.63) (-1.64)  (-1.6) (-0.5) (-0.5) (-0.45) (-0.44) 
Socialist 
29.83 29.69 29.97 29.86 98.45 120.23 109.33 110.46 -63.63** -63.32**  -61.59** -14.65 -11.61 -11.14 -9.23 
(0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.54) (0.33) (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (-2.41) (-2.41)  (-2.35) (-0.64) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.41) 
Africa 
13.73 13.53 13.63 12.67 17.84 22.63 26.33 15.07 -10.47 -9.74  -8.88 -0.43 0.82 1.39 2.32 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.42) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (-0.72) (-0.67)  (-0.62) (-0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.19) 
East Asia &  93.16** 88.94** 89.65** 89.56** 586.48*** 510.13*** 575.13*** 525.77*** 46.66*** 42.92***  42.37** 72.06*** 63.12*** 64.32*** 61.83*** 
   Pacific (2.58) (2.49) (2.54) (2.51) (3.05) (2.74) (3.11) (2.83) (2.72) (2.59)  (2.57) (4.94) (4.53) (4.55) (4.49) 
Europe &  38.50 36.44 36.63 36.75 16.42 -28.33 8.37 -21.94 22.66* 21.08  20.16 60.51*** 55.30*** 55.49*** 53.63*** 
   Central Asia (1.34) (1.28) (1.3) (1.29) (0.11) (-0.19) (0.06) (-0.15) (1.65) (1.57)  (1.51) (5.1) (4.79) (4.78) (4.69) 
Middle East &  18.74 13.73 14.71 16.28 129.32 43.87 117.71 53.70 51.45*** 48.54***  47.61*** 58.01*** 50.22*** 51.69*** 47.49*** 
   North Africa (0.61) (0.45) (0.49) (0.54) (0.76) (0.27) (0.73) (0.34) (3.38) (3.37)  (3.38) (4.41) (4.01) (4.05) (3.97) 
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Independent 
variable 
Bank branches ATMs Outstanding deposits Outstanding loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE RE RE RE 
South Asia 
51.52 47.55 48.12 48.01 101.77 52.24 96.63 65.15 30.61* 25.89  25.31 46.89*** 39.96*** 39.49*** 38.52*** 
(1.38) (1.28) (1.31) (1.3) (0.52) (0.27) (0.51) (0.34) (1.74) (1.5)  (1.48) (3.17) (2.75) (2.74) (2.68) 
2007 
1.89** 1.88** 1.80** 1.71** -39.25*** -36.21*** -38.30*** -36.85*** -7.73*** -8.02*** -9.42*** -8.18*** -4.92*** -4.97*** -5.45*** -5.18*** 
(2.23) (2.24) (2.15) (2.05) (-3.01) (-2.8) (-2.96) (-2.87) (-6.53) (-6.72) (-7.54) (-6.94) (-3.07) (-3.09) (-3.39) (-3.25) 
2008 
1.11* 1.09* 1.02 0.99 -35.52*** -33.35*** -35.29*** -33.44*** -5.06*** -5.33*** -6.15*** -5.54*** -1.75 -1.80 -2.25* -2.08 
(1.7) (1.68) (1.57) (1.54) (-3.45) (-3.26) (-3.45) (-3.31) (-5.41) (-5.65) (-6.39) (-5.96) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.72) (-1.6) 
2009 
1.85*** 1.84*** 1.82*** 1.79*** -20.86** -19.35** -20.23** -19.67** -2.59*** -2.76*** -3.67*** -2.73*** -0.10 -0.17 -0.29 -0.13 
(3.01) (3) (2.98) (2.92) (-2.19) (-2.04) (-2.14) (-2.08) (-3) (-3.15) (-4.03) (-3.14) (-0.08) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.11) 
2010 
1.12** 1.09** 1.09** 1.07** -8.27 -7.63 -8.00 -7.52 -1.76** -1.90*** -2.36*** -1.87*** -0.74 -0.85 -0.89 -0.80 
(2.35) (2.3) (2.3) (2.26) (-1.1) (-1.01) (-1.06) (-1) (-2.57) (-2.73) (-3.35) (-2.71) (-0.77) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.83) 
CONSTANT 
-148.33** -146.77** -148.47** -145.63** -479.95 -453.62 -500.38 -443.49 147.60*** 142.10*** 162.60*** 138.63*** 29.88 26.10 21.07 21.15 
(-2.5) (-2.49) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-1.25) (-1.18) (-1.32) (-1.16) (4.28) (4.12) (7.08) (4.05) (0.86) (0.75) (0.61) (0.61) 
                 
Joint test 
statistic 
(regression) 
77.07 *** 72.22*** 75.91*** 74.54*** 62.94*** 57.07*** 62.67*** 60.70*** 239.68*** 218.41*** 9.80*** 226.94*** 261.63*** 246.57*** 251.38*** 252.01*** 
Corr (µi, x) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1699 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
F-statistic  
(all µi= 0) 
- - - - - - - - - - 313.48*** - - - - - 
Hausman test 
FE vs RE  (χ2) 
4.01 3.78 7.44 3.66 23.21 20.24 10.50 19.15 16.95 17.46 26.39* 24.44 18.06 22.19 23.04 21.68 
R2 within 0.1658 0.1527 0.1613 0.1580 0.1396 0.1140 0.1359 0.1238 0.3852 0.3521 0.3688 0.3637 0.3048 0.2794 0.2859 0.2890 
R2 between 0.2034 0.2053 0.2042 0.2059 0.1787 0.2077 0.1832 0.2062 0.4283 0.4366 0.0051 0.4368 0.6643 0.6579 0.6593 0.6550 
R2 overall 0.2034 0.2053 0.2042 0.2059 0.1787 0.2066 0.1826 0.2053 0.4278 0.4356 0.0073 0.4359 0.6571 0.6503 0.6518 0.6477 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variables are the financial inclusion indicators (i.e., as stated in the first row). Bank branches is commercial bank branches 
per 1,000 km2. ATMs is referred to ATMs per 1,000 km2. Outstanding deposits is outstanding deposits from commercial banks (% of GDP). Outstanding loans is defined as outstanding loans from commercial banks (% of GDP). IB quantity is defined as 
total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the 
Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws 
facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including 
legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved 
road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is 
the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according 
to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of 
German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, 
Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All estimates include observation year dummies. White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in OLS (results are not reported). t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses for fixed effects and random effects models, respectively. Joint test statistic for fixed effects model is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model 
is the Wald χ2. Fixed effects estimate is preferred if the Hausman test is significant, otherwise random effects estimate is adopted. Hausman test result is reported in each column.   ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively (2-tail test). 
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infrastructure, are largely consistent with the main results, indicating the importance 
of these elements in promoting greater use of financial services. Taken together, these 
results support the notion that institutional settings give impact on financial inclusion. 
 
Since it is argued that comprehensive measure of financial inclusion is better in 
examining the barriers (Sarma & Pais, 2011), the results of this alternative financial 
inclusion specification will not invalidate the main results.  
7.5.2 Sub-samples analyses 
For robustness purposes, this study also employs sub-sample analyses. In the main 
analysis, we pooled all the financial inclusion determinants in one single regression to 
identify the effect of these variables on financial inclusion. This study included one 
new institutional setting variables i.e., Islamic banking presence. The pooled model in 
Table 7.4 generally supports the notion of institutional settings which have influence 
on financial inclusion. However, apart from governance, contractual and 
informational framework and regulation restrictions, the regression coefficients for 
Islamic banking presence, legal origin and regions are mixed, both in sign and 
significance. These warrant for sub sample analyses to shed lights for potential 
reasons and statistical influence.  
 
The results and discussions are explained in the following sub-sections.     
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7.5.2.1 Islamic banking presence in countries with Islamic Financial 
Sector 
A concern with our earlier analysis is that, by looking specifically into the countries 
with Islamic banking presence only, it might better explain the influence of Islamic 
banking existence on the level of financial inclusion. To address whether this is the 
case, this study investigates whether financial inclusion in countries with Islamic 
banks tend to have better coincide with Islamic banking presence. This study finds 
that, this appears to be the case. The results are shown in Table 7.6. The sub-sample 
analysis is largely consistent with the main results; it supports the notion that size 
matters in financial inclusion.  
 
By only examining countries with Islamic banking presence (hence controlling 
potential bias in the full sample where Islamic banks are relatively less profitable than 
their conventional counterparts), the impact of profitability is also found to be 
positively significant with financial inclusion. This supports the importance of 
financial capacity of the Islamic banks in promoting financial inclusion (see, for 
examples, Mirakhor & Iqbal, 2012; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu, 2012; 
Mohieldin, 2012; El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013; Martowardojo, 2015; MIFC, 2015). 
Overall, this implies that Islamic finance has room in supporting financial inclusion. 
 
Other variables, that are cost contracts and internet yield consistent results with the 
main analysis. As far as the period of study (i.e., year 2007 to 2017) is concerned, we 
find statistically significant impact on Islamic banking landscape during financial 
crisis on financial inclusion. In other words, Islamic banking sector through its  
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Table 7.6 Multivariate results of the determinants of financial inclusion for countries with Islamic banking presence 
 
Independent variables Exp. 
sign 
Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
IB quantity ? 2.5812 -4.1813   -11.9851*** -5.8631***   -11.9851*** -5.8631***   
  (0.41) (-1.2)   (-5.77) (-2.86)   (-5.37) (-4.93)   
IB size ? 0.3270**  0.2184***  -0.3611***  -0.1675***  -0.3611***  -0.1675**  
  (2.6)  (3.01)  (-5.15)  (-2.56)  (-3.46)  (-2.38)  
IB profitability ? 7.6812**   5.2522* 4.8566   5.2609 4.8566   5.2609 
  (2.09)   (1.8) (1.2)   (1.12) (1.52)   (1.19) 
IB quantity x size ? -0.3408 0.5429 -0.0298  1.5261*** 0.5246** 0.0063  1.5261*** 0.5246*** 0.0063  
  (-0.44) (1.3) (-0.22)  (5.55) (2.15) (0.07)  (4.67) (3.58) (0.1)  
IB quantity x profitability ? 3.5069 -0.9362  -29.1261** -14.6684 7.8306  7.1405 -14.6684 7.8306  7.1405 
  (0.2) (-0.12)  (-2.04) (-0.69) (0.81)  (0.32) (-0.74) (0.96)  (0.5) 
IB size x profitability ? -1.3654  -0.0269 0.0806 0.0571  0.4449 -0.8076 0.0571  0.4449 -0.8076 
  (-1.6)  (-0.13) (0.14) (0.06)  (1.61) (-0.81) (0.07)  (1.59) (-1.05) 
GDP  + -0.0128 -0.1722 -0.1009 -0.1517 -0.1581 0.0971 0.0383 -0.0734 -0.1581 0.0971 0.0383 -0.0734 
  (-0.04) (-0.45) (-0.28) (-0.42) (-1.05) (0.59) (0.23) (-0.53) (-1.07) (0.61) (0.26) (-0.61) 
Governance + -0.6007 -0.4731 -0.8574 -0.2478 0.7072*** 0.2128 0.5320** 0.3527 0.7072*** 0.2128 0.5320*** 0.3527* 
  (-1) (-0.75) (-1.43) (-0.41) (3.44) (1.03) (2.22) (1.54) (4.48) (1.21) (3.26) (1.7) 
Legal rights  + -0.0622 -0.0905 -0.0552 -0.0756 -0.0937 0.0761 0.0765 0.1026* -0.0937*** 0.0761 0.0765 0.1026* 
  (-0.26) (-0.34) (-0.23) (-0.3) (-1.45) (1.15) (1.13) (1.66) (-1.22) (1.29) (1.21) (1.81) 
Credit information + -0.0098 -0.0106 -0.0009 -0.0197 -0.1786*** -0.1918*** -0.1929*** -0.1986*** -0.1786 -0.1918** -0.1929** -0.1986** 
  (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.02) (-0.43) (-4.21) (-3.89) (-3.88) (-3.78) (-2.87) (-2.57) (-2.6) (-2.49) 
Cost contracts - -4.2019** -2.8809 -2.6694 -4.8313*** -0.1969 0.2539 -0.5033 -0.6020 -0.1969 0.2539 -0.5033 -0.6020 
  (-2.42) (-1.63) (-1.59) (-2.68) (-0.5) (0.59) (-1.15) (-1.42) (-0.45) (0.56) (-0.96) (-1.28) 
Financial restrictions - -0.0078 -0.0019 -0.0072 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0069 0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0069 0.0021 
  (-0.93) (-0.21) (-0.85) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.98) (0.35) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-1.47) (0.48) 
Paved road + 0.0010 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0088** 0.0106** 0.0109** 0.0066 0.0088** 0.0106** 0.0109** 0.0066 
  (0.09) (0.13) (-0.07) (-0.01) (2.04) (2.15) (2.18) (1.44) (2.29) (2.45) (2.47) (1.7) 
Phone + 0.0264 0.0353 0.0335 0.0400 -0.0113 -0.0145 -0.0094 -0.0038 -0.0113 -0.0145 -0.0094 -0.0038 
  (0.9) (1.12) (1.13) (1.34) (-1.06) (-1.22) (-0.78) (-0.31) (-0.85) (-1.01) (-0.67) (-0.24) 
Internet + 0.0184*** 0.0147** 0.0165** 0.0147** 0.0216*** 0.0096 0.0012 0.0057 0.0216* 0.0096 0.0012 0.0057 
  (2.82) (2.1) (2.51) (2.24) (2.73) (1.08) (0.15) (0.71) (1.79) (0.87) (0.12)  (0.57) 
Deposit interest rate ? 6.5571 1.8413 3.8842 4.4571 2.5583 1.4577 5.4568 4.7861 2.5583 1.4577 5.4568* 4.7861 
  (1.57) (0.42) (0.94) (1.05) (0.83) (0.41) (1.51) (1.27) (1.09) (0.55) (1.95) (1.63) 
Lending interest rate ? -6.3104* -3.3455 -5.0071 -5.5565 1.6317 1.3715 -4.6386 -4.1772 1.6317 1.3715 -4.6386* -4.1772 
  (-1.8) (-0.9) (-1.44) (-1.54) (0.52) (0.37) (-1.34) (-1.2) (0.64) (0.55) (-1.79) (-1.61) 
English  ?     0.6825* 0.1991 0.1993 -0.1130 0.6825* 0.1991 0.1993 -0.1130 
      (1.7) (0.49) (0.47) (-0.24) (2.04) (0.62) (0.6) (-0.3) 
French  ?     0.5280 0.0354 0.1243 0.1691 0.5280 0.0354 0.1243 0.1691 
      (1.45) (0.09) (0.31) (0.41) (1.17) (0.08) (0.29) (0.36) 
East Asia & Pacific ?     0.2942 0.0987 0.0125 0.1181 0.2942 0.0987 0.0125 0.1181 
      (1.02) (0.3) (0.04) (0.34) (1.49) (0.36) (0.05) (0.42) 
Europe & Central Asia ?     -0.6494* -0.5656 -0.5895 -0.8350* -0.6494 -0.5656 -0.5895 -0.8350 
      (-1.75) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.91) (-1.27) (-0.94) (-1.02) (-1.37) 
Middle East & North Africa ?     -0.5816 0.0411 -0.2897 -0.3693 -0.5816 0.0411 -0.2897 -0.3693 
      (-1.22) (0.08) (-0.52) (-0.7) (-0.89) (0.07) (-0.43) (-0.57) 
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Independent variables Exp. 
sign 
Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
South Asia ?     0.4393 0.2627 -0.3353 -0.1978 0.4393** 0.2627 -0.3353 -0.1978 
      (1.49) (0.77) (-1.09) (-0.62) (2.45) (1.25) (-1.2) (-0.77) 
2007  0.6148*** 0.3442 0.5181** 0.3280* 0.0657 0.0988 -0.1450 0.0160 0.0657 0.0988 -0.1450 0.0160 
  (3.01) (1.62) (2.46) (1.69) (0.41) (0.53) (-0.78) (0.09) (0.28) (0.42) (-0.64) (0.07) 
2008  0.3995** 0.2315 0.3603** 0.1881 0.0335 0.0607 -0.1475 -0.0195 0.0335 0.0607 -0.1475 -0.0195 
  (2.61) (1.44) (2.28) (1.29) (0.22) (0.34) (-0.84) (-0.11) (0.21) (0.43) (-0.92) (-0.13) 
2009  0.2572* 0.1152 0.1879 0.1158 0.1221 0.1106 -0.0030 0.0619 0.1221 0.1106 -0.0030 0.0619 
  (2.01) (0.85) (1.43) (0.91) (0.92) (0.72) (-0.02) (0.38) (1.01) (0.95) (-0.02) (0.46) 
2010  0.1876* 0.0982 0.1458 0.0969 0.0884 0.0885 0.0183 0.0596 0.0884 0.0885 0.0183 0.0596 
  (2.02) (0.99) (1.53) (1.03) (0.74) (0.63) (0.13) (0.41) (0.92) (0.88) (0.17) (0.52) 
CONSTANT  -1.0329 1.9341 -0.0809 2.5000 3.6148** -1.2046 1.3217 0.8609 3.6148* -1.2046 1.3217 0.8609 
  (-0.29) (0.57) (-0.02) (0.81) (2.24) (-0.76) (0.72) (0.59) (1.89) (-0.81) (0.74) (0.68) 
              
Adj. R2  - - - - - - - - 0.7120 0.6039 0.5940 0.5550 
Joint test statistic (regression)  1.98** 1.06*** 1.67* 1.54 271.72*** 174.95*** 168.87*** 147.48*** 21.60*** 20.32*** 8.46*** 9.88*** 
Corr (µi, x)  -0.9307 -0.8779 -0.8846 -0.9271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - - 
F-statistic (all µi= 0)  11.14*** 10.36*** 12.00*** 12.38*** - - - - - - - - 
Hausman test FE vs RE   115.58*** 35.04*** 55.98*** 86.84*** - - - - - - - - 
R2 within  0.4140 0.2349 0.3262 0.3090 0.0005 0.0026 0.0005 0.0106 - - - - 
R2 between  0.0087 0.0077 0.0014 0.0294 0.9534 0.8343 0.8433 0.7829 - - - - 
R2 overall  0.0112 0.0094 0.0002 0.0306 0.7905 0.6999 0.6925 0.6629 - - - - 
The full sample consists of 100 country-year observations (i.e., 20 countries with Islamic banking presence, with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of 
financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the 
average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value 
of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost 
contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement 
in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land 
line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending 
interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of 
financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin 
America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank.  All estimates include observation year dummies. White‘s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to correct for heteroskedasticity in OLS. t-statistics in parentheses for fixed effects and OLS models and z-statistics in parentheses for random effects 
model. Joint test statistic for fixed effects and OLS models is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model is the Wald χ2. Fixed effects estimate is preferred based on Hausman test.  ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
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capability and capacity, manage to increase financial inclusion during the period of 
financial crisis and post-crisis.   
7.5.2.2  Legal origins 
As far as historical (evolutionary) institutionalism is concern (refer Hall & Taylor, 
1996), further robustness test is also examined for legal origins. This test examines 
the link between financial access and historical variable as posited by Steinmo (2008) 
when argues that this historical institutionalism should answer ―why a certain choice 
was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred‖. Despite having no country with 
Islamic banking, these results include Socialist origin but omit Scandinavian origin 
due to insufficient data. Table 7.7 presents the results.  
 
After splitting the sample based on legal origins, the results show some differences in 
the correlation of legal origin with determinants of financial inclusion especially the 
institutional setting variables. With respect to Islamic banking variables, we continue 
to find a statistically significant impact of Islamic banking size on financial inclusion 
in countries adopting English origin. Additionally, the German legal origin is never 
significant in any of the regressions for Islamic banking presence. This finding, to a 
certain extent, also helps to better understand Grassa & Gazdar (2014)
51
 who finds 
that Islamic financial industry is more developed in countries adopting a mixed legal 
system based on Common Law
 
(i.e., English origin) and Shariah Law, whereas 
countries adopting a mixed legal system based on both Civil Law (French and  
                                              
51
 In their study, legal origins of 30 countries are reclassified to incorporate the Islamic legal system 
(i.e., Shariah Law) adopt by the countries, if any. Their study examines how Shariah legal origin matter 
for Islamic finance development. 
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Table 7.7 Multivariate results of the determinants of financial inclusion by legal origins 
 
Independent variables English French German Socialist 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE FE FE FE FE 
IB quantity 
-2.58* -2.10   -1.29 0.23        
(-1.66) (-0.57)   (-0.61) (0.2)        
IB size 
0.21***  0.16***  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02   
(8.41)  (4.14)  (0.48)  (0.4)  (0.15)  (0.34)   
IB profitability 
-1.33   0.37 -0.01   -0.96 -2.13   -1.19  
(-0.23)   (0.07) (-0.00)   (-0.74) (-0.09)   (-0.08)  
IB quantity x size 
0.08 0.23 -0.19**  0.16 0.01 0.02  -4.52 -3.77 -4.67   
(0.42) (0.53) (-2.13)  (0.61) (0.11) (0.21)  (-1.08) (-1.22) (-1.22)   
IB quantity x profitability 
-50.66 -2.07  -30.67 7.08 -4.09**  1.89      
(-1.64) (-0.1)  (-1.23) (0.84) (-2.15)  (0.3)      
IB size x profitability 
1.04  0.05 0.71 -0.35  -0.14** -0.05 0.59  0.23 -0.22  
(0.84)  (0.14) (0.59) (-0.95)  (-2.42) (-0.27) (0.15)  (0.26) (-0.09)  
GDP  
-0.03 0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.30** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.49* 
(-0.24) (0.17) (-0.77) (0.01) (-1.50) (-1.40) (-1.38) (-1.32) (-2.68) (-2.80) (-2.74) (-2.70) (-2.09) 
Governance 
0.68*** 0.03 0.68** -0.01 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.29** 0.30** 0.30** 0.29** 0.28 
(2.66) (0.08) (2.01) (-0.01) (3.30) (3.51) (3.61) (3.53) (2.36) (2.44) (2.41) (2.33) (1.32) 
Legal rights  
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 
(1.06) (0.53) (1) (0.72) (0.89) (0.74) (0.76) (0.69) (0.38) (0.26) (0.40) (-0.01) (-1.6) 
Credit information 
-0.08*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
(-2.85) (-0.1) (-0.99) (-0.23) (-0.25) (0.14) (-0.01) (-0.15) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.61) (-0.76) 
Cost contracts 
-0.85*** -0.62 -0.58 -0.67 -0.29 -0.23 -0.25 -0.23 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.81 
(-3.04) (-1.42) (-1.62) (-1.54) (-1.44) (-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.22) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.39) 
Financial restrictions 
-0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 
(-2.36) (-2.18) (-2.44) (-2.29) (-0.98) (-1.28) (-1.13) (-0.97) (1.43) (1.5) (1.43) (1.26) (3.33) 
Paved road 
0.00 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
(2.39) (0.9) (2.04) (0.92) (2.17) (1.97) (2.04) (2.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.53) (-0.77) 
Phone 
0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(1.67) (-0.1) (0.57) (0.18) (-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.23) (0.88) (0.96) (0.97) (0.71) (-0.02) 
Internet 
0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 
(0.22) (1.95) (1.06) (1.83) (-1.08) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.53) (2.16) (2.29) (2.29) (1.96) (-1.09) 
Deposit interest rate 
-6.10*** 0.44 -0.56 0.66 -0.27 -0.35 -0.34 -0.29 -0.71 -0.67 -0.71 -0.53 1.96 
(-2.71) (0.16) (-0.22) (0.25) (-0.49) (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.54) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.67) (1.69) 
Lending interest rate 
5.67*** -1.10 0.84 -1.78 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.35 -0.78 
(2.75) (-0.49) (0.39) (-0.8) (-0.22) (-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.34) (0.62) (0.64) (0.64) (0.53) (-1.41) 
Africa 
0.42 0.49 0.34 0.49 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18      
(1.58) (0.73) (0.83) (0.72) (-1) (-1.05) (-1.00) (-1.06)      
East Asia & Pacific 
-0.11 0.28 -0.26 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.14 0.19      
(-0.61) (0.48) (-0.73) (0.38) (0.71) (0.34) (0.42) (0.60)      
Europe & Central Asia 
-0.62*** -0.39 -0.98** -0.39 0.31* 0.32** 0.30* 0.31**      
(-2.74) (-0.54) (-2.23) (-0.53) (1.76) (2.14) (1.88) (2.1)      
Middle East & North  0.59*** 0.08 0.31 0.02 0.32* 0.33** 0.30* 0.36***      
Africa (2.71) (0.11) (0.78) (0.03) (1.78) (2.15) (1.99) (2.69)      
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Independent variables English French German Socialist 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE FE FE FE FE 
South Asia 
1.06*** 0.64 0.51 0.48 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09      
(3.28) (0.88) (1.2) (0.65) (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) (0.33)      
2007 
0.10 0.24* 0.11 0.23* -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.45*** 
(0.73) (1.86) (0.97) (1.92) (-3.77) (-4.06) (-4.00) (-4.17) (-0.21) (-0.28) (-0.16) (-0.86) (-4.11) 
2008 
0.05 0.16 0.07 0.15 -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.29*** 
(0.4) (1.51) (0.71) (1.5) (-2.74) (-2.99) (-2.95) (-3.11) (1.28) (1.24) (1.28) (0.78) (-4.32) 
2009 
0.01 0.11 0.03 0.10 -0.05** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.32*** 
(0.08) (1.08) (0.35) (1.02) (-2.42) (-2.68) (-2.62) (-2.7) (-0.76) (-0.91) (-0.77) (-1.4) (-4.51) 
2010 
-0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05** -0.03 -0.03* -0.03 -0.04* -0.16*** 
(-0.24) (0.84) (0.25) (0.68) (-2.4) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.59) (-1.54) (-1.76) (-1.66) (-1.97) (-3.41) 
CONSTANT 
-0.67 -0.91 0.27 -0.65 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.37 1.61 1.95 1.89 1.69 4.84 
(-0.62) (-0.44) (0.17) (-0.32) (1.06) (0.98) (0.94) (0.89) (0.89) (1.14) (1.1) (0.97) (1.57) 
Number of observation 115 115 115 115 160 160 160 160 75 75 75 75 40 
Joint test statistic (regression) 501.55*** 28.93 89.86*** 30.84 104.68*** 104.68*** 110.30*** 111.36*** 2.33** 2.87*** 2.66*** 2.48*** 7.26*** 
Corr (µi, x) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9636 -0.5035 -0.6067 -0.5406 -0.8970 
F-statistic (all µi= 0) - - - - - - - - 74.42*** 112.20*** 78.08*** 89.99*** 12.85*** 
Hausman test FE vs RE  9.45 7.84 22.75 5.39 5.99 2.87 23.33 5.98 49.54*** 52.73*** 50.56*** 52.65*** 19.19*** 
R2 within 0.0517 0.1445 0.1240 0.1694 0.3672 0.3672 0.3775 0.3545 0.5379 0.5312 0.5331 0.5152 0.8649 
R2 between 0.9543 0.6003 0.8630 0.6008 0.6439 0.6439 0.3211 0.6588 0.2008 0.0002 0.0095 0.0077 0.1761 
R2 overall 0.8507 0.5565 0.7925 0.5594 0.6345 0.6345 0.3229 0.6485 0.1933 0.0000 0.0064 0.0046 0.1106 
The samples are country-year observations for country of legal system origins used in this study: English (115), French (160), German (75) and Social ist (40).  English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is 
where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of 
Scandinavian Civil Law origin. The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by 
total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural 
logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where 
scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, 
assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road 
is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is 
the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated 
according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based 
on World Bank. All estimates include observation year dummies. White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to correct for heteroskedasticity in OLS (results are not reported). t-statistics and z-statistics are in 
parentheses for fixed effects and random effects models, respectively. Joint test statistic for fixed effects model is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model is the Wald χ2. Fixed effects estimate is preferred if the Hausman test is 
significant, otherwise random effects estimate is adopted. Hausman test result is reported in each column..  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
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German origins) and Shariah Law thwarted the development of the Islamic financial 
industry.  As far as an Islamic banking presence is concerned, these findings continue 
to support the notion that Islamic financial system has an impact on financial 
inclusion. 
 
With regards to other institutional settings variables, except for Socialist legal origin, 
level of financial inclusion is continue to show significantly correlated with the 
measure of governance. However, when it comes to legal rights, level of credit 
information and banking restriction, only English legal origin enters significantly for 
all the variables. These regressions further support findings by Beck et al., (2007) 
which finds that the economies with legal institutions originated from the British 
Common Law tend to be more financially developed than those based on the French 
Civil Code.  
 
Furthermore, GDP enters significant with negative sign for German legal origin. This 
finding is inconsistent with the findings of Beck et al. (2007) and Sarma & Pais 
(2011). However, this finding helps to better understand Dabla-norris, Ji, Townsend, 
& Unsal (2015) who find that GDP is more responsive to a decrease in credit 
participation costs, demonstrating that limited credit availability or lower financial 
access is attributed by GDP in different dimension. Other variables that are internet 
and lending interest rate yield consistent results with the main analysis for English 
legal origin. 
 
On the whole, these findings suggest that institutional settings based on different legal 
origins shape financial inclusion. 
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7.5.2.3  Regions  
Again, to gauge the robustness of the results, we also employ regional analysis as one 
of the important institutional approach in understanding its association with financial 
inclusion. The test further answers the question, ―to what extent and in what ways are 
the processes of geographically uneven capitalist economic development shaped and 
mediated by the institutional structures?‖ (Martin, 2000, page 79). The results are 
presented in Table 7.8. The results include Latin America & Caribbean which country 
with Islamic banking is absent. 
 
Similarly, this particular sub-sample analysis is largely consistent with the main result 
which supports the notion that Islamic banking size matters in dealing with financial 
inclusion particularly in South Asia. This indicates the important role played by the 
Islamic bank in less developed countries, namely Bangladesh and Pakistan, in serving 
financially excluded. Moreover, the impact of profitability is also found to be 
positively and significantly with the level of financial inclusion in Europe and Central 
Asia. This further supports the role of financial capability of the Islamic banks in 
promoting greater financial inclusion. 
 
Equally important, governance and cost contracts are significant for Africa and East 
Asia & Pacific region while Europe & Central Asia and MENA are reported to have 
more banking restrictions as compared to other regions. Internet yield consistent 
results with the main analysis for both, Europe & Central Asia and MENA regions. 
 
Above all, our results seem to further support the notion that institutional settings are 
regionally-specific. 
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Table 7.8 Multivariate results of the determinants of financial inclusion by region 
 
Independent 
variable  
Africa East Asia & Pacific Europe &Central Asia Middle East & North Africa South Asia Latin 
America 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE RE FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE FE 
IB quantity 
-208.53** 4.06   -5.95 9.22    -7.40   -1.10 -0.18   -3.40 -1.25    
(-2.13) (0.17)   (-0.22) (0.38)    (-0.81)   (-0.47) (-0.35)   (-0.58) (-0.45)    
IB size 
-1.83**  -0.19  0.31  0.34  0.20*  -0.03  0.05  0.01  2.19**  1.46***   
(-2.41)  (-1.01)  (1.21)  (1.58)  (1.71)  (-0.93)  (0.59)  (0.55)  (2.13)  (3.28)   
IB profit -5.59   -1.05 58.15   46.04 65.10**   38.17*** 3.27   0.14 66.50   -25.22  
-ability (-0.41)   (-0.35) (0.74)   (0.7) (2.01)   (2.69) (1.26)   (0.08) (0.77)   (-1.06)  
IB quantity x 51.13** -1.38 0.42  0.64 0.07 -0.24  -6.68 0.28 0.07  0.14 0.04 0.01  -8.48** 0.20 -6.25***   
size (2.35) (-0.32) (0.23)  (0.28) (0.03) (-0.18)  (-1.17) (0.19) (0.06)  (0.48) (0.54) (0.48)  (-2.43) (0.44) (-3.24)   
IB quantity x  -259.51 45.07  60.10 -63.96 36.93  -16.83 -588.71* -4.22  -336.5** 5.66 -1.32  0.01 -118.91 -8.09  56.21  
profitability (-1.46) (1.29)  (1.16) (-0.44) (0.97)  (-0.14) (-1.94) (-0.18)  (-2.42) (0.71) (-0.88)  (0) (-0.67) (-0.64)  (0.44)  
IB size x 3.20  0.63* -0.06 -7.53  0.03 -5.97 -9.33**  -0.14 -5.60*** -0.64*  -0.05 -0.05 -7.31  -0.67 1.33  
profitability (1.31)  (1.83) (-0.05) (-0.76)  (0.02) (-0.7) (-2.06)  (-0.74) (-2.85) (-1.75)  (-1.13) (-0.44) (-0.69)  (-1.34) (0.19)  
GDP  
-0.17 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.15 0.50 0.20 0.45 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.39*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.34*** 0.35 0.06 0.28 0.14 -0.09 
(-1.41) (-1.64) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-0.19) (0.82) (0.34) (0.73) (-1.14) (-1.45) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-4.37) (-3.76) (-3.81) (-4.04) (0.94) (0.14) (0.99) (0.36) (-1.17) 
Governance 
0.21 0.29** 0.29** 0.29** -1.48 -1.79 -1.45* -2.70*** 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.14 -1.39* 0.11 -1.21** -0.03 0.17 
(1.67) (2.33) (2.27) (2.34) (-0.76) (-0.96) (-1.16) (-3.04) (1.33) (0.08) (0.24) (0.52) (1.53) (0.82) (0.87) (1.29) (-1.88) (0.2) (-2.17) (-0.05) (1.43) 
Legal rights  
-0.02 -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 0.19 0.36 0.12 0.77** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01     0.02* 0.02* 0.02** 0.02*  
(-1.5) (-1.79) (-1.76) (-1.82) (0.26) (0.54) (0.25) (2.37) (0.48) (0.45) (0.13) (-0.41)     (1.67) (1.72) (2.38) (1.71)  
Credit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.34 -0.66** -0.26 -0.57*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00   0.00 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 -0.01 
information (-1.15) (-1.27) (-1.47) (-1.19) (-0.83) (-2.43) (-0.89) (-2.59) (-1.11) (-0.7) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.03) (0.31) (0.25) (0.26) (0.88) (0.5) (1.13) (0.92) (-0.56) 
Cost  
contracts 
-0.32*** -0.30** -0.29** -0.30** -11.89 
* 
-17.76 
*** 
-12.89 
** 
-18.20 
*** 
-0.18 0.19 0.19 0.33     -6.40 -3.27 -3.57* -1.22  
 (-2.92) (-2.6) (-2.57) (-2.6) (-1.7) (-3.64) (-2.47) (-3.46) (-0.3) (0.45) (0.45) (0.81)     (-1.13) (-1.01) (-1.83) (-0.31)  
Banking  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
restrictions (1.22) (1.11) (1.19) (1.12) (-0.72) (-0.17) (-0.93) (-0.64) (-2.29) (-2.2) (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.3) (-2.26) (-2.08) (-2.17) (-0.49) (0.47) (-0.57) (0.37) (1.2) 
Paved road 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
(0.02) (0.31) (0.23) (0.29) (0.11) (1.63) (0.4) (0.96) (1.9) (2.67) (2.76) (2.83) (1.16) (1.29) (1.33) (1.12) (0.54) (-1.67) (0.42) (-1.19) (-0.28) 
Phone 
0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.09** 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01* 
(2.87) (3.18) (2.93) (3.08) (2.23) (2.16) (2.53) (2.05) (-0.15) (-0.57) (-0.32) (-0.35) (1.54) (1.94) (1.83) (1.82) (1.27) (-0.1) (1.32) (0.21) (1.83) 
Internet 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
(0.71) (-0.08) (0.54) (-0.37) (1.09) (0.33) (1.28) (0.27) (2.49) (2.5) (2.35) (2.16) (-2.51) (-2.71) (-2.68) (-2.77) (-0.92) (-0.31) (-1.12) (-0.32) (0.01) 
Deposit  -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 1.77 -2.20 7.70 -8.31 0.77 0.65 0.70 1.05 0.02 0.48 0.61 0.37 -4.76 0.58 -3.67 -0.23 0.10 
interest rate (-0.33) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.36) (0.11) (-0.17) (0.6) (-0.64) (0.96) (0.89) (0.97) (1.47) (0.02) (0.49) (0.61) (0.35) (-1.25) (0.19) (-1.48) (-0.06) (0.21) 
Lending -0.25 -0.10 -0.14 -0.09 13.25 12.85 3.07 18.90 -0.08 -0.36 -0.35 -0.16 -1.65 -2.23* -2.29* -1.95 0.26 -0.95 0.03 -0.83 -0.44 
interest rate (-0.47) (-0.19) (-0.26) (-0.16) (0.56) (0.69) (0.18) (0.97) (-0.13) (-0.6) (-0.59) (-0.29) (-1.36) (-1.97) (-2.01) (-1.57) (0.32) (-1.37) (0.06) (-1.02) (-1.55) 
English  
    3.24** 3.26** 3.38*** 3.43***  -0.07 -0.02 -0.11     1.86 -0.85 1.40* -0.48  
    (2.18) (2.34) (2.84) (2.65)  (-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.44)     (1.51) (-1.18) (1.68) (-0.5)  
French  
    17.01* 21.58*** 19.05*** 23.59***  0.04 0.04 0.05    0.362*** 5.65 -0.20 3.20*** -0.65  
    (1.67) (2.59) (2.82) (3.51)  (0.2) (0.17) (0.23)    (2.65) (1.59) (-0.27) (2.65) (-0.49)  
German  
         -0.24 -0.18 -0.18     3.50* 0.63 3.37** 0.66  
         (-1.09) (-0.86) (-0.92)     (1.82) (0.33) (2.24) (0.38)  
Socialist 
         -0.64** -0.57** -0.58**          
         (-2.11) (-2) (-2.23)          
2007 
-0.16*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 0.54 0.19 0.62 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.21*** 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.08** 
(-3.03) (-3.38) (-3.2) (-3.49) (0.95) (0.42) (1.27) (0.22) (-0.59) (-0.78) (-0.98) (-1.29) (-4.11) (-3.6) (-3.58) (-3.76) (0.25) (-0.19) (0.16) (0.13) (-2.18) 
2008 
-0.10** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.10 -0.19 0.27 -0.35 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 
(-2.63) (-2.91) (-2.95) (-2.91) (0.19) (-0.51) (0.61) (-0.87) (0.45) (0.38) (0.1) (-0.23) (-3.78) (-3.51) (-3.47) (-3.61) (-0.03) (-0.33) (-0.27) (-0.08) (-1.53) 
2009 
-0.09** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.19 0.19 0.32 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07** 
(-2.55) (-3.14) (-3.01) (-3.21) (0.48) (0.57) (1) (0.11) (-0.05) (-0.39) (-0.56) (-0.71) (-3.36) (-3.11) (-3.02) (-3.09) (-0.86) (-0.48) (-1.24) (-0.41) (-2.28) 
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Independent 
variable  
Africa East Asia & Pacific Europe &Central Asia Middle East & North Africa South Asia Latin 
America 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE FE RE RE RE FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE FE 
2010 
-0.05 -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 0.11 0.00 0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.08 -0.05 -0.08* -0.04 -0.04** 
(-2.1) (-2.33) (-2.38) (-2.27) (0.47) (0.01) (0.69) (-0.16) (-0.61) (-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.06) (-3.06) (-2.49) (-2.53) (-2.59) (-1.39) (-0.74) (-1.71) (-0.68) (-2.7) 
CONSTANT 
1.80 0.89 0.99 0.89 -4.10 -7.86 -7.38 -8.63 0.66 0.89 0.66 0.60 3.19*** 2.68*** 2.55*** 2.96*** -2.98 2.88 -2.78 0.52 0.41 
(1.69) (0.98) (1.09) (0.96) (-0.42) (-0.98) (-1.11) (-1.23) (0.71) (1.13) (0.87) (0.82) (3.38) (3.07) (3.01) (3.63) (-0.54) (0.55) (-0.77) (0.1) (0.53) 
                      
Number of 
observation 
65 65 65 65 35 35 35 35 165 165 165 165 50 50 50 50 30 30 30 30 55 
Joint test 
statistic 
(regression) 
4.58*** 4.58*** 4.60*** 4.60*** 301.39 
*** 
313.68 
*** 
362.80 
*** 
316.29 
*** 
3.25*** 73.91*** 76.71*** 86.37*** 3.94*** 4.16*** 4.25*** 4.12*** 2619.59 
*** 
1599.86 
*** 
3666.30 
*** 
1776.27 
*** 
2.73 
*** 
Corr (µi, x) -0.9987 -0.7745 -0.9264 -0.7584 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.8304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7159 -0.5395 -0.5247 -0.5460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3655 
F-statistic  
(all µi= 0) 
10.86*** 10.94*** 10.05*** 22.97*** - - - - 42.02*** - - - 11.76*** 15.14*** 15.41*** 19.97*** - - - - 43.92 
*** 
Hausman test 
FE vs RE  (χ2) 
72.05*** 75.82*** 36.10*** 63.62*** 1.41 3.60 1.74 3.17 13.49* 13.56 19.43 8.64 22.04*** 491.44 
*** 
153.16 
*** 
333.03 
*** 
0.11 0.00 0.14 0.05 953.72 
*** 
R2 within 0.7564 0.7080 0.7090 0.7089 0.7747 0.7288 0.7623 0.7303 0.3676 0.3146 0.3066 0.3308 0.7810 0.7352 0.7393 0.7333 0.8968 0.7304 0.8820 0.7571 0.5335 
R2 between 0.6807 0.0159 0.2935 0.0550 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0007 0.4593 0.5053 0.5397 0.0029 0.0051 0.0043 0.0022 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7345 
R2 overall 0.6152 0.0263 0.2282 0.0696 0.9648 0.9573 0.9628 0.9576 0.0017 0.4497 0.4923 0.5260 0.0017 0.0074 0.0065 0.0038 0.9981 0.9950 0.9978 0.9955 0.7316 
The samples are country-year observations for regions used in this study:   Africa (65), East Asia & Pacific (35), Europe & Central Asia (165), Middle East & North Africa (50), South Asia (30) and Latin America (55). The classification of geographic regions based on 
World Bank. The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI) calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking 
system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP 
in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) 
which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored 
on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, 
regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) 
subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-
term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal 
system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. All estimates 
include observation year dummies. White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to correct for heteroskedasticity in OLS (results are not reported). t-statistics and z-statistics are in parentheses for fixed effects and random effects 
models, respectively. Joint test statistic for fixed effects model is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model is the Wald χ2. Fixed effects estimate is preferred if the Hausman test is significant, otherwise random effects estimate is adopted. Hausman test 
result is reported in each column.   ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 194 
 
7.6 Regression Diagnostics 
Although the results of pair-wise correlation coefficients in section 7.3 show that the 
multicollinearity is less likely, this issue of multicollinearity is further tested using the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) approach. The VIF values are reported in Table A1.1 
in Appendix 1. The VIF is interpreted based on the rule of thumb; the larger the value 
of VIF, the more collinear the variable. The suggested cut-off point is at 10 (Gujarati, 
2003, p. 362). Generally, it is found that the VIF values for most of the variables are 
below the cut-off point with an overall mean of 7.27 and thus, multicollinearity is not 
an issue. 
 
With respect to the heteroskedasticity problem, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test is conducted and it is found that the problem is present in each regression. To 
correct this problem, the White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix 
estimation is used. The robust standard errors are used for all estimates but the results 
are not reported.  
 
In addition, using graphical devices, i.e., the Kernel and normal density estimates and 
the normal probability plot (NPP) of the residuals, the normality assumption of the 
regression‘s residuals is checked. If the NPP is approximately a straight line, one can 
say that the residuals are generally normally distributed (Gujarati, 2003, p. 147). It is 
reported that the residuals are generally normally distributed for most of the 
observations and the NPP is not largely deviated from the straight line. Refer Figure 
A1.1 and A1.2 in Appendix 1. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the normality assumption does hold in this study. 
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented an empirical analysis of the predictions of institutional 
theory on financial inclusion. The results of the analysis are robust in respect of 
central tendency measure (mean) was analysed using both pooled cross-sectional and 
panel data methods. 
 
To conclude, the chapter draws the following findings: 
i. Islamic banking size and profitability are positively related to the level of 
financial inclusion.  
ii. The relationships between level of financial access and governance, legal 
rights, cost contracts, banking restrictions, regions, paved road and internet 
are consistent with previous studies, which indicate the importance of 
these factors in shaping financial inclusion. 
 
It is worth noted that, to my knowledge, the empirical findings of relationships 
between financial inclusion and the Islamic financial system as proxied by the Islamic 
banking presence, is the first of its kind that using the inclusion index as the 
dependent variable. Although not largely prevalent, the evidence, to a certain extent, 
seems to support the notion of the positive impact of Islamic finance in shaping 
financial inclusion, as mentioned in many studies (see, for example, Mirakhor & 
Iqbal, 2012; Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu, 2012; Mohieldin, 2012; El-Zoghbi & 
Tarazi, 2013; Martowardojo, 2015; MIFC, 2015). 
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Chapter 8  
RESULTS OF HETEROGENEITY IN THE DETERMINANTS OF 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the heterogeneity in the determinants of 
financial inclusion using the quantile regression method developed by Koenker & 
Bassett (1978) and Koenker & Hallock (2001). Drawing from earlier work on the 
institutional theory of organization by Tolbert (1985),  Zucker (1987) purports that 
institutional environment is heterogeneous, hence reflects the impact of institutional 
processes on the organization. She argues that homogeneity of environment decreases 
structure of internal organization, in which contradicting the environment-as-
institution approach. In response to this, this chapter further investigates heterogeneity 
in the determinants of financial inclusion using the quantile regression method. The 
quantile regression approach, which has also been suggested as a form of robust 
regression (R. W. Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Rogers, 1993), could provide appropriate 
insights on the heterogeneous effects of the variables of interest across different levels 
of financial inclusion. It examines how the explanatory variables shape different 
segments of the financial inclusion index distribution. By doing this, we could 
empirically observe the dynamic impacts of the key driver (i.e., the institutional 
settings). This will shed more lights on how financial inclusion emerge as a product of 
institutional processes and structures, which could be created and shaped at various 
levels, as highlighted by Scott (2004). 
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For this purpose, the same full sample (i.e., 400 country-year observations) is further 
employed in this analysis.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 8.2 presents the results of quantile 
regressions in examining the determinants of financial inclusion, followed by 
robustness checks in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 summarizes the chapter. 
8.2 Heterogeneity in the Determinants of Financial Inclusion 
In analysing the data using the quantile regression method, bootstrapped standard 
errors are used. The bootstrap procedure of Efro (1979) provides interesting method 
to simultaneously test the regression coefficients. The idea is to rectify inferior 
statistical properties with data of a larger number of estimates, each based on different 
subsamples of data (Guiot, 1991). 1000 bootstrap replications are used in this study in 
order to minimize the randomness and to increase the accuracy of the approximation 
(Guiot, 1991; Rogers, 1993). The bootstrapped regression coefficients are judged 
significant at the 95% level if they are twice, in absolute value of their standard 
deviation (Guiot, 1991). 
 
Table 8.1 presents the results of quantile regressions for the financial inclusion 
determinants. Results in Colums 1 through 7 for each regression  are for the 5
th
, 10
th
, 
25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, 90
th
 and 95
th
, respectively. The significant coefficients are boxed for 
ease of exposition. Following the table, a compact summary of the plotted estimated 
coefficients across all quantiles, for each explanatory variable, is presented in Figure 
8.1. Note that the solid line with marker in the figure indicates the estimated 
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 Table 8.1 Quantile regression estimates for CIFI 
  
Variable with all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 
                             
IB quantity -2.54*** -2.84*** -2.44*** -2.25*** -2.14* -3.97*** -4.25*** -2.22*** -2.53*** -2.23*** -1.86** 0.15 0.11 -0.07               
(-4.48) (-4.91) (-2.86) (-3.08) (-1.73) (-3.01) (-3.36) (-4.57) (-5.14) (-3.4) (-2.27) (0.09) (0.06) (-0.04)               
                             
IB size 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03* 0.04** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07***        0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.03* 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03        
(2.54) (2.88) (1.88) (2.16) (3.19) (3.55) (3.5)        (1.49) (0.96) (1.93) (1.79) (2.82) (1.98) (1.52)        
                             
IB -1.36 2.77 -0.58 -1.92 1.63 5.43 5.65               -5.01* -4.64 -3.62 -2.44 0.67 1.33 1.20 
profitability (-0.29) (0.57) (-0.13) (-0.53) (0.41) (0.95) (0.87)               (-1.68) (-1.55) (-1.07) (-0.77) (0.22) (0.39) (0.33) 
                             
IB quantity x  0.26*** 0.27*** 0.21** 0.17* 0.05 0.22 0.28** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.17* -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.10**        
size (4.13) (3.88) (2.11) (1.88) (0.37) (1.5) (2.01) (5.06) (5.41) (3.12) (1.74) (-0.34) (-0.5) (-0.33) (-1.37) (-1.24) (-0.35) (-0.74) (-2.7) (-2.95) (-2.15)        
                             
IB quantity x  35.64** 41.99*** 33.50** 27.68* 36.33 42.01 36.78 2.60 11.52* 9.26* 3.35 6.90 11.16 15.28        7.96 12.50 13.75 7.28 3.29 -21.88 -23.46 
profitability (2.47) (2.88) (2.14) (1.82) (1.47) (1.38) (1.17) (0.35) (1.75) (1.66) (0.72) (0.73) (0.86) (1.11)        (0.7) (1.07) (0.86) (0.62) (0.15) (-0.91) (-0.92) 
                             
IB size x  -0.53 -1.54 -0.68 -0.42 -0.90 -1.95 -1.87        0.13 0.19 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.74 0.61 0.34 0.13 -0.25 0.05 0.21 
profitability (-0.56) (-1.65) (-0.76) (-0.51) (-0.82) (-1.22) (-1.06)        (0.45) (0.64) (-0.17) (-0.3) (0.3) (0.46) (0.67) (1.16) (0.82) (0.4) (0.2) (-0.33) (0.05) (0.21) 
                             
GDP  0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.11*** 0.09** 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.12*** 0.09** 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.08** 0.09** 
 (0.57) (0.03) (0.18) (-0.55) (0.66) (3.05) (3.51) (0.24) (-0.49) (0.66) (-0.19) (1.19) (3.17) (2.33) (0.58) (0.69) (-0.67) (-1) (0.48) (3.37) (2.54) (1.26) (0.56) (-0.57) (-1.04) (1.05) (2.39) (2.39) 
                             
Governance -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14** 0.13* 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.11* 0.14* 0.18** -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.08 0.15** 0.13 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.11** 0.10 0.15** 0.12 
 (-0.43) (0.26) (0.4) (2.36) (1.8) (0.47) (0.07) (-1.34) (-0.75) (-0.57) (1.04) (1.7) (1.92) (2.4) (-0.15) (-0.29) (1.24) (1.28) (1.98) (1.41) (1.14) (-0.88) (-0.54) (0.58) (2.01) (1.64) (2.12) (1.64) 
                             
Legal rights  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (1.22) (1.34) (0.27) (0.14) (3.1) (3.39) (2.45) (1.09) (0.97) (-0.1) (0.12) (3.78) (3.42) (2.63) (0.52) (0.64) (-0.26) (1.15) (3.65) (3.84) (2.92) (0.56) (0.46) (0.02) (1.26) (3.86) (3.01) (3.22) 
                             
Credit  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.02 
information (-1.42) (-0.45) (-0.31) (0.09) (0.43) (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.5) (0.94) (0.42) (1.73) (0.93) (1.03) (1.86) (-0.24) (0.01) (0.27) (1.05) (0.38) (0.32) (1.1) (0) (-0.28) (0.29) (1.7) (1.28) (0.75) (1.62) 
                             
Cost  -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.16 -0.13 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.08 -0.19 -0.16** -0.16 -0.13 -0.17* -0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.15* -0.19** -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 
contracts (-1.58) (-1.19) (-0.49) (-0.9) (-0.64) (0.95) (1.29) (-1.56) (-0.81) (0.36) (-0.16) (-1.63) (-0.61) (-1.43) (-2.02) (-1.63) (-1.53) (-1.87) (-1.25) (0.55) (-0.01) (-1.81) (-2.01) (-0.9) (-1.11) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-0.67) 
                             
Banking 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
restrictions (0.67) (0.35) (0.61) (-1.13) (-1.76) (-0.73) (-0.23) (-0.41) (0.21) (1.37) (-1.07) (-1.36) (-0.16) (-0.43) (0.76) (1.21) (0.41) (-0.86) (-1.92) (-1.41) (-0.64) (0.66) (0.38) (0.55) (-1.5) (-1.37) (-0.28) (-0.32) 
                             
Paved road 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 
 (3.41) (2.28) (1.02) (1.5) (2.31) (2.98) (2.15) (3.35) (2.94) (1.92) (1.87) (3.08) (3.49) (2.33) (2.43) (1.64) (-0.01) (1.92) (2.47) (2.1) (1.64) (2.29) (2.65) (1.22) (3.15) (3.29) (2.74) (2.45) 
                             
Phone -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-4.52) (-4.08) (-1.42) (0.49) (2.07) (0.62) (-0.22) (-5) (-4.48) (-1.95) (0.74) (1.45) (0.22) (-0.48) (-4.06) (-3.54) (-0.28) (1.56) (1.85) (0.33) (-0.11) (-2.66) (-3.68) (-1.22) (0.67) (1.28) (-0.23) (-0.36) 
                             
Internet 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00* 
 (3.1) (2.44) (0.92) (1.23) (-0.51) (-0.51) (0.21) (2) (2.21) (1.27) (1.19) (-0.95) (-2.73) (-2.76) (3.1) (2.78) (0.9) (1.03) (-0.59) (-1.07) (-0.53) (1.96) (2.32) (1.12) (0.58) (-0.46) (-2.04) (-1.78) 
                             
Deposit  -0.37 -0.09 -0.52 -0.38 -0.15 0.08 -0.08 -1.11** -0.63 0.13 -0.18 -0.11 0.22 -0.54 -0.68 -0.71 -1.39* -1.03 -0.57 0.33 0.09 -0.94 -0.97 -0.93 -0.20 -0.77 -0.13 -0.25 
interest rate (-0.68) (-0.14) (-0.66) (-0.55) (-0.23) (0.11) (-0.09) (-2.02) (-1.22) (0.2) (-0.27) (-0.17) (0.28) (-0.7) (-1.16) (-1.01) (-1.82) (-1.36) (-0.76) (0.41) (0.11) (-1.43) (-1.24) (-0.99) (-0.29) (-1.1) (-0.17) (-0.32) 
                             
Lending  -0.15 -0.20 -0.59 -0.90* -0.89*** -0.67** -0.77** 0.14 -0.10 -1.10 -1.20* -1.26*** -1.04*** -1.17*** -0.10 -0.12 -0.15 -0.75 -1.09*** -0.76** -0.87** -0.04 -0.10 -0.46 -1.10* -0.93** -1.18*** -1.02*** 
interest rate (-0.52) (-0.58) (-1.08) (-1.9) (-2.69) (-2.12) (-2.27) (0.41) (-0.24) (-1.48) (-1.77) (-3.09) (-3.09) (-3.33) (-0.32) (-0.3) (-0.24) (-1.33) (-2.98) (-2.26) (-2.48) (-0.14) (-0.27) (-0.7) (-1.77) (-2.11) (-3.13) (-2.66) 
                             
English  -0.25*** -0.25** -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 0.25** -0.32*** -0.28*** -0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.11 -0.22* -0.20 0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.20 0.25* -0.35*** -0.23* -0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.18 0.20 
 (-2.96) (-2.42) (-0.87) (-0.07) (-0.32) (1.3) (2.31) (-3.86) (-2.7) (-0.51) (0.67) (0.91) (1.17) (0.99) (-1.99) (-1.5) (0.58) (-0.41) (-0.26) (1.59) (1.96) (-3.28) (-1.75) (-0.13) (-0.62) (0.69) (1.52) (1.62) 
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Variable with all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 
French  -0.16** -0.18* -0.11 0.08 0.27** 0.34*** 0.44*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.12 0.09 0.32*** 0.25** 0.24* -0.12 -0.10 0.03 0.06 0.28*** 0.43*** 0.46*** -0.26*** -0.16 -0.06 0.08 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.33** 
 (-2.04) (-1.94) (-1.01) (0.72) (2.6) (3) (3.41) (-4.09) (-3.41) (-1.09) (0.93) (3.49) (2.37) (1.85) (-1.09) (-0.89) (0.26) (0.53) (2.7) (3.38) (3.04) (-2.58) (-1.37) (-0.47) (0.82) (3.57) (2.77) (2.38) 
                             
German  -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.20 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.21* -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.20* 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.11 -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.02 0.06 0.16 0.25** 0.26** -0.42*** -0.31*** -0.19 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.13 
 (-4.99) (-3.68) (-1.62) (1.11) (1.26) (1.24) (1.93) (-5.99) (-5.05) (-1.87) (0.64) (1.24) (0.82) (0.88) (-4.61) (-3.35) (-0.14) (0.59) (1.4) (2.02) (1.99) (-4.55) (-2.82) (-1.62) (0.32) (1.32) (0.98) (1.04) 
                             
Socialist -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.41** 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 -0.82*** -0.80*** -0.46*** -0.13 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.15 -0.60*** -0.53*** -0.34* -0.19 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-4.92) (-4.15) (-2.17) (0.08) (-0.22) (-0.34) (0.65) (-7.27) (-6.16) (-2.67) (-0.93) (-0.5) (-0.48) (0.33) (-3.8) (-3.21) (-0.86) (-0.42) (0.08) (0.38) (0.79) (-4.84) (-3.75) (-1.8) (-1.46) (-0.02) (0.1) (0.09) 
                             
Africa -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.20* 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.17 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.41) (0.82) (-0.96) (-1.32) (-0.85) (-0.62) (0.03) (-0.24) (1.88) (0.87) (0.49) (0.3) (0.41) (-0.87) (0.04) (1.34) (0.13) (0.08) (1.42) (0.56) (-0.67) (-0.11) (1.63) (0.64) (0.71) 
                             
East Asia &  0.49*** 0.48*** 0.41*** 0.24** 0.22 1.20** 1.70* 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.47*** 0.32** 0.33* 1.59** 2.06** 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.26** 0.12 0.20 1.36** 1.85* 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.35*** 0.27* 0.36* 1.62** 1.96** 
Pacific (6.67) (6.05) (3.41) (2.09) (1.08) (1.97) (1.81) (8.37) (7.49) (3.67) (2.37) (1.93) (2.28) (2.09) (5.4) (4.84) (2) (0.92) (1.11) (2.1) (1.95) (5.96) (5) (2.58) (1.95) (1.77) (2.28) (2.05) 
                             
Europe &  0.31** 0.34*** 0.31** -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.34** 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.26* -0.12 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.33** -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.12 
Central Asia (4.29) (3.94) (2.11) (-0.54) (0.21) (-0.12) (0.37) (5.36) (5.48) (2.44) (0.29) (0.98) (0.73) (1.06) (4.11) (3.66) (1.82) (-0.95) (0.05) (0.26) (0.93) (3.46) (3.2) (2.35) (-0.16) (0.79) (1.24) (1.39) 
                             
Middle East & 0.15** 0.25*** 0.25** 0.15 0.41*** 0.33** 0.23* 0.11 0.25*** 0.25* 0.19 0.28** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.25** 0.00 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.22*** 0.14* 0.28** 0.10 0.27** 0.38*** 0.40*** 
North Africa (2.27) (3.49) (2.17) (1.08) (3.51) (2.45) (1.81) (1.32) (3.01) (1.9) (1.62) (2.28) (3.49) (3.24) (2.93) (3.11) (2.07) (-0.01) (2.81) (2.62) (2.61) (3.04) (1.73) (2.27) (0.91) (2.57) (3.09) (3.31) 
                             
South Asia 0.17* 0.20** 0.19 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.15* 0.20** 0.32** 0.28** 0.36*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.19 0.26** 0.08 0.24** 0.33*** 0.29** 0.33*** 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.23** 0.32*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 
 (1.85) (1.97) (1.32) (3) (3.82) (2.99) (2.8) (1.71) (2.12) (2.34) (2.23) (3.25) (3.78) (3.31) (1.6) (2.18) (0.66) (2.04) (3.51) (2.29) (2.58) (1.36) (1.04) (0.91) (2.01) (2.95) (3.94) (3.59) 
                             
CONSTANT -0.68** -0.52 -0.49 -0.19 -0.66* -1.43*** -1.58*** -0.43 -0.33 -0.86** -0.41 -0.86** -1.26*** -0.76* -0.82** -0.94** -0.23 -0.15 -0.51 -1.51*** -1.31*** -0.98*** -0.75* -0.28 -0.15 -0.92** -0.97** -1.10** 
 (-1.86) (-1.33) (-1.17) (-0.55) (-1.69) (-3.7) (-3.89) (-1) (-0.73) (-2.04) (-1.1) (-2.1) (-3.15) (-1.72) (-2.07) (-2.17) (-0.53) (-0.41) (-1.33) (-3.88) (-2.93) (-2.61) (-1.84) (-0.63) (-0.4) (-2.39) (-2.5) (-2.44) 
                             
Pseudo R2 0.4486 0.4341 0.4105 0.4041 0.4326 0.4777 0.5545 0.4289 0.4207 0.3906 0.3857 0.4125 0.4544 0.5383 0.4052 0.3892 0.3841 0.3861 0.4240 0.4616 0.5449 0.4061 0.3914 0.3750 0.3793 0.4083 0.4511 0.5367 
 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is 
defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is 
the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with 
legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an 
index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land 
line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-
term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to the creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of 
French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & 
Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All estimates include observation year dummies (not reported). Bootstrapped standard errors are used (not reported) and they were 
obtained using 1,000 bootstrap replications. t-statistics in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
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Figure 8.1 Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 8.1 Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence intervals (cont’d) 
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coefficients and the two dashed lines, side by side, signify the upper and lower bounds 
of the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal lines in Figure 8.1 represent the 
random effects estimate and the 95% confidence intervals. 
8.2.1 Institutional setting variables 
8.2.1.1  Islamic banking presence 
Table 8.1 reports the quantile regression results for Islamic banking presence 
determinants using CIFI as the dependent variable. Overall, heterogeneity in the 
Islamic banking determinants of financial inclusion is mixed. The quantity of Islamic 
banks is negative and significant at all financial inclusion distribution, indicating that 
higher number of Islamic banks dampen the level of financial inclusion both for lower 
level (i.e., negative and  significant at the left tail) and higher level of financial 
inclusion (i.e., negative and  significant at the right tail). However, looking at the 
reality of the number of Islamic banks operated in the countries (i.e., relatively very 
few, refer Table 6.4 in Chapter 6), this result could be interpreted in the other way 
around. On one hand, having less number of Islamic banks could contribute to lower 
financial inclusion (i.e., negative and significant at the left tail). On the other hand, 
having less number of Islamic banks but truly operating based on the essential aspect 
of Islamic banking through emancipation and empowerment, this could promote 
better financial inclusion (i.e., negative and significant at the right tail).  
 
This is consistent with observations that there could be many Islamic banks in 
presence (mainly of smaller size) but yet the level of financial inclusion remains low. 
The case can be exemplified by Indonesia and Pakistan which has 33 and 18 Islamic 
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banks, respectively but yet their inclusion index is relatively low (i.e., only 0.15 and 
0.13,  respectively). This reflects the ‗bottom-up‘ Islamic banking model52 in those 
countries (Akkizidis & Khandelwal, 2008; Ismal, 2011; Fitriasari, 2012; Sari et al., 
2014). It is not surprising that the results are reversed when the quantity is weighted 
against the banking size (i.e., IB quantity x size) and the profitability (i.e., IB quantity 
x profitability). The signs are as expected, i.e., as the larger the size and more 
profitable of the bank, the better the inclusion is and the effect is only observed at the 
lower level of financial inclusion (i.e., positive and significant for the 5
th
, 10
th
, 25
th
 
and 50
th 
with degrees of sensitivity are 0.17-0.27 and 33.50-41.99, respectively). As 
for the size of Islamic banking, the results continue to support the importance of 
Islamic banking size in improving financial inclusion at all levels (i.e., positive and 
significant for the all financial inclusion distribution). These imply that, both factors 
of Islamic banking size and profitability do exert some influences in the process of 
shaping the financial inclusion.  
 
In sum, while theory suggests significant repercussions of Islamic finance sector for 
financially included, the presented evidence in the present study is mixed. This is very 
much consistent with Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Randall (2013) and Ben Naceur, 
Barajas, & Massara (2015). On the one hand, this could be due to the different 
preferences of Muslims towards banking services. The case can be exemplified by 
little use of Islamic banking products by the Muslim themselves (Ismal, 2011; 
Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, & Randall, 2013) and even some of them do not deal with 
the products (Naser & Jamal, 1999). Some Muslims opine that religious motives do 
not stand out as being the only significant reason in choosing Islamic bank (Erol & 
                                              
52
 In this model, the need for the Islamic banking industry is largely motivated by the consumer-side. In 
the opposite direction, the ‗top-down‘ model is originated from the government who is promoting the 
Islamic banking industry (e.g., Malaysia). 
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El-Bdour, 1989; Gait & Worthington, 2008; Rashid & Hassan, 2009) and they also do 
not differentiate between the services offered by conventional and Islamic banks 
(Erol, Kaynak, & El-Bdour, 1990; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). With 
regard to financial access in particular, Gait & Worthington (2008) find that the 
increase in Islamic banks‘ branches do not necessarily improve financial inclusion. 
All the above reasons, to a certain extent, reflect the argument made by Asutay (2007) 
that ‗‖the Islamic banking has failed to internalise the social dimension and social 
justice into its own operational function‖ (p. 184).  
 
On the other hand, as mentioned by Ben Naceur et al. (2015), the deficiency in the 
empirical findings may also be partly due to data issues. A better uniformity of 
Islamic banking definitions as well as a wider coverage of database representing 
Islamic banking presence are crucial to uncovering statistically reliable link between 
Islamic financial sector and financial inclusion.  
8.2.1.2  Other institutional setting variables 
The measure of overall institutional environment variable, i.e., Governance has a 
positive and significant effect at the medium level of inclusion (i.e., in the 50
th
 and 
75
th
 percentiles). This situation appears in line with the view put forward by Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt (2008) who stated that the broad institutional framework plays an 
important role in expanding financial outreach and inclusion. This suggests that, 
governance factor can be an important enabler in shaping financial inclusion 
especially at the medium to higher levels of inclusion. From the policy making 
perspective, this implies that although the institutional reform (i.e., in this case the 
improvement of governance‘s quality) is a long-term process, this action needs to be 
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emphasized as asserted by Beck et al. (2009). Prioritizing some institutional reforms 
over other policies could help in focusing the reform efforts and produce impact on 
financial inclusion in the short- to medium-term (Beck et al., 2009). 
 
The strength of legal rights index has a positive and increasing effect as the level of 
inclusion increases. Interestingly, this variable is only significant at the higher levels 
of financial inclusion. This suggests that countries with relatively higher level of 
financial inclusion is influenced by the role of legal support. This finding 
complements previous study by Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012) who observed the 
importance of legal rights in improving access to finance. Overall, this suggests that 
countries with higher level of financial inclusion are shaped and maintained by a 
decent contractual and informational frameworks. 
 
It is also found that there is a negative and significant effect of lending interest rate at 
the higher inclusion levels. This indicates that the lending interest rate becomes more 
sensitive in countries which have greater access to finance. This is in line with the 
Keynesian theory and suggests that the cost of debt (i.e., in this case through lending 
interest rate) is a significant driver for financial intermediations that would have an 
impact on the levels of financial inclusion (Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot, 2012). By 
implication, this result suggests that the lending interest rate should be kept as low as 
possible if countries are to support access to finance. In other words, the lending 
interest rate plays an important impact in shaping countries to have higher level of 
inclusion. 
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Similar to legal rights, the legal origins indicators are also significant at several 
quantiles of financial inclusion. The coefficients of the legal origin variables show an 
upward pattern. Except for Socialist origin (i.e., which only show negative and 
significant coefficients at the lower levels of inclusion), the other legal origins exhibit 
similar finding as well as becomes significantly positive at the 75
th
 quantiles. The 
results suggest that countries with higher levels of inclusion is shaped and mediated 
by the English and the French origins. 
 
This study further examines whether the institutional setting are regionally-specific. 
Except for Africa, the coeeficients for all other regions are positive and significant at 
both lower and higher levels of financial inclusion.  Such evidence suggests the role 
of region in shaping the countries of both with the lower and higher level of financial 
inclusion. This appears in line with the view put forward by Martin (2000) who 
argues that the processes of geographically uneven capitalist economic development 
are shaped and mediated by the differences in the institutional structures. 
 
To this juncture, this evidences lend a support to the theoretical prediction of the 
presence of heterogeneity in the institutional settings, consistent with Zucker (1987).  
8.2.2 Other explanatory variables 
One of the important determinants of financial inclusion is GDP. This variable is 
positive and significant only at the higher levels of financial inclusion. This is not 
surprising given the importance of economic condition in shaping financial inclusion  
especially in countries with higher levels of financial inclusion. This finding is 
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consistent with many previous studies (i.e., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 
2006; Beck et al., 2007; Sarma & Pais, 2011). 
 
As far as the physical infrastucture is concerned, the findings reveal that paved road, 
phone and internet are among the important determinants in the process of shaping 
financial inclusion. The role of internet is only significant at the lower levels of 
financial inclusion, while paved road and phone appear to be an important enabler for 
financial access at lower and higher levels of inclusion. With regard to the role of 
phone specifically, it is quite sensible to observe in the Sub-Saharan African region, 
that only a third of account holders have access to the mobile money account. The 
mobile money account is increasingly used in the Sub-Saharan Africa to extend 
financial services beyond bank branches. With such convenient and affordable 
financial services offered by the mobile money accounts, it manages to reach the 
unbanked adults who are typically excluded from the formal financial system – such 
as women, poor people, young people, and those living in the rural areas. An example 
is the M-PESA
53
, that can be found in Kenya, Tanzania, Afghanistan, South Africa, 
India and Eastern Europe (MIFC, 2015). In summary, it is evidenced that physical 
insfrastucture is an important enabler in the process of shaping financial inclusion, 
both at the lower and higher level, thus  supporting Beck et al., (2007), Beck et al., 
(2008), Sarma & Pais (2011) and Gimet & Lagoarde-Segot (2012).   
                                              
53
 M-Pesa is a mobile-phone based money transfer and microfinancing service, launched in 2007 by 
Vodafone for Safaricom and Vodacom, the largest mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania. 
M-Pesa allows users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money and pay for goods and services easily with a 
mobile device. 
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8.3 Robustness Checks 
Two additional tests were conducted to examine the robustness of the results obtained 
in this chapter as follows: 
8.3.1 Sub-sample of countries with Islamic financial sector 
Table 8.2 presents the result of quantile regressions for the financial inclusion 
determinants in countries with Islamic banking presence (i.e., n=100). Following the 
table, a compact summary of the plotted estimated coefficients across all quantiles, for 
each explanatory variable, is presented in Figure 8.2.  
 
Overall, the results are broadly consistent with the main quantile regressions results. 
Except for IB size and IB quantity x profitability, both IB quantity and IB quantity x 
size of Islamic bank‘s variables explain some variations at different level of inclusion. 
Although the degrees of sensitivity are quite similar across the lower levels of 
inclusion (especially for IB quantity x size i.e., 0.85-0.95), it does suggest that the role 
of Islamic banking size in shaping financial inclusion level is heterogenous.  
 
Other variables that are governance, region and phone yield consistent results with the 
main analysis.   
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 Table 8.2 Quantile regression estimates of CIFI for countries with Islamic banking presence 
  
Variable with all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 
                             
IB quantity -7.85*** -7.85*** -6.92*** -7.72*** -6.18 -5.72 -7.37 -4.88*** -4.88*** -5.28*** -5.69*** -2.08 -2.08 0.12               
 (-4.11) (-4.11) (-3.44) (-2.78) (-1.54) (-0.96) (-1.12) (-3.26) (-3.29) (-4.21) (-3.63) (-0.76) (-0.57) (0.03)               
                             
IB size -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.23        0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18        
 (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.71) (-1.05) (-1.30) (-0.60) (-0.94)        (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.59) (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.99)        
                             
IB  3.60 3.60 2.68 3.75 2.15 3.96 2.48               2.01 2.01 1.90 0.10 1.85 0.29 5.02 
profitability (0.93) (0.93) (0.68) (0.66) (0.25) (0.32) (0.19)               (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.02) (0.23) (0.03) (0.40) 
                             
IB quantity x  0.95*** 0.95*** 0.84*** 0.93** 0.74 0.66 0.79 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.21 0.20 -0.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.02        
size (3.79) (3.79) (3.19) (2.64) (1.45) (0.86) (0.93) (3.21) (3.23) (3.83) (3.32) (0.65) (0.46) (-0.22) (0.68) (0.68) (0.68) (0.29) (0.45) (0.42) (-0.13)        
                             
IB quantity x  13.12 13.12 9.39 8.04 -2.64 6.77 17.30 1.20 1.20 4.58 4.85 12.65 13.59 24.24        2.71 2.71 3.23 3.46 10.82 19.90 17.13 
profitability (0.84) (0.84) (0.65) (0.40) (-0.09) (0.15) (0.35) (0.16) (0.16) (0.63) (0.52) (1.03) (0.89) (1.39)        (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.54) (0.75) (0.54) 
                             
IB size x  -0.77 -0.77 -0.62 -0.65 0.12 -0.45 -0.15        -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.22 0.22 0.70 -0.48 -0.48 -0.49 -0.24 -0.33 -0.34 -0.73 
profitability (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.77) (-0.53) (0.06) (-0.18) (-0.05)        (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.23) (-0.04) (0.52) (0.42) (1.20) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.2) (-0.35) 
                             
GDP  -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.10 -0.05 -0.17 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 
 (-0.90) (-0.90) (-0.47) (-0.22) (-0.43) (-0.31) (0.02) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.19) (0.06) (0.03) (-0.08) (0.16) (-0.30) (-0.30) (0.34) (0.45) (-0.17) (-0.46) (-0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.49) (0.57) (-0.19) (-0.38) (0.03) 
                             
Governance 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.65*** 0.68* 0.77* 0.39** 0.39** 0.37** 0.33 0.54* 0.58 0.67 0.52** 0.52** 0.50** 0.52** 0.66** 0.72** 0.81** 0.29 0.29 0.33* 0.45** 0.58** 0.64* 0.69* 
 (3.01) (3.03) (3.07) (3.08) (2.54) (1.74) (1.76) (2.11) (2.12) (2.19) (1.58) (1.8) (1.58) (1.52) (2.21) (2.23) (2.32) (2.28) (2.42) (2.09) (2.04) (1.51) (1.53) (1.96) (2.33) (2.23) (1.84) (1.73) 
                             
Legal rights  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.08* 0.08* 0.09* 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.27 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.41) (0.45) (0.32) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) (0.85) (0.53) (1.13) (0.86) (1.28) (0.65) (0.66) (1.13) (1.33) (1.33) (0.76) (0.89) (1.83) (1.83) (1.90) (1.40) (1.32) (0.96) (1.38) 
                             
Credit  -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 -0.19 -0.33 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.18 -0.32** 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.13 -0.17 -0.33** -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.14 -0.19 -0.31** 
information (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.19) (-0.54) (-1.59) (-1.34) (-2.23) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00) (-0.06) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-2.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (-0.02) (-1.24) (-1.25) (-2.19) (-0.64) (-0.64) (0.07) (0.29) (-1.4) (-1.51) (-2.25) 
                             
Cost  0.38 0.38 0.47 0.40 -0.77 -1.35 -2.16 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.70 -1.03 -1.40 -2.63 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.29 -1.16 -1.82 -2.72* 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.38 -1.26 -1.82 -2.79* 
contracts (0.87) (0.87) (1.02) (0.68) (-0.89) (-1.12) (-1.64) (1.09) (1.10) (1.14) (0.91) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-1.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.34) (-1.10) (-1.35) (-1.83) (0.33) (0.33) (0.50) (0.48) (-1.27) (-1.39) (-1.94) 
                             
Banking 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
restrictions (1.19) (1.19) (0.86) (0.30) (0.00) (0.03) (-0.30) (-0.85) (-0.85) (1.18) (0.65) (0.39) (0.32) (0.20) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.40) (-0.47) (0.16) (0.43) (-0.12) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-0.72) (-0.74) (0.74) (0.89) (0.59) 
                             
Paved road 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (1.40) (1.40) (1.67) (1.49) (0.66) (0.04) (0.02) (1.09) (1.10) (1.33) (1.04) (0.01) (-0.08) (-0.37) (1.61) (1.62) (1.86) (1.68) (0.38) (-0.06) (-0.11) (2.74) (2.76) (2.67) (2.00) (0.00) (-0.39) (-0.62) 
                             
Phone -0.02* -0.02* -0.03** -0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (-1.72) (-1.72) (-2.17) (-1.73) (0.31) (0.62) (0.97) (-1.59) (-1.6) (-1.53) (-1.28) (0.19) (0.37) (0.70) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.47) (-1.22) (0.15) (0.66) (1.00) (-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.38) (-1.25) (0.27) (0.49) (0.61) 
                             
Internet 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (1.11) (1.11) (0.56) (0.42) (0.15) (0.18) (0.43) (0.24) (0.25) (0.16) (0.40) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.24) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-1.72) (-1.69) (-0.66) (-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-1.31) (-1.45) (-0.93) (-0.55) (-0.03) 
                             
Deposit  2.42 2.42 1.86 2.59 2.32 0.59 1.76 -2.17 -2.17 1.23 0.52 2.85 2.70 6.16 -2.05 -2.05 0.38 2.27 4.27 4.41 4.84 0.22 0.22 0.46 0.83 3.93 5.49 7.66 
interest rate (1.09) (1.10) (0.78) (0.81) (0.50) (0.09) (0.24) (-0.93) (-0.94) (0.57) (0.18) (0.58) (0.42) (0.78) (-0.78) (-0.78) (0.14) (0.66) (0.91) (0.71) (0.67) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.21) (0.72) (0.77) (0.96) 
                             
Lending  -0.87 -0.87 -0.61 -0.72 0.61 3.44 6.38 0.80 0.80 -1.35 -0.49 -0.60 0.55 -0.33 0.89 0.89 -1.18 -2.61 -2.34 -1.88 0.43 -0.99 -0.99 -0.92 -0.97 -2.62 -3.55 -2.09 
interest rate (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.23) (-0.21) (0.13) (0.48) (0.81) (0.34) (0.35) (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.14) (0.0) (-0.04) (0.32) (0.32) (-0.44) (-0.88) (-0.61) (-0.36) (0.07) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.59) (-0.63) (-0.32) 
                             
English  0.09 0.04 0.00 0.08 -0.15 -0.60 -0.99 0.57 0.56 0.06 0.13 -1.07 -1.26 -2.38* 0.60 0.60 0.18 0.17 -0.89 -1.16 -1.47 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.14 -1.20 -1.67* -2.53** 
 (0.26) (0.12) (-0.01) (0.17) (-0.20) (-0.54) (-0.78) (1.40) (1.36) (0.14) (0.23) (-1.22) (-1.11) (-1.75) (1.25) (1.26) (0.39) (0.26) (-1.05) (-1.07) (-1.20) (0.56) (0.56) (0.25) (0.19) (-1.56) (-1.88) (-2.60) 
                             
French  0.02 -0.03 -0.23 -0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.45 -0.38 -0.79 0.45 0.45 -0.10 -0.28 -0.38 -0.22 -0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.16 -0.26 -0.50 -0.56 -0.80 
 (0.04) (-0.07) (-0.47) (-0.40) (0.25) (0.20) (0.18) (0.27) (0.25) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.61) (-0.48) (-0.84) (0.62) (0.62) (-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.54) (-0.27) (-0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (-0.22) (-0.33) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.82) 
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Variable with all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 
                             
East Asia &  0.24 0.24 0.26 0.35 0.39 0.50 0.71 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.70 0.71 1.25 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 0.55 0.73 0.83 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 0.76 0.96 1.43* 
Pacific (1.19) (1.19) (1.26) (1.25) (0.84) (0.70) (0.90) (0.38) (0.39) (0.56) (0.40) (0.94) (0.70) (1.04) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.15) (0.96) (0.93) (0.96) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.37) (1.47) (1.32) (1.76) 
                             
Europe &  -0.07 -0.07 0.22 0.23 -0.52 -0.87 -1.61 0.60 0.60 0.33 0.36 -0.59 -0.90 -1.67 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.37 -0.58 -1.05 -1.58 0.20 0.20 0.32 0.40 -0.61 -1.07 -1.65 
Central Asia (-0.18) (-0.18) (0.57) (0.47) (-0.75) (-0.81) (-1.36) (1.15) (1.16) (0.65) (0.61) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-1.29) (0.60) (0.61) (0.68) (0.57) (-0.81) (-1.15) (-1.52) (0.37) (0.37) (0.56) (0.58) (-0.86) (-1.11) (-1.54) 
                             
Middle East & 0.31 0.31 0.54 0.61 -0.19 -0.48 -1.07 0.36 0.36 0.59 0.66 0.21 -0.04 -0.23 0.11 0.11 0.36 0.62 0.11 -0.30 -0.72 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.64 0.22 -0.02 -0.18 
North Africa (0.82) (0.83) (1.42) (1.25) (-0.25) (-0.43) (-0.86) (0.88) (0.89) (1.44) (1.27) (0.28) (-0.04) (-0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.72) (0.98) (0.14) (-0.28) (-0.57) (0.59) (0.59) (0.97) (1.04) (0.26) (-0.02) (-0.14) 
                             
South Asia 0.56** 0.56** 0.54** 0.57** 0.50 0.61 0.70 0.31 0.31 0.44** 0.47 0.64 0.62 0.82 -0.52 -0.52 -0.53 -0.24 0.57 0.69 0.67 -0.61** -0.61** -0.50 -0.26 0.62 0.71 0.87 
 (2.41) (2.42) (2.45) (2.19) (1.40) (1.06) (1.10) (1.22) (1.23) (2.23) (1.64) (1.25) (0.89) (0.99) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.19) (-0.50) (1.20) (1.14) (0.98) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-1.53) (-0.71) (1.38) (1.19) (1.26) 
                             
CONSTANT 0.63 0.68 0.25 0.58 2.64 2.91 3.59 -1.03 -1.02 -0.57 -0.96 0.79 1.47 1.95 -0.39 -0.39 -0.68 -0.93 1.64 3.38 3.84 -0.89 -0.89 -1.37 -1.56 1.40 2.83 2.39 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.24) (0.37) (1.03) (0.76) (0.87) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.47) (-0.50) (0.25) (0.35) (0.39) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-0.45) (0.59) (0.95) (0.93) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-1.13) (-0.82) (0.52) (0.77) (0.56) 
                             
Pseudo R2 0.7713 0.7261 0.6706 0.5908 0.6112 0.7096 0.8060 0.7155 0.6592 0.6140 0.5357 0.5626 0.6892 0.7877 0.6850 0.6227 0.5387 0.4401 0.5483 0.6811 0.7921 0.6841 0.6216 0.5340 0.4368 0.5454 0.6785 0.7855 
 
The sub sample consists 100 country-year observations (i.e., 20 countries with Islamic banking presence, with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma 
(2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets 
of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with 
scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. 
Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the 
number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually 
meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a 
country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia 
& Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All regressions include year dummies, i.e., for 2007 to 2010 (not reported). Bootstrapped standard errors are 
used (not reported) and they were obtained using 1,000 bootstrap replications. t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 
 211 
 
 Figure 8.2 Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for countries with Islamic banking presence 
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Figure 8.2 Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for countries with Islamic banking presence (cont’d) 
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8.3.2 Inter-quantile regressions 
The robustness of the quantiles regression results is also checked by conducting inter-
quantile regression, where the disparity of the estimated coefficient between different 
quantiles is examined. The disparity is tested between the two extreme tails (95
th
 and 
5
th
), the right tail and the median (95
th
 and 50
th
), the median and the left tail (50
th
 and 
5
th
) and the two quartiles (75
th
 and 25
th
) respectively. The inter-quantile regression is 
modelled as higher quantile minus lower quantile, and the positive sign represents an 
ascending pattern of coefficients between the two quantiles while a negative sign 
indicates a descending pattern (Dzolkarnaini, 2009).  
 
The results are reported in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix 2  for the full sample 
and the sub sample of countries with Islamic banking presence, respectively. 
Generally speaking, the results demonstrate that the explanatory variables exert some 
different effects on level of financial inclusion at different points of the distribution, 
thus confirming the visual inspection of Figures 8.1 and 8.2. The different effects of 
the independent variables at the different quantiles of the distribution suggest that 
there is an evidence of heterogeneity in the sample of countries, particularly the 
institutional settings variables. With regard to the Islamic banking variables, the 
presence of heterogeneity is not largely prevalent. 
8.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has further presented an empirical examination of heterogeneity aspect 
of institutional theory. The results of the analysis are robust in which the 
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heterogeneity of the determinants was addressed by examining the entire distribution 
of sample using the quantile regression method. 
 
The chapter offers the following findings; firstly, although not largely prevalent, the 
determinants are found to be heterogenous and they differ in terms of relative strength 
and significance across the whole distributions of financial inclusion index. Secondly, 
more specifically, the Islamic banking presence is found to have a mixed influence on 
the process and structure of financial inclusion.  
 
By further examining the distribution of financial inclusion, it is found that 
heterogeneity in the financial access determinants is evident. This supports the notion 
of heterogeneity in institutional theory as put forward by Zucker (1987) on the role of 
institutional settings‘ processes and structures in creating and shaping the various 
levels of financial inclusion. It shows that the determinants (Islamic banking presence, 
in particular), are not homogeneous across the whole distribution of countries‘ 
financial inclusion levels, which contradicts to the earlier studies done by Benson 
(1975) and Rowan (1982). In other words, financial inclusion index distribution is not 
only heterogenous with significantly different institutional settings, but also with 
significantly different state of Islamic banking development and efficiency.  
 
Admittedly, these findings demonstrate that institutional settings are shaped and 
designed to be consistent with financial inclusion enhancement for both at lower and 
higher level of financial inclusion. For example, in countries with lower financial 
inclusion, the presence of Islamic banking (i.e., based on its asset size) would 
facilitate fuller participation by the vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low 
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income groups by offering customized service and products (with empowerment 
element) to freeing themselves from financial burdens. Whereas, in countries with 
higher financial inclusion, stronger and better policies (such as contractual and 
informational frameworks and regulatory restriction) are more crucial to achieve and 
sustain in order to promote greater financial inclusion.          
 
It should also be noted that, to my knowledge, the empirical findings on the 
heterogeneity of the determinants of financial inclusion is the first of its kind in the 
literature. Therefore, this chapter further contributes to this field of study by 
examining the financial inclusion index distribution. 
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Chapter 9  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a summary of the whole thesis is provided for an overall and 
comprehensive picture of the entire study. It is the most important chapter of the 
whole thesis as it reflects the justification of the study by highlighting the extent to 
which the aims and objectives of the study have been obtained.  It begins by 
summarizing the chapters which give the background knowledge of the thesis and 
explains why this study is useful. The methodologies of the research and the tools 
employed are also briefly mentioned to provide a logical flow of the thesis.  
 
Next, section 9.3 briefly presents the findings and analysis of the results to conclude 
the whole thesis, followed by elaboration of the implications of the study. 
Contributions to the body of knowledge is presented in Section 9.4. The final section 
discusses the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research that 
resulting from potential bias in the results that can be avoided in future research 
studies.   
 
The thesis consists of two major components; the first six chapters are foundational 
chapters which give the background of the study and the last two chapters constitute 
the empirical work. 
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9.2 Overall Summary 
This thesis investigates the determinants of financial inclusion, while recognising the 
heterogeneous impacts of those determinants across different levels of financial 
inclusion based on institutional theory. The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 present the review of the relevant literatures. Chapter 2 looks at the 
main topic of financial exclusion studies and highlights the role of financial system in 
shaping financial inclusion. The chapter also discusses the different type of financial 
systems with major concern on  the role of Islamic banking and finance in driving 
financial inclusion. It deserves special mention because the present study considers 
the Islamic banking presence as one of the bases for explaning the determinants of 
access to finance. This is in response to the view put forward by Mirakhor & Iqbal 
(2012) and Mohieldin, Iqbal, Rostom, & Fu (2012) who claim that Islamic finance 
can play an important role in enhancing financial inclusion.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed survey of literature related to the measurement and 
determinants of financial inclusion.  Amongst others, the chapter discusses the 
measurement of financial inclusion which entail two major aspects, namely the 
dimensions and indicators as well as formula used in the index computation. Further, 
the chapter presents the empirical evidence on the financial access determinants. As 
far as the Islamic banking determinant is concerned, and despite the relatively little 
research being carried out on the possible link between Islamic bank and financial 
inclusion, the evidence is relatively weak and inconclusive (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 
& Randall, 2013; Ben Naceur, Barajas, & Massara, 2015). 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to the research methods of the present study. Chapter 
4 designates the basic structure of the research design and the methodology employed 
to conduct the study, comprising variable definitions and the sample selection 
procedure. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the construction of financial inclusion index using method 
initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). The index computation is vital given that the 
measurement of financial inclusion is not previously well-developed and not uniform 
enough to make cross-country analysis possible. It is learned from this chapter that in 
order to produce a better and comprehensive financial inclusion index, all the 
following three important aspects need to be considered:  
 inclusion of as many dimensions as possible: outreach, usage, ease and cost 
of the financial services. 
 comprises all the four basic financial services: savings, credits, insurance and 
banking transactions. However, one may also include microfinance or 
microcredit  as more concerns are placed on the role of these financial 
services in promoting financial inclusion. 
 uses a well supported formula/approach, particularly the one used by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).   
 
However, the issue of data availability remains to be the major constraint as pointed 
by Claessens (2006) and Beck & Demirguc-Kunt (2008). The chapter further presents 
the empirical distribution of the countries based on level of financial inclusion and 
marginal differences throughout the periods. It is generally shown that the mass of the 
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distribution is concentrated on the low level of financial inclusion and the substantial 
variation through time is not largely noticeable.  
 
Chapter 6 describes the procedure for measuring the Islamic banking presence. For 
the present study, the Ben Naceur et al. (2015) approach is modified to produce the 
indicators of Islamic banking – the number of Islamic banks operating in the country, 
the size of the Islamic banks‘ assets and the profitability of these banks - which is 
used as the main Islamic banking proxy in all regression analyses. This chapter further 
presents the empirical distribution of Islamic banking indicators and it is generally 
shown that, in terms of quantity and profitability, the Islamic bank are still far behind 
but it is not the case in terms of size.    
 
The next two chapters report the results of the present study. Chapter 7 presents the 
results of investigating the determinants of financial inclusion. It is found that the size 
of Islamic banking, governance, legal rights, paved road, internet and East Asia & 
Pacific are positively related to the level of financial access while the cost of 
enforcing contracts, regulatory restrictions and lending interest rate are negatively 
related. The relationships between financial inclusion and the Islamic banking 
quantity and profitability, GDP, phone, deposit interest rate and legal origins are less 
clear. As far as the institutional theory is concern, these findings support the general 
notion that the institutional framework plays an essential role in creating and shaping 
financial inclusion as remarked by Beck & Torre (2007) and Beck & Demirguc-Kunt 
(2008).   
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Finally, Chapter 8 presents empirical evidence on the heterogeneity in the 
determinants of financial inclusion. The quantile regression results show that the 
financial inclusion determinants are heterogenous across the whole distribution of 
CIFI. Overall, it is found that physical infrastructure, legal origins and regions have 
impacts on financial inclusion at both, lower and higher levels. It is also documented 
that the internet becomes an important enabler for access to finance in the countries 
where the level of inclusion is lower while GDP and legal rights are the key drivers 
for countries with higher levels of financial inclusion. The evidence of heterogeneity 
in the Islamic banking presence determinants is mixed and inconclusive. 
 
To summarize, this thesis offers the following answers to the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 4: 
 
1. Does the Islamic financial sector (i.e., as proxied by the Islamic banking 
presence) have significant influence on financial inclusion? 
  
The use of Islamic banking presence to proxy for the country‘s Islamic 
financial sector status have shown that there are tentative, mixed and relatively 
weak link between financial inclusion and Islamic financial system. More 
specifically, it is evident that Islamic banking size does exert financial 
inclusion whereas the influences of number of Islamic banks and their 
profitability level are somewhat unclear.  
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2. Are the empirical effects between the Islamic financial sector and financial 
inclusion consistent with the theoretical presumption (i.e., Islamic banking is 
positively related with financial inclusion)? 
 
Using the Islamic banking presence indicators, it is evident that the empirical 
relationship between the Islamic financial system factor and the financial 
inclusion is less consistent with the theoretical presumption. This finding 
suggests that the Islamic financial sector, as proxied by the Islamic banking 
presence is not necessarily removing the high barriers of access to finance.  
 
3. Do the financial access determinants, especially institutional settings, that 
have been tested in prior studies remain significant in explaining factors 
associated with financial access?  
 
There is significant evidence to support the view that most of the usual 
financial inclusion determinants remain significant in explaining factors 
associated with access to finance. More specifically, countries with better level 
of governance and legal rights index are more likely to prevent exploitation of 
the least-advantaged group in the financial system, whereas access to finance 
could be distorted when countries impose higher cost of enforcing contracts 
and banking restrictions. In sum, all these evidences are consistent with the 
institutional theory. Countries with higher level of financial inclusion also 
portray as having good physical infrastructure in terms of paved road and 
internet. The contention that cost of debt is a powerful driver of financial 
intermediation levels through the demand-side effects (and hence placing 
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more burden to those disfavoured people) is also supported as higher lending 
rate inhibits the expansion of credit access. In contrast with prior studies, little 
evidence is found between the level of financial inclusion and GDP as well as 
the legal origin. As far as the effect of geographical region on financial access 
is concerned, the evidence is generally supporting the view of Martin (2000) 
who argues that the processes of geographically uneven capitalist economic 
development are shaped and mediated by the institutional structures, and 
consequently affecting the level of financial inclusion. Overall, the evidence 
supports the view that institutional settings affect financial inclusion.    
 
4. Are the financial access determinants heterogeneous across the whole 
distribution of countries?  
 
The heterogeneity in the financial inclusion determinants is evident in the 
quantile regression analysis. It shows that the determinants are not 
homogenous across the whole distributions of countries. This further supports 
that financial inclusion is institutionally-driven and the sheer size of impacts 
varies across countries and geographical regions. 
9.3 The Research Findings and Implications of the Study  
The findings and the results of the research have been presented in a more empirical 
and analytical way in Chapters 7 and 8. As a matter of reflection, recent development 
of Islamic banking is briefly presented, followed by the summary of research findings. 
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Islamic finance has grown rapidly in recent years, but remains concerted in a few 
jurisdictions. Islamic finance assets grew at double-digit rates during the past decade, 
from about US$200 billion in 2003 to an estimated US$1.88 trillion at the end of 2015 
(Ernst & Young, 2014; IFSB, 2016; Oliver Wyman, 2002). Nevertheless, despite this 
growth, Islamic finance assets are still concentrated in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries, Iran, and Malaysia, and represent less than 1 per cent of global 
financial assets. Islamic finance now encompasses a wide range of services. 
Nonetheless, banking still dominates and represented about four-fifths of total Islamic 
finance assets in 2013 (IFSB, 2014). 
 
The growth of Islamic banking, in particular, outperformed conventional banking over 
the past decade. Islamic banking has thus increased its penetration in many countries, 
crossing the threshold of 15%  as a share of banking system assets in 10 countries 
(i.e., Iran and Sudan with a full-fledged Islamic financial sector, Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) 
(IFSB, 2014). Islamic banking represents about 1.25% of global banking assets. 
During the recent global financial crisis, Islamic banks were less exposed to the toxic 
assets that contaminated the conventional banking world, but suffered from second-
round effects, notably through the real estate slump. Asset quality and capitalization 
are still better on average than for conventional banks, while profitability remains 
lower (IFSB, 2014). 
 
With Islamic banking currently dominates and represented about 80% of total Islamic 
finance assets, we should expect that the impact of such developments could be 
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considered having some positive impact on financial inclusion, particularly in 
countries with Islamic banking sector. 
 
Theoretically speaking, it is evident that the institutional settings‘ environment are 
essential in shaping access to finance. However, in many cases, it can be observed 
that the impact of countries‘ policies on the incidence of financial inclusion is hardly 
taking any effect. In the specific context of Islamic banking presence, although the 
effect is not largely prevalent, it is well-documented in this study that it does exert 
some influences on the levels of financial inclusion to some extent. This in turn 
reinforces the importance to recognize other institutional factors that could facilitate 
access to finance, namely sound contractual frameworks, regulatory restrictions, 
physical infrastructures and lower lending interest rate. 
 
Building on institutional theory, these findings on the institutional setting variables 
show the important of  having a good institutional framework in expanding financial 
access as remarked by  Beck & Torre (2007) and Beck & Demirguc-Kunt (2008). As 
there are number of challenges that Islamic finance faces, the role of institutional 
settings become more crucial. Despite the efforts of Islamic finance standard setters 
such as AAOIFI and IFSB, in many countries the industry is governed by  regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks that are developed primarily for conventional finance. 
Hence, it does not fully take into account of the special nature of Islamic finance. 
Furthermore, the Islamic finance industry is still largely a nascent one, lacking 
economies of scale, and operating in an environment where legal and tax rules, 
financial infrastructure, and access to financial safety nets and central bank liquidity 
are either absent or, if available, do not appropriately take into account the special 
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characteristics of Islamic finance. Additionally, large differences in practice across 
countries and limited standardization and securitization create additional uncertainty 
for Islamic finance clients. Scarcity of Shariah scholars with financial sector expertise 
and a slow pace of innovation are also weighing on the industry. These challenges 
may not only be hindering its development, but could also encourage practices and 
products that are complex, thus carrying heightened risks (Kammer et al, 2015). 
Therefore, by providing a specific and unique institutional setting for Islamic finance, 
this industry has the potential to contribute to higher and more financial inclusiveness.  
 
Empirically speaking, despite the other factors associated with financial inclusion, the 
results in Chapter 7 are very important in understanding theimpact of Islamic banking 
on financial inclusion. In general, the presence of Islamic banking sector has only 
minimal influence in enhancing financial inclusion. While Islamic banking coefficient 
is significant; it does have zero (0) coefficient (refer Table 7.3). This constitutes an 
important substance for the so-called ‗social failure of Islamic finance‘, as there is 
relatively no difference in terms of the contribution of Islamic banking and 
conventional banking towards financial inclusion. Further findings (refer Tables 7.4 
and 7.6) support this idea as only the size of Islamic banks are found to give an impact 
on the level of financial inclusion. Furthermore, not having English legal origin is 
rather meaningful for the Islamic finance related inclusiveness debate. This is because 
of Islamic financial development has been predominantly facilitated by the English 
legal system, and therefore, London as well as Malaysia remain as important centres 
for contractual agreements and disputes.  
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As mentioned earlier, the significant but rather zero coefficient perhaps therefore is an 
indication of religious inclusiveness in terms of provision of Shariah compliant 
financial instruments. In addition, most of the previous studies are looking into the 
perspective of financialization in financial inclusion debates. Only a few are 
discussing this subject matter from the perspective of developmentalism. On the one 
hand, as financial inclusion relates to developmentalism, the zero coefficient perhaps 
is an indication that financial inclusivity (in terms of developmentalism) is not 
affected by Islamic banks. This would suggests that the progress of Islamic banks so 
far in enhancing financial inclusion is still below par as compared to its conventional 
counterparts.. Again, this reflects the problem of ‗too small to make a contribution‘. 
On the other hand, this subject is very much related to the issue of substance over 
form as claimed by some scholars in Islamic finance. Products and services offered by 
Islamic banks are merely a replication of those in conventional banks in which the 
social impact is hardly observed. This concern (i.e., not really promoting Islamic 
finance objectives) could lead to twofold scenarios; firstly impeding the growth of 
Islamic banking since the true nature of Islamic finance is lacking in its operation. 
Secondly, Islamic banking is lacking of capability in driving financial inclusion. 
These findings reflect an  important aspect of how the essence of Islamic finance can 
contribute to financial inclusion through the realization of maqasid al-shariah. As in 
tawhid
54
, being the complementarity and unitarity axiom under maqasid al-shariah, 
the interest of all stakeholders is deliberately considered through the Islamic banking 
operations for human well-being. Under maqasid al-shariah, greater financial 
inclusion in terms of emancipation and empowerment could be directly observed 
                                              
54
 Tawhid means the oneness of God. Tauhid also is defined as the indivisible oneness concept of 
monotheism in Islam. Tawhid is the religion's most fundamental concept and holds that God (Allah), 
literally Al-Ilāh "the God") is One (Al-ʾAḥad) and Single (Al-Wāḥid) because of the "principle of 
Tawhid the Islamic belief in God is considered Unitarian. 
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through the utilization of the assets of Islamic bankwhich comprises of the risk 
sharing and profit and loss sharing contracts. This element of empowerment is absent 
in the conventional banking as its underlying principle of operation is interest-based 
system. Sadly, the reality of Islamic banks mimicking conventional banks‘ interest-
based practice by preferring murabahah-based over profit-sharing based instruments 
(Aggarwal & Goodell, 2009; Khan, 2010; Beck, et.al, 2013) is far from contributing 
to empowerment agenda. The present study is therefore proposing that there will be 
an incredible acceptance and growth for Islamic banking worldwide which will result 
in greater financial inclusiveness once the unique characteristics of Islamic finance 
are clearly observed and experienced by all the stakeholders.  
 
9.4 Contributions to the Knowledge 
Prior financial inclusion research has made attempts in developing indices to measure 
financial inclusion (e.g., Sarma, 2008; Sarma, 2010; Arora, 2010; Beck, Chakravarty 
& Pal, 2010; Prathap, 2011; Gupte, Venkataramani, & Gupta, 2012). The approach 
taken is mainly incorporating some dimensions and indicators that could quantify and 
describe the level of financial inclusion. However, to certain extent, the indices are 
not well supported and remain incomplete. Thus, this present study replicates the 
work of Sarma (2008, 2010) to compute a more updated index. 
 
With such replication in place, empirical examination of the determinants of financial 
inclusion  can  be carried out. Despite the important notes made by Leyshon & Thrift 
(1995) on the role of financial system in shaping financial inclusion, there exist very 
few studies dealing with the issue. To a certain extent, those studies are far from being 
comprehensive. Apart from examining the other determinants of financial inclusion, 
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the present study therefore investigates the role of financial system in greater details 
by focusing on to what extent Islamic-based financial system, as one of the 
institutional settings, shapes financial inclusion.  
 
While it is still far from well-developed and well-accepted, the debate on the 
classification of financial system continues. Therefore, acknowledging the 
development and increased interest of Islamic finance, this present study develops a 
systematic classification of financial system using Islamic banking presence as the 
proxy to differentiate between Islamic and conventional financial systems. To the best 
of my knowledge, the present study is the first of its kind to develop such a 
classification system. 
 
Empirical evidence on the factors felt likely to be important in explaining countries‘ 
financial inclusion level is lacking and far from conclusive. Notably, a direct or 
indirect relationships and significance levels are commonly observed. Such 
inconclusive findings are perhaps due to the notion of institutional theory.  Based on 
study done by Tolbert (1985), Zucker (1987) argues that institutional environment is 
heterogeneous, hence reflects the impact of institutional processes on the 
organization. She claims that homogeneity of environment decreases structure of 
internal organization, in which contradicting the environment-as-institution approach. 
The conditional quantile regression method developed by Koenker & Bassett (1978) 
and Koenker & Hallock (2001) is therefore used in the present study to further 
explore the heterogeneity aspect of the institutional theory. Also, to the best of my 
knowledge, the present study is the first of its kind to investigate the issue of 
heterogeneity in the determinants of financial inclusion using this approach. 
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Empirically investigating heterogeneity in the financial inclusion determinants has the 
potential to enable better understanding of the determinants of financial inclusion, and 
more importantly provides renewed insights on the heterogeneity aspect of the 
institutional theory. To the best of my knowledge, the present study is the first to 
document the evidence of heterogeneity in the financial access determinants.   
 
Above all, the present study has made a number of significant contributions to the 
understanding of financial inclusion and Islamic finance literature particularly in 
terms of the role of Islamic financial system. Firstly, it improves our understanding of 
the extent of the relationship between financial inclusion and Islamic financial system. 
Although the issue has been previously mentioned in many studies, this present study 
documents rich and vast empirical evidence on the influence of Islamic financial 
system on the level of financial inclusion, which  was previously thought as very 
lacking and inconclusive. Secondly, the use of quantile regression method to 
investigate the heterogeneity issue of financial inclusion determinants is considered as 
making a novel contribution to the body of knowledge.  
9.5 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research  
This study is subject to some limitations. The results of the study are based on a 
relatively small sample of countries (i.e., 400 country-year observations) where data 
on both financial access indicators as well as Islamic banking indicators are required 
to be available. Although the financial access indicators data are readily available 
from several standard databases, the full and wider data coverage is largely absent 
which limits the present study to compute a better and more comprehensive financial 
inclusion index (i.e., to include more dimensions and more type of financial services). 
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Similarly, the Islamic banking data are not much available in the standard databases, 
hence manual data collection from the banks‘ financial statements was required. In 
addition, as suggested by Casu & Molyneux (2003), all variables are required to be 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index of each country. This is to take account for 
macroeconomic differences across countries during the period of the study.  
 
Due to data limitation, it was not possible in the present study to investigate 
separately the determinants of financial services inclusion (i.e., deposits, loans/credits, 
insurance, banking transactions, etc). These areas offer more room for improvement 
on the robustness of the present study‘s results. However, this is only possible if the 
databases on those financial services are readily available and reliable or further 
manual data collection of the required data items can be undertaken. 
 
The ability of the Islamic banking presence to proxy for the countries‘ Islamic 
financial sector  is somewhat debatable and inconclusive. As stated in many prior 
studies pertaining to the role of Islamic finance in promoting financial inclusion, 
Islamic finance could contribute to greater inclusion in two essential ways, namely (i) 
promoting risk-sharing contracts that provide a viable alternative to conventional 
debt-based financing, and (ii) through specific instruments of wealth redistribution 
(e.g., through zakat, waqaf, sadaqah, etc) among the society. To examine the 
influence of Islamic financial system on countries‘ level of financial inclusion in 
greater details, the measurements of risk-sharing contracts and wealth redistribution 
are clearly required. These measurements of Islamic financial system are more 
appropriate in investigating the impact of Islamic finance to financial access. This 
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offers a fruitful area for further research which will make significant contribution to 
the research method.   
 
On top of having the Islamic banking presence (i.e., IB quantity, IB size and IB 
profitability) as the variables for the Islamic banking factor,  the risk-sharing and 
profit-and-loss sharing type of factors (i.e., the share of such instruments and 
financing in Islamic banking financing) should also have been considered as 
variables. This is due to the fact that, a developmentalist orientation of financial 
inclusion would require a financial paradigm based on risk-sharing and sharing 
economy of participation through profit-and-loss sharing financing paradigm as 
opposed to financialisation to the conventional and Islamic banking sector. The 
inclusion of the risk-sharing and profit-and-loss sharing variable could shed more 
lights on the effect of Islamic finance on financially included. 
 
In addition, while this study focused on the role of Islamic bank on having inclusive 
financial participation in the society, the role of other non-banking financial 
institutions should also be recognised (see Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2). Microfinance is 
considered as one of the powerful tools for poverty alleviation and empowerment of 
the poor and it is not really a new concept in Islam in particular. Islamic microfinance 
is not only including financial inclusion to provide various Islamic financial products 
and services needed by underserved segments of the society, but also providing a 
more holistic framework to enhance financial inclusion, eradicate poverty and a 
healthy economy. This can be done by promoting microfinance, micro and small 
enterprises financing  as well as  micro insurance, using redistributive instruments 
from social funds, such as zakat, waqf and sadaqah, as well as risk sharing 
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instruments from commercial funds, such as microfinance and micro takaful 
(Mohieldin, et al., 2012; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2012 and 2013; Iqbal, 2014). Baitul 
Maal wat Tamwil (house of wealth and business) or BMT
55
 in Indonesia is a well-
known example of institution adopting Islamic microfinance institution. As far as the 
developmentalism aspect is concerned, BMT as a non-banking Islamic financial 
institution provides an ideal channel which could carry out the holistic mission of 
financial inclusion, rather than solely focusing on the role of Islamic banks 
themselves.  
  
To end the present study, we could conclude that Islamic banking is not necessarily 
removing the high barriers of access to finance. It seems that the notion of ―unfinished 
agenda‖ as purported by Beck & Demirguc-Kunt (2008) remains to be valid for many 
years to come.  
 
 
                                              
55
 Baitul Maal (Bait means house, al-Maal means wealth) focuses on collecting compulsory and 
voluntary charities, such as zakat, infaq, sadaqah, waqf and optimizing their distribution by applying 
Shariah based management. Meanwhile, Baitut Tamwil (at-Tamwil means finance/capital) focuses on 
developing productive businesses as well as investment to enhance the quality of human economic life 
especially for those in the micro and small scale economy, by promoting funding and financing 
activities (Ascarya & Tanjung, 2016). As ‗a community-based financial institution‘ which helps SMEs 
through training and social development programmes, the feature of BMT is distinctive as it is not just 
a financial institution but it is also a social enterprise for two reasons- firstly, BMT started as a 
cooperative; thus, it has a cooperative nature with the advantage of providing a more flexible and faster 
financing approval process than banks. Secondly, BMT offers entrepreneurial skills and the promotion 
of Islamic values in a practical way (Riwajanti & Asutay, 2015). 
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Appendix 1 
Supplementary results of regression diagnostics 
Table A1.1 Variance inflation factor (VIF) of regression variables 
Variable VIF 
IB quantity 26.54 
IB size 3.12 
IB profitability 12.74 
IB quantity . IB size 22.02 
IB quantity . IB profitability 6.58 
IB size . IB profitability 19.78 
GDP 9.73 
Governance 9.32 
Legal rights 2.96 
Credit information 1.99 
Cost contracts 1.81 
Banking restrictions 2.98 
Paved road 3.1 
Phone 6.08 
Internet 12.21 
Deposit interest rate 2.71 
Lending interest rate 3.46 
English 14.33 
French 14.83 
German 8.72 
Socialist 8.18 
Africa 3.31 
East Asia & Pacific 2.53 
Europe & Central Asia 5.9 
Middle East & North Africa 3.46 
South Asia 2.22 
2007 2.15 
2008 1.95 
2009 1.76 
2010 1.64 
Mean 7.27 
 
IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the 
average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) 
divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in 
US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance 
indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption) which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information 
is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total 
enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is 
an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values ind icate more 
banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm 
of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 
1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest 
rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is 
normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal 
system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is 
where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. 
Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & 
Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic 
regions based on World Bank. Year dummies for 2007 to 2010. 
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Figure A1.1 Kernel and normal density estimates of regression’s residuals 
(checking for normality assumption in the analysis of CIFI determinants) 
 
 
 
Figure A2.2 Normal probability plot (NPP) of regression’s residuals (checking 
for normality assumption in the analysis of CIFI determinants) 
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Appendix 2 
Supplementary results of robustness checks for quantile regressions 
Table A2.1 Inter-quantile regression estimates for determinants of financial inclusion 
Variable With all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 
                 
IB quantity -1.710 -2.003 0.293 0.294 2.152 1.793 0.359 2.381         
 (-1.12) (-1.43) (0.32) (0.22) (1.1) (1.01) (0.41) (1.42)         
                 
IB size 0.047* 0.036 0.011 0.032     0.009 -0.004 0.013 0.006     
 (1.75) (1.4) (0.61) (1.58)     (0.46) (-0.19) (0.23) (0.32)     
                 
IB profitability 7.011 7.569 -0.558 2.206         6.203 3.632 2.571 4.289 
 (0.95) (1.1) (-0.1) (0.42)         (1.25) (0.87) (0.68) (1.05) 
                 
IB quantity x size 0.018 0.111 -0.092 -0.160 -0.369 -0.254 -0.115 -0.322* -0.016 -0.067 0.051 -0.082     
 (0.1) (0.69) (-0.89) (-1.09) (-1.43) (-1.09) (-1.15) (-1.69) (-0.23) (-1.24) (0.26) (-1.27)     
                 
IB quantity x profitability 1.138 9.093 -7.955 2.829 12.675 11.924 0.752 -2.357     -31.424 -30.741 -0.684 -10.464 
 (0.03) (0.28) (-0.39) (0.1) (0.73) (0.84) (0.1) (-0.2)     (-1.15) (-1.16) (-0.04) (-0.44) 
                 
IB size x profitability -1.347 -1.448 0.101 -0.224     0.086 0.252 -0.166 0.095 -0.533 0.078 -0.611 -0.595 
 (-0.67) (-0.79) (0.08) (-0.17)     (0.18) (0.72) (-0.18) (0.31) (-0.47) (0.07) (-0.73) (-0.6) 
                 
GDP  0.100* 0.142*** -0.042 0.021 0.075 0.093* -0.018 0.022 0.068 0.130*** -0.062 0.051 0.034 0.123** -0.089* 0.074 
 (1.94) (3.32) (-0.95) (0.4) (1.25) (2) (-0.36) (0.38) (1.22) (2.88) (-0.18) (0.91) (0.64) (2.53) (-1.93) (1.32) 
                 
Governance 0.032 -0.128 0.161** 0.096 0.259** 0.117 0.141* 0.159* 0.118 0.025 0.094 0.042 0.188* 0.014 0.175** 0.049 
 (0.27) (-1.13) (2.18) (0.96) (2.51) (1.29) (1.9) (1.67) (0.95) (0.22) (0.4) (0.41) (1.74) (0.15) (2.19) (0.48) 
                 
Legal rights  0.023 0.029 -0.007 0.034* 0.024 0.032 -0.007 0.041** 0.034* 0.020 0.014 0.045*** 0.037** 0.021 0.015 0.042** 
 (1.55) (1.45) (-0.39) (1.84) (1.56) (1.48) (-0.42) (2.39) (1.89) (1.06) (0.17) (3.22) (2) (1.02) (0.79) (2.56) 
                 
Credit information 0.015 -0.006 0.020 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.031* 0.006 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.019 -0.004 0.023 0.012 
 (0.71) (-0.29) (1.21) (0.57) (1.52) (-0.02) (1.67) (0.32) (0.91) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) (1) (-0.22) (1.32) (0.62) 
                 
Cost contracts 0.273* 0.226* 0.047 -0.014 -0.063 -0.177 0.114 -0.216 0.163 0.169 -0.006 0.016 0.051 0.001 0.050 -0.023 
 (1.9) (1.7) (0.53) (-0.12) (-0.4) (-1.21) (1.12) (-1.48) (1.07) (1.18) (-0.01) (0.14) (0.29) (0.01) (0.46) (-0.17) 
                 
Financial restrictions -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.005** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.006** -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.005** -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.47) (0.53) (-1.39) (-2.02) (-0.2) (0.25) (-0.64) (-2.26) (-0.82) (-0.05) (-0.43) (-2.03) (-0.57) (0.57) (-1.62) (-1.61) 
                 
Paved road 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.65) (-0.67) (0.76) (0.46) (0.58) (-0.17) (0.65) (-0.1) (-0.1) (0) (1.9) (0.45) (-0.35) (0.89) (1.23) 
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Variable With all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 
Phone 0.009** -0.002 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.006* -0.004 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011** -0.005 0.016 0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.009** 0.007** 
 (2.49) (-0.56) (3.14) (2.89) (1.8) (-0.99) (2.9) (2.76) (2.55) (-1.38) (1.48) (1.57) (1.5) (-0.87) (2.27) (2.04) 
                 
Internet -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.005* -0.007** -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.005* -0.002 -0.004 
 (-1.24) (-0.81) (-0.4) (-1.11) (-3.29) (-2.88) (-0.06) (-1.77) (-2.08) (-1.17) (-0.07) (-1.19) (-2.69) (-1.74) (-0.7) (-1.31) 
                 
Deposit interest rate 0.293 0.305 -0.012 0.365 0.567 -0.362 0.929 -0.249 0.779 1.121 -0.343 0.815 0.688 -0.054 0.741 0.163 
 (0.29) (0.33) (-0.02) (0.37) (0.57) (-0.36) (1.26) (-0.27) (0.74) (1.14) (-0.11) (0.85) (0.63) (-0.05) (0.87) (0.15) 
                 
Lending interest rate -0.619 0.126 -0.745 -0.302 -1.305*** 0.037 -1.341** -0.163 -0.777* -0.124 -0.652 -0.934 -0.974** 0.081 -1.055* -0.468 
 (-1.48) (0.24) (-1.55) (-0.54) (-2.77) (0.05) (-2.11) (-0.22) (-1.78) (-0.21) (-0.87) (-1.49) (-2) (0.12) (-1.69) (-0.68) 
                 
English  0.501*** 0.260 0.241 0.083 0.435*** 0.021 0.414*** 0.174 0.471*** 0.312* 0.160 -0.128 0.550*** 0.292* 0.258 0.102 
 (3.58) (1.48) (1.55) (0.49) (3.12) (0.13) (2.78) (1.1) (2.87) (1.72) (0.06) (-0.76) (3.54) (1.71) (1.6) (0.6) 
                 
French  0.600*** 0.358** 0.241* 0.382*** 0.555*** 0.149 0.406*** 0.434*** 0.577*** 0.394** 0.182 0.253* 0.589*** 0.246 0.343*** 0.399*** 
 (3.73) (2.14) (1.91) (2.87) (3.56) (0.93) (3.52) (3.33) (3.02) (2.17) (0.07) (1.85) (3.46) (1.59) (2.59) (2.85) 
                 
German  0.565 0.099 0.466*** 0.332** 0.537*** 0.048 0.489*** 0.324** 0.638*** 0.197 0.441 0.175 0.551*** 0.103 0.448*** 0.319** 
 (4.21) (0.7) (3.92) (2.3) (3.74) (0.32) (4.4) (2.51) (4.14) (1.21) (0.17) (1.16) (3.81) (0.73) (3.84) (2.39) 
                 
Socialist 0.698*** 0.097 0.601*** 0.378* 0.869*** 0.182 0.687*** 0.394** 0.661*** 0.216 0.446 0.169 0.610*** 0.207 0.403** 0.340 
 (3.25) (0.42) (3.29) (1.83) (4.46) (0.86) (4.3) (2.04) (2.92) (0.94) (0.12) (0.84) (3.03) (1.03) (2.46) (1.64) 
                 
Africa -0.055 -0.087 0.032 0.144 0.146 0.065 0.081 0.193 -0.029 0.002 -0.031 0.233* -0.107 0.069 -0.176 0.255* 
 (-0.37) (-0.74) (0.27) (1.14) (0.97) (0.53) (0.57) (1.4) (-0.2) (0.02) (0) (1.76) (-0.79) (0.59) (-1.39) (1.77) 
                 
East Asia & Pacific 1.211 1.460 -0.249* -0.186 1.457 1.744* -0.287** -0.137 1.349 1.734 -0.385 -0.063 1.431 1.694* -0.263* 0.001 
 (1.25) (1.6) (-1.89) (-0.94) (1.47) (1.84) (-2.03) (-0.59) (1.36) (1.85) (0) (-0.34) (1.44) (1.83) (-1.76) (0.01) 
                 
Europe & Central Asia -0.271** 0.096 -0.368*** -0.286** -0.291** 0.053 -0.344 -0.247* -0.235* 0.217 -0.451 -0.253* -0.151 0.139 -0.290** -0.260* 
 (-2.21) (0.7) (-3.02) (-1.97) (-2.56) (0.35) (-2.51) (-1.66) (-1.77) (1.46) (0) (-1.81) (-1.31) (1.08) (-2.17) (-1.83) 
                 
Middle East & North Africa 0.078 0.083 -0.005 0.160 0.294* 0.206 0.088 0.032 0.140 0.365* -0.224 0.124 0.182 0.304** -0.122 -0.003 
 (0.52) (0.47) (-0.04) (1.1) (1.89) (1.27) (0.65) (0.2) (0.92) (1.93) (0) (0.82) (1.26) (2.07) (-0.95) (-0.02) 
                 
South Asia 0.156 -0.017 0.173 0.184 0.253 0.130 0.122 0.047 0.137 0.089 0.047 0.253* 0.249 0.189 0.060 0.207 
 (0.99) (-0.12) (1.26) (1.19) (1.6) (0.84) (0.84) (0.31) (0.75) (0.56) (0) (1.89) (1.42) (1.31) (0.37) (1.36) 
                 
CONSTANT -0.897 -1.392*** 0.495 -0.169 -0.338 -0.357 0.018 -0.004 -0.491 -1.163** 0.672 -0.279 -0.117 -0.949* 0.832* -0.645 
 (-1.64) (-2.89) (1.14) (-0.34) (-0.52) (-0.65) (0.04) (-0.01) (-0.84) (-2.22) (0) (-0.52) (-0.21) (-1.67) (1.82) (-1.27) 
                 
Pseudo R2 0.5545 0.5545 0.4041 0.4326 0.5383 0.5383 0.3857 0.4125  0.5449 0.5449 0.3861 0.3861 0.5367 0.5367 0.3793 0.4083 
 
The full sample consists 400 country-year observations (i.e., 80 countries with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), calculated based on formula 
initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of Islamic banks. IB profitability is 
the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates divided by total population). 
Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) which higher score correspond to better 
governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit information is an index, scored on zero to 
six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. Banking restriction is an index capturing 
government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of 
the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or savings deposits. 
Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. 
English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a 
country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and 
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South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All estimates include observation year dummies (not reported). Bootstrapped standard errors are used (not reported) and they were obtained using 1,000 
bootstrap replications. t-statistics in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
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Table A2.2 Inter-quantile regression estimates for determinants of financial inclusion in countries with Islamic banking presence 
Variable With all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 
                 
IB quantity 0.477 0.350 0.127 0.748 5.001 5.814 -0.813 3.207         
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.2) (1.06) (1.31) (-0.48) (1.13)         
                 
IB size -0.154 -0.100 -0.054 -0.137     -0.180 -0.114 -0.066 -0.020     
 (-0.67) (-0.45) (-0.54) (-0.94)     (-0.92) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.15)     
                 
IB profitability -1.124 -1.270 0.146 -0.529         3.011 4.924 -1.913 -0.058 
 (-0.09) (-0.11) (0.03) (-0.07)         (0.23) (0.44) (-0.34) (-0.01) 
                 
IB quantity x size -0.160 -0.141 -0.019 -0.097 -0.694 -0.768 0.074 -0.421 -0.088 -0.050 -0.039 -0.020     
 (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.21) (-1.26) (-1.48) (0.36) (-1.27) (-0.49) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.16)     
                 
IB quantity x profitability 4.178 9.266 -5.088 -12.023 23.042 19.395 3.646 8.068     14.417 13.667 0.750 7.591 
 (0.09) (0.22) (-0.26) (-0.41) (1.21) (1.18) (0.46) (0.72)     (0.39) (0.43) (0.04) (0.36) 
                 
IB size x profitability 0.617 0.496 0.121 0.737     0.715 0.710 0.006 0.270 -0.251 -0.486 0.234 0.159 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.1) (0.43)     (1.15) (1.28) (0.02) (0.65) (-0.11) (-0.26) (0.22) (0.12) 
                 
GDP  0.103 0.038 0.065 -0.043 0.028 0.064 -0.036 0.039 0.029 -0.117 0.146 -0.106 0.000 -0.083 0.083 -0.108 
 (0.28) (0.12) (0.49) (-0.2) (0.06) (0.15) (-0.19) (0.13) (0.06) (-0.3) (0.73) (-0.37) (0) (-0.25) (0.57) (-0.48) 
                 
Governance 0.286 0.187 0.099 0.159 0.278 0.342 -0.065 0.171 0.289 0.288 0.001 0.158 0.398 0.241 0.157 0.251 
 (0.6) (0.41) (0.55) (0.6) (0.6) (0.87) (-0.3) (0.57) (0.62) (0.73) (0.01) (0.51) (0.89) (0.58) (0.71) (0.84) 
                 
Legal rights  0.028 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.243 0.213 0.030 0.100 0.118 0.059 0.059 0.084 0.188 0.158 0.030 0.076 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.33) (0.17) (1.27) (1.2) (0.5) (0.84) (0.66) (0.37) (0.74) (0.75) (0.98) (0.92) (0.4) (0.68) 
                 
Credit information -0.290* -0.286** -0.003 -0.151 -0.326** -0.313** -0.013 -0.140 -0.332** -0.330** -0.002 -0.160 -0.272** -0.331** 0.059 -0.142 
 (-1.89) (-2.14) (-0.05) (-1.59) (-2.19) (-2.28) (-0.21) (-1.46) (-2.18) (-2.34) (-0.03) (-1.49) (-2.07) (-2.5) (0.84) (-1.58) 
                 
Cost contracts -2.533* -2.552** 0.019 -1.241 -3.219** -3.335** 0.116 -1.660 -2.726* -3.010** 0.284 -1.310 -2.975** -3.177** 0.202 -1.547 
 (-1.87) (-2.22) (0.04) (-1.6) (-2.13) (-2.39) (0.2) (-1.63) (-1.76) (-2.2) (0.36) (-1.21) (-2.06) (-2.32) (0.3) (-1.64) 
                 
Financial restrictions -0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.008 
 (-0.62) (-0.43) (-0.65) (-0.42) (0.51) (-0.08) (1.44) (-0.22) (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.41) (1.04) (1.02) (0.09) (1.08) 
                 
Paved road -0.005 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 0.001 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 0.003 -0.008 -0.021* -0.021* -0.001 -0.013 
 (-0.36) (-0.6) (0.5) (-0.11) (-0.77) (-0.99) (0.24) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-1.07) (0.42) (-0.74) (-1.67) (-1.75) (-0.09) (-1.57) 
                 
Phone 0.059 0.065* -0.007 0.035 0.066 0.067 0.000 0.033 0.068 0.076* -0.009 0.032 0.056 0.064 -0.009 0.036 
 (1.48) (1.87) (-0.47) (1.45) (1.21) (1.4) (-0.02) (0.99) (1.28) (1.71) (-0.4) (0.96) (1.04) (1.34) (-0.43) (1.07) 
                 
Internet 0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.010 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.37) (-0.42) (-0.1) (-0.34) (-0.48) (0.15) (-0.4) (0.07) (0.59) (-0.85) (0.54) (0.28) (0.84) (-0.87) (0.07) 
                 
Deposit interest rate -0.657 -0.832 0.174 0.462 8.335 5.645 2.691 1.613 6.897 2.577 4.321 3.893 7.438 6.833 0.605 3.466 
 (-0.09) (-0.12) (0.06) (0.11) (1.11) (0.76) (1) (0.33) (0.91) (0.39) (1.14) (0.78) (0.91) (0.96) (0.16) (0.69) 
                 
Lending interest rate 7.246 7.104 0.142 1.222 -1.130 0.159 -1.289 0.756 -0.457 3.035 -3.492 -1.165 -1.100 -1.112 0.013 -1.700 
 (0.91) (1) (0.04) (0.28) (-0.17) (0.02) (-0.52) (0.19) (-0.07) (0.54) (-1.02) (-0.28) (-0.17) (-0.2) (0) (-0.4) 
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Variable With all IB variables IB Quantity IB Size IB Profitability 
95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 95th-5th 95th-50th 50th-5th 75th-25th 
English  -1.083 -1.071 -0.013 -0.151 -2.954** -2.514** -0.439 -1.127 -2.072 -1.644 -0.428 -1.075 -2.795*** -2.665** -0.130 -1.333 
 (-0.83) (-0.94) (-0.03) (-0.21) (-2.39) (-2.16) (-0.9) (-1.36) (-1.55) (-1.39) (-0.68) (-1.18) (-2.65) (-2.5) (-0.2) (-1.68) 
                 
French  0.152 0.382 -0.230 0.386 -0.963 -0.576 -0.387 -0.229 -0.599 0.132 -0.731 -0.281 -0.844 -0.536 -0.308 -0.330 
 (0.16) (0.43) (-0.5) (0.65) (-0.93) (-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.32) (-0.52) (0.12) (-1.15) (-0.32) (-0.77) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.41) 
                 
East Asia & Pacific 0.476 0.367 0.110 0.124 1.161 1.086 0.075 0.569 0.931 0.899 0.032 0.651 1.581** 1.590* -0.009 0.922* 
 (0.57) (0.47) (0.38) (0.26) (1) (1.04) (0.22) (0.86) (1.09) (1.13) (0.08) (1.17) (2) (1.88) (-0.02) (1.82) 
                 
Europe & Central Asia -1.542 -1.836* 0.294 -0.740 -2.265* -2.031* -0.234 -0.916 -1.900 -1.948* 0.048 -0.944 -1.855* -2.049** 0.193 -0.930 
 (-1.32) (-1.83) (0.69) (-1.15) (-1.85) (-1.95) (-0.51) (-1.2) (-1.65) (-1.94) (0.09) (-1.27) (-1.8) (-2.08) (0.34) (-1.37) 
                 
Middle East & North Africa -1.379 -1.681 0.302 -0.731 -0.584 -0.886 0.301 -0.376 -0.829 -1.333 0.505 -0.253 -0.456 -0.826 0.369 -0.247 
 (-1.14) (-1.57) (0.65) (-1.07) (-0.46) (-0.81) (0.69) (-0.49) (-0.63) (-1.16) (0.8) (-0.31) (-0.37) (-0.71) (0.65) (-0.34) 
                 
South Asia 0.142 0.130 0.012 -0.047 0.518 0.353 0.165 0.198 1.196 0.918 0.278 1.096** 1.480** 1.135 0.345 1.122** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.04) (-0.13) (0.62) (0.51) (0.55) (0.41) (1.56) (1.27) (0.58) (2.03) (2.11) (1.6) (0.93) (2.34) 
                 
CONSTANT 2.963 3.014 -0.050 2.384 2.987 2.919 0.068 1.356 4.233 4.772 -0.540 2.326 3.280 3.947 -0.667 2.769 
 (0.74) (0.84) (-0.04) (1.03) (0.64) (0.69) (0.04) (0.45) (0.92) (1.19) (-0.27) (0.81) (0.77) (1.03) (-0.38) (1.09) 
                 
Pseudo R2 0.8060 0.8060 0.6112 0.5908 0.7877 0.7877 0.5357 0.5626 0.7921 0.7921 0.4401 0.5483 0.7855 0.7855 0.4368 0.5454 
 
The sub sample consists 100 country-year observations (i.e., 20 countries with Islamic banking presence, with year observations from 2007 to 2011). The dependent variable is the country‘s cumulative index of financial inclusion (CIFI), 
calculated based on formula initiated by Sarma (2008, 2010). IB quantity is defined as total number of Islamic banks divided by total number of banks in the banking system. IB size is the average of natural logarithm of total assets of 
Islamic banks. IB profitability is the average of profit before tax (and zakat) divided by total assets of the Islamic bank. GDP is the natural logarithm of the country‘s value of GDP per capita (i.e., GDP in US dollars at market exchange 
rates divided by total population). Governance is an index of the average score of six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) 
which higher score correspond to better governance. Legal rights is an index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending, where scored on a 0–10 scale, with scores increasing with legal rights. Credit 
information is an index, scored on zero to six scale; scores increasing with availability of credit information. Cost contracts is total enforcement cost, including legal fees, assessment, and court fees expressed as a percentage of total debt. 
Banking restriction is an index capturing government‘s control, regulations, and involvement in financial sector, where higher values indicate more banking restrictions. Paved road is paved roads (in km) per square km of land area and 
per 1000 population. Phone is logarithm of the number of telephone (land line and mobile) subscription per 1000 population. Internet is number of internet users per 1000. Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar 
banks for demand, time or savings deposits. Lending interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector, where this rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness 
of borrowers and objectives of financing. English is where a country legal system is of British Common Law origin. French is where a country legal system is of French Civil Law origin. German is where a country legal system is of 
German Civil Law origin. Socialist is where a country legal system is Socialist origin. Scandinavian is where a country legal system is of Scandinavian Civil Law origin. Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America 
& Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa and South Asia are the classification of geographic regions based on World Bank. All regressions include year dummies, i.e., for 2007 to 2010 (not reported). Bootstrapped standard errors are 
used (not reported) and they were obtained using 1,000 bootstrap replications. t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
